(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree that the trial court, acting in place of the arbitrators, did not err in awarding interest as an element of damages. I also agree that compounding interest as an element of damages was error. However, I would not, on this record, approve the use of the twelve percent figure found in MCL 600.6013(4); MSA 27A.6013, but would remand to the trial court for reconsideration and a statement of reasons for the choice of a rate.
The trial court apparently concluded it was proper to apply the twelve percent compound rate set forth in MCL 600.6013(4); MSA 27A.6013, applicable to complaints filed between June 1, 1980, and January 1, 1987. While I agree that the trial court, acting in place of the arbitrators, was not bound to apply the five percent rate approved in Vannoy v City of Warren, 26 Mich App 283; 182 NW2d 65 (1970), I conclude that the court was obliged to impose a rate designed to allow "full compensation” to plaintiffs, but not punish defendant. See Banish v Hamtramck, 9 Mich App 381, 399-400; 157 NW2d 445 (1968). Under the circumstances that (1) the prime interest rate between May 21, 1985 — the day after the accident — and September 16, 1987 — the date the complaint was filed — fluctuated between a low of 7.5 percent and high of 10 percent,1 and (2) the analogous provision of MCL 600.6013(5); MSA 27A.6013(5) applicable to complaints filed after January 1, 1987,2 provided for a rate lower than twelve percent, I believe *623remand for reconsideration and explanation is necessary.
Next, I agree that the arbitration in this case was pursuant to the contract between the parties, as in Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488; 475 NW2d 704 (1991), and not a decision to pursue alternative dispute resolution made in the context of a civil action, as in Old Orchard By the Bay Associates v Hamilton Mutual Ins Co, 434 Mich 244; 454 NW2d 73 (1990). Therefore, I agree that the filing of the complaint in 1987 did not enlarge plaintiffs’ right to statutory interest under MCL 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013. Nor, however, did it restrict plaintiffs’ right to interest as an element of damages. Therefore, I would hold that the trial court, having determined that interest as an element of damages is appropriate under the circumstances, should have awarded simple interest as damages from May 20, 1985, to the date of the arbitration award, July 25, 1989, and not merely to the date of the complaint.
Finally, I agree with the majority regarding the calculation of interest from the date of the award to the date of judgment and payment thereafter.3
The record contains a printout of interest rates during the period in question, supplied as an appendix to one of plaintiffs’ briefs regarding the interest issue.
The period for which interest was awarded as an element of damages spanned beyond the January 1, 1987, date.
I observe that while it might appear inconsistent that plaintiffs be permitted a rate in excess of five percent from the date of injury to the date of the award, and again from the date of the motion to confirm the award to the date of payment, but only five percent from the date of the award to the date of the motion, this is due to the fact that the court, and not the arbitrators, was assigned the task of awarding interest as an element of damages. Normally, the rate of interest used when computing interest as an element of damages is unknown because the arbitration award is not rendered in such specific terms.