concurring:
I concur to address the dissent, which is both hypocritical and misleading.
The fact that I owned a bar-restaurant in Las Vegas has been public knowledge since I joined this court seven years ago. The business has been listed in my yearly disclosure statement filed at the court, and I have talked many times with Justices Steffen and Springer about the bar and my attempts to sell it. When I voted at conference on this case and on Hinegardner v. Marcor Resorts, 108 Nev. 1091, 844 P.2d 800 (1992), neither Justice Steffen nor Justice Springer made a whimper of any concern — as a judge is required to do if he or she observes what he or she believes is improper conduct by a fellow judge. See Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct, § 3D(1). If there was an authentic objection, it should have been voiced at that time.
Justices Steffen and Springer also express concern with my participation in this motion to disqualify, but they did the very same thing in the Whitehead case in which they were extremely interested. Whitehead v. Comm’n on Jud. Discipline, 110 Nev. 380, 422-29, 873 P.2d 946, 972-77 (1994) (Whitehead II). The Attorney General filed a motion to disqualify Justices Steffen and Springer, claiming that they had a disqualifying personal and financial interest because of a letter written by the justices’ attorney to the Las Vegas Review-Journal. As the majority explains, Justices Steffen and Springer participated in the dismissal of the motion to disqualify lodged against them, stating that not every motion for disqualification “rises to the level of a statutory ‘charge,’ which automatically calls for a formal hearing before unchallenged justices.” Id. at 429, 873 P.2d at 976.
This case presents the same situation as in Whitehead II, but this time the motion is filed against me, and Justices Steffen and Springer now want to change the rules. What is good for the goose should be good for the gander.
In the dissents, Chief Justice Steffen and Justice Springer claim that they did not vote on their own disqualification, but one need only review pages 422-30 of the Whitehead II decision to see that Justices Steffen and Springer clearly considered the motion to disqualify them, determined that they could participate and then denied the challenge. Id. at 422-30, 873 P.2d at 972-77. *580The concurrence signatures of Justices Steffen and Springer appear on page 430. The Justices’ statements that they did not vote on their own disqualification are a reflection of the accuracy of many of the statements in their dissents.
When a judge is charged with a disqualifying interest, it must be established that the interest is a direct substantial ongoing financial or personal interest, and Snyder has totally failed to do that. A decision adverse to Viani’s tavern would not have affected me personally or financially. At the time of the decision, my business had been sold, and the transfer was awaiting gaming board and commission approval. It was also subject to the control of the United States Bankruptcy Court. When I voted in the Viani case, there was no direct ongoing interest for me with my bar business. The dissent seems to acknowledge this, but states that it is possible that I will retake the bar business if not paid the remaining sales price. This is rank speculation; and if this remote eventuality occurred, I would simply resell the property.
Not being able to establish a disqualifying ongoing direct interest when the Viani case was decided, the dissent refers back to the 1992 Hinegardner decision and claims I improperly voted on that case. That vote is not the subject of the motion to disqualify, and the dissent’s criticism also misses the mark in claiming that the Hinegardner decision lessened my insurance costs. I have always carried full high limits insurance coverage, including a one million dollar personal liability insurance umbrella. My insurance costs would have remained the same with or without a dram shop act. However, this may not be true for other taverns or casinos.
The letter written by my bar manager and three of his bar manager/owner friends was an action taken independent of my campaign for reelection. I wrote no part of the letter, did not approve it in advance, and only gave three case citations which that constituency might have approved. I have always thought that a judge could refer to his record in a campaign and that he was not responsible for the statements and actions of third parties. The dissent states that this letter was “on behalf of the campaign,” and that is simply false. It also claims that I fulfilled a campaign promise made in this letter in voting on the underlying case, but any promise made in the letter by the bar owners/ managers was not a promise made by me, and I certainly did not feel bound by the letter.
I participate in the motion to disqualify me because, as a matter of law, the motion was not timely filed and does not establish “fraud or like illegal conduct” on my part, as is required by NRAP 35. Even before the stringent requirements of NRAP 35 had been promulgated, Justices Steffen and Springer decided *581that a motion to disqualify former Justice Elmer Gunderson was not timely filed because prior to the court decision information had been in the newspapers about Gunderson’s asserted disqualifying interests. Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 105 Nev. 237, 774 P.2d 1003 (1989). They also decided that although Gunderson’s own attorney, Laura FitzSimmons, was an attorney in the Ainsworth case, this was not a sufficient outside interest to merit disqualification of Gunderson. When you combine the Ainsworth decision with the Whitehead II decision, where Justices Springer and Steffen participated in dismissing the disqualification motion filed against them, and with NRAP 35, it is clear that, as a matter of law, the motion to disqualify me is not timely and is legally insufficient. I am using the same rules and reasoning Justices Steffen and Springer used to reject disqualification attempts filed against them and former Justice Elmer Gunderson.
As a final point, it certainly appears that the dissent is motivated more by continuing animosity towards me rather than any reasonable belief that Snyder has any chance of taking her case to trial for the estate of a drunk driver who killed four people. For decades the law in Nevada has been that no such action lies because this court will not judicially enact a dram shop law. In 1995, the Legislature passed a law stating unequivocally that such actions will not lie against a purveyor of alcoholic beverages. NRS 41.1305. Since the law of this state is very clear that an action such as Snyder asserts will not be entertained by the courts, I can only think that the dissents’ motivation is again to criticize and embarrass me.