I respectfully dissent.
I agree with the City of Lawton that the exclusionary rule does not apply to this administrative personnel proceeding.
V
Leonard Turner was dismissed from the Lawton Fire Department when amphetamine, a controlled substance, was found in his residence by police executing a search warrant.
He was charged with possession of cocaine, with intent to distribute. While the criminal charges were pending, Turner pursued an appeal of his dismissal to the Personnel Board and was given a full hearing. The City presented evidence of the amphetamine to justify his dismissal. The Board affirmed the termination of his employment.
Subsequently, in the criminal case, the trial court held the affidavit was insufficient. The search warrant was set aside, the evidence suppressed and the criminal charge dismissed.
It was then that Turner sought reinstatement from the district court and review of that administrative decision, contending it was based on an illegal search which violated his constitutional rights.
The trial court agreed with him and found his dismissal improper. The Court of Appeals, in what I believe to be a well reasoned opinion, reversed the trial court, 56 OBJ 535. The Court of Appeals adopted *383the rationale of the Second Circuit in Tirado v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 689 F.2d 307, (2nd Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014, 103 S.Ct. 1256, 75 L.Ed.2d 484 (1983), wherein that court established guidelines for the application of the balance of interests tests fashioned by the Supreme Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed 2d 561 (1974); and United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 49 L.Ed 2d 1046 (1976).
That analysis first seeks to determine the motivation of the officers who seized the evidence and examine whether their interests are related to the civil proceeding. This approach best serves society by excluding reliable and relevant evidence only when necessary to protect the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Here there is no close relationship between the search by police and subsequent use of the evidence by the city and personnel board. Those proceedings are too remote from the primary interests served by officers seizing the drugs, and there is no evidence of collusion between police and city officials.
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter future police misconduct. That purpose is clearly not served by excluding this evidence, and society’s interest in maintaining levels of integrity and fitness of its public servants far outweighs any possible interest protected.
I do not believe that allowing the illegally seized evidence in the administrative proceeding violated either the Fourth Amendment or Article 2, Section 30, of pur Constitution.
I am authorized to state that Justices HODGES and Justice SUMMERS join in this dissent.