(dissenting). As the majority opinion indicates, continuing problems with Hughes's car — purchased in January 1990 for $14,440 — caused him to write to Chrysler on June 19,1991, demanding that it be replaced without cost. And even though Chrysler, acknowledging that the car did not conform to its warranty, offered to replace it on August 23, 1991 — admittedly, some thirty-five days beyond the thirty-day deadline contained in the "lemon law" — Hughes recovered $32,000 in damages, and his attorney received approximately $35,000 in fees. Chrysler, whose only "bad act" was its delay in agreeing to Hughes's demand — much of which was the result of Hughes's attorney's refusal to return the company's telephone calls while he was busy preparing the complaint in this action — is out $74,000.1 do not share the majority's belief that such a result is mandated by the statute.
It is instructive, I think, to consider a more detailed chronology of these events. As indicated, *22Hughes purchased the car in January 1990, and persistent transmission problems caused him to seek legal advice in mid-1991, which resulted in the June 19, 1991, letter to Chrysler. On July 29, 1991, ten days after expiration of the statutory deadline, Hughes's counsel telephoned a Chrysler service official, who requested a copy of the June 19 letter. A copy was sent on August 2 and, upon its receipt, Chrysler attempted to contact Hughes's attorney, placing calls to him on August 8, August 13, August 15, and August 21. Although messages were left in each instance, Hughes's attorney did not return any of the calls and, during this time, began drafting a complaint against Chrysler. On August 22, Hughes's attorney finally returned Chrysler's calls and, upon learning that the company was acknowledging the defects in the car and agreeing in full to his replacement demand, rejected the offer, telling Chrysler he had already filed the action.
Hughes's attorney proceeded with discovery and Chrysler eventually agreed to stipulate to its violation of the lemon law, leaving only questions of the amount of Hughes's pecuniary damages and attorney fees for decision by the court. Hughes's attorney never responded to the proffered stipulation, but instead sought to enforce his discovery requests. At the hearing on the discovery motions, the trial court, learning of Chrysler's offer, directed counsel to reduce it to writing. This was done and the agreement was eventually signed.
Hughes moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion. The court awarded Hughes double damages under the statute, leaving his claim for attorney fees — ultimately for 248 hours of work billed by his lawyer — for resolution. Eventually, *23the trial court allowed the claim for attorney fees in its entirety, deducting only 1.6 hours from the total request.
Where the manufacturer violates the lemon law by, among other things, failing to comply with the time deadlines, § 218.015(7), Stats., gives the consumer a cause of action for "damages caused by [the] violation," and goes on to describe those damages as "twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees . . .." (Emphasis added.)
To me, the result in this case goes well beyond both the language and the underlying purpose of the statute — both in the damages awarded to Hughes and the fees awarded to his attorney.1 The statute does not exist to punish automobile dealers, or to enrich lawyers, but to "rectify the problem a new car buyer has when that new vehicle is a 'lemon.'" Nick v. Toyota Motor Sales, 160 Wis. 2d 373, 381, 466 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Ct. App. 1991). Plainly, it entitles the purchaser of a "lemon" to recover double the damages "caused by" the manufacturer's violation of the thirty-day refund requirements of the law. But I fail to see how Chrysler's violation — a thirty-five-day delay in agreeing in full to Hughes's demand for a new car — "caused" Hughes damages in the sum of the full value of the car plus more than six forty-hour weeks of his attorney's time at $135 per hour.
*24I agree with Chrysler that, reading the statute, we are to "look to [its] commonsense meaning ... to avoid unreasonable . . . results." Sonnenburg v. Grohskopf, 144 Wis. 2d 62, 66, 422 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Ct. App. 1988). In my opinion, the only damages caused by the violation were the expenses Hughes incurred up to the time Chrysler acknowledged the defect and offered to replace the car: his attorney fees and other expenses up to that point, doubled under the statute, and, of course, either replacement of the car or a refund of what he paid for it. Because I would reverse and remand for the trial court to determine damages within those limits, I respectfully dissent.
In my opinion, Chrysler has made a good case that the trial court exceeded its discretion in awarding some $35,000 in fees to Hughes's attorney. Because, as indicated below, I would limit Hughes's damages to the fees and expenses he incurred only up to the point Chrysler acceded to his demand for a replacement car, it is unnecessary to discuss my disagreement with the trial court's decision on the fees.