(concurring)— I concur in the result. The majority, at page 851, states that "[t]he planned presence of a weapon necessary to facilitate a killing" is adequate evidence to allow the issue of premeditation to go to the jury. The majority poses the issue as being whether under the evidence no trier of fact could find premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority distinguishes State v. Bingham, 105 Wn.2d 820, 719 P.2d 109 (1986) by stating that (1) Bingham involved one continuous act while Ollens involves stabbings and a final throat slashing; (2) the strangulation used in Bingham did not involve the procurement of a weapon, while the stabbing in Ollens does; (3) the jury could have found that Ollens struck the defendant from behind as evidence of premeditation; and (4) the jury in Ollens could find a motive which would eliminate speculation as to the existence of premeditation. The majority then concludes that it is the function of the jury to determine whether Ollens "deliberated, formed and reflected upon the intent to take Tyler's life in order to effectuate the robbery." Majority, at 853.
Premeditated means thought over beforehand. When a person, after any deliberation, forms an intent to take human life, the killing may follow immediately after the formation of the settled purpose and it will still be premeditated. Premeditation must involve more than a moment in point of time. The law requires some time, however long or short, in which a design to kill is deliberately formed.
WPIC 26.01.
When the four justifications for finding sufficient evidence for the issue of premeditation to go to the jury set forth in the majority are compared with Bingham, we find: (1) both attacks were prolonged, continued for an appreciable period of time and concluded with the death of the vie-*855tim; (2) the absence of a weapon in Bingham is more than compensated for by the physical advantage of a man over a retarded female. I recognize that the procurement of a knife is a conscious act, but when a person habitually carries a knife as a tool this may not be evidence of premeditation, while, on the other hand, the physically powerful man who can kill a smaller woman at will without a weapon may well have premeditated. Is the evidence of the first fact evidence of premeditation and of the latter fact not for consideration by a jury on the question of premeditation? I submit the presence of the knife in the first situation might not prove premeditation, while evidence of a dominant, physically strong man with a motive to kill to silence a potential witness reflects a situation which could establish premeditation. I submit that in either situation the evaluation of the totality of the evidence in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances is for the jury. (3) The jury in Ollens, because it could have found that the defendant struck the victim from behind, is permitted to find that this was evidence of premeditation. The jury in Bingham had before it the conclusive evidence that the defendant had violently raped and then strangled his victim. This latter fact is surely as probative as speculation as to which stab wound was inflicted first and from what direction. (4) While the jury in Ollens is permitted to find a motive ("could find") to eliminate speculation as to premeditation, the jury in Bingham had before it as strong a reason to find a motive from the evidence as exists in this case.
I do not concur for the purpose of rehashing the result in Bingham; I concur to point out that no basis exists to make homicide by strangulation an isolated crime where premeditation cannot be proven. The majority's rationale forces this conclusion when only the defendant and the victim were present in a one-on-one situation, yet allows proof of premeditation in a one-on-one situation when a weapon is present. Sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation to allow the issue to go to the jury is present in this case, and I submit the evidence was sufficient to pass that test in the *856Bingham circumstances.
The only question for this court is whether we can evaluate from the record the sufficiency of the evidence to take the question to the jury.
As stated by the court in both State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) and State v. Bingham, supra at 823, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979), the standard for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements . . . beyond a reasonable doubt."
The decision of the majority in this case does not violate that standard of review, while the decision in Bingham does. A special area has been carved out and removed from jury consideration. This is a dangerous precedent and it is for this reason that I concur in the result.
Andersen and Durham, JJ., concur with Callow, J.