dissenting. I dissent upon the ground that the grantor in the deed to' the Board of Education of Franklin County retained an alienable interest, enjoyable at the time the premises ceased to be used for school purposes. While I agree with the statement in the majority opinion that the plaintiff in ejectment must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of the defendant’s title (Code *126§ 33-101), and upon a proper test of a later deed in the plaintiff’s chain of title, in which certain lands were not deeded, having been previously cut off from the property and “deeded to the Board of Education of Bold Springs School, subject to the conditions in said school house deed,” the result might be the failure of plaintiff’s title to said property here in question — yet the majority opinion does not deal with any question other than the failure in the first link in plaintiff’s chain of title, and for this reason I dissent from the language used in the opinion and from the judgment of reversal based thereon.