(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the learned trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants and its determination that plaintiff insurance company is obligated to defend and provide coverage for the claims presented in the underlying action.
Exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are strictly construed in favor of the insured. The question is whether a person acting in self-defense *691intends or expects the consequences of his action within the meaning of the exclusionary provision. I do not find the authority relied on by the majority involving a guilty plea in a criminal case inapposite. Also, in the case involving a mentally ill insured, Auto-Owners Ins Co v Churchman, 440 Mich 560; 489 NW2d 431 (1992), where the policy language was identical to the language of the exclusion in the present case, the decision did not address the issue in point here.
Although Michigan has not specifically addressed the issue presented in this case, other jurisdictions have held that an injury resulting from an act committed by an insured in self-defense is not an expected or intended act. In Transamerica Ins Group v Meere, 143 Ariz 351, 356; 694 P2d 181 (1984), and Allstate Ins Co v Novak, 210 Neb 184, 192-193; 313 NW2d 636 (1981), the Arizona and Nebraska Supreme Court, respectively, held that an injury resulting from an act committed by an insured in self-defense is not an expected or intended act within the meaning of the intentional injury exclusion. These cases were cited with approval by Justice Levin in his concurring/ dissenting opinion in Allstate Ins Co v Freeman, 432 Mich 656; 443 NW2d 734 (1989). In Freeman, the Supreme Court was asked to construe the identical exclusionary clause at issue in this case. Although the question whether an insurer has a duty to defend an insured where the insured acted in self-defense despite policy language excluding injury caused by an intentional act was not addressed in Freeman, Justice Levin quoted from the Meere and Novak decisions:
"[T]he provision [the exception from coverage] is designed to prevent an insured from acting wrongfully with the security of knowing that his insur*692anee company will 'pay the piper’ for the damages. That design is not served by interpreting the provision to exclude coverage in self-defense situations where the insured is not acting by conscious design but is attempting to avoid a 'calamity’ which has befallen him.
"[T]here is evidence from which the finder of fact may decide that Meere was confronted with a risk over which he had little control. His blow may not have been the result of a cognitive process, and his action may not have been 'voluntary.’ Although his act was intentional, and its natural consequence was to cause injury, his basic desire or purpose may not have been to injure. . . .
"Substantial authority supports such an analysis. The Nebraska Supreme Court, after analyzing a number of cases concluded:
" 'The cases, as evidenced by those already cited, point out that when one acts in self-defense the actor is not generally acting for the purpose of intending any injury to another but, rather, is acting for the purpose of attempting to prevent injury to himself. It can easily be said that such act, though resulting in bodily injury to another, was neither expected nor intended within the terms of the policy .... An injury resulting from an act committed by an insured in self-defense is not, as a matter of law, an expected or intended act . . . [.]’ Allstate Insurance Company v Novak, 210 Neb 184, 192-193; 313 NW2d 636, 640-41 (1981); see also Patrons-Oxford Mutual Insurance Co v Dodge [426 A2d 888 (Me, 1981)]; Farmers Insurance Exchange v Sipple, 255 NW2d 373 (Minn, 1977); Hanover Insurance Group v Cameron, 122 NJ Super 51; 298 A2d 715 (1973).” [Freeman, supra at 759-760.]
The reasoning contained in Meere and Novak is persuasive. The intentional injury exclusion is designed to prevent an insured from acting wrong*693fully with the security of knowing that his insurance company will cover the damages. Here, Harrington, in shooting Tew, was not acting wrongfully. He was acting in the defense of himself or his family. Therefore, a holding that coverage is excluded under these circumstances would not further the purpose of the intentional injury exclusion. Furthermore, as the Nebraska Supreme Court noted, when a person acts in self-defense he is not generally acting for the purpose of intending to injure another but, rather, for the purpose of attempting to prevent injury to himself. Novak, supra.
I would affirm.