concurring in result.
The trial court’s order granting Central Power possession of the property before a jury determined the damages, effectively created a form of “quick-take” eminent domain authority without benefit of law and without benefit of immediate review.
Quick take authority is given by our State Constitution only to the “state or any of its departments, agencies or political subdivi-sions_” Art. I, § 16, N.D. Const. Even then, the quick take authority is not a self-executing grant but must be authorized by the Legislature. Johnson v. Wells County Water Resource Bd., 410 N.W.2d 525 (N.D.1987). Central Power is not, of course, the State, a state department, agency or political subdivision, nor has the Legislature — nor could it — authorize Central Power to exercise quick take authority.
Here there was a court hearing as to the necessity for the taking, and in that respect this procedure differs from a quick take procedure. But the Constitution also specifies that no right of way shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation “until full compensation therefor be first made in money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner,” and, most significantly, requires that the “Compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived.”
Here, contrary to the Constitution, compensation, as determined by Central Power, not by a jury, was paid into court, and Central Power was permitted to take possession of the property “pending determination of actual damages by a jury.”
Adding insult to injury, Central Power, while using C-K’s property, moved to dismiss C-K’s appeal from the order granting partial summary judgment on the issue of necessity and permitting Central Power to have possession of the property, relying on City of Williston v. Beede, 289 N.W.2d 235 (N.D.1980), and sought attorney fees for its motion. Although we concluded in City of Williston that the issue of necessity and damages could not be bifurcated for purposes of appeal, there was one essential difference in that case. The condemnor had not been given possession of the property subsequent to the determination of the necessity for the taking but prior to the determination of damages. The landowner took the appeal subsequent to the decision of necessity and the trial court stayed the determination of damages pending the appeal of the necessity *717determination. We exercised supervisory jurisdiction at the request of the City, lifted the stay and directed that the trial court proceed forthwith to determine damages.
In concluding that the issue of necessity and the issue of damages should not be bifurcated for purposes of appeal, it is apparent that we did not contemplate a procedure in the trial court that would violate the Constitution by permitting the condemnor to take the property before the damages have been ascertained by a jury. Here, notwithstanding that the procedure is clearly contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, the majority concludes that the issue of necessity for the taking cannot be determined on appeal because the damages are yet to be ascertained.
The majority relies on the evolution of our application of Rule 54(b) NDRCivP, to the appeal process. I have been an advocate of that development. See, e.g., Gillan v. Saffell, 395 N.W.2d 148 (N.D.1986). I do not shy away from that development. However, the safety net in using Rule 54(b) to restrict the number of appeals has been the use of our supervisory authority in a given case in which the result of denying immediate review by appeal is so prejudicial that to deny review would create a substantial injustice. E.g., B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D.1993). Because I believe the procedure1 sought by Central Power and approved by the trial court is so contrary to that required to unilaterally obtain a person’s property without that person’s consent, I would ordinarily urge that we exercise our supervisory jurisdiction to either immediately review the issue of the necessity for the taking or order Central Power to remove its transmission lines until compensation has been determined by a jury and paid into court.
But, despite what was an obviously improper acquisition of the property, C-K, as the majority opinion notes, did not request this court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction, which can be done expeditiously. Rather, C-K pursued the ordinary route of appeal with its attendant time intervals for preparing a transcript and briefing, thus allowing time for the transmission line to be built. Although C-K argues that the continued presence of the transmission line damages its business, and perhaps its employees and customers, that argument should have prompted C-K to ask this court to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction rather than to file an appeal. City of Williston, supra, juxtaposed with the cases cited by the majority concerning our application of Rule 54(b) for determining the appealability of eminent domain cases, after a finding of use and necessity but prior to a determination of damages, clearly set forth the appropriate path to seek immediate relief from this Court. The most severe damage suffered by C-K’s failure to do so may well be to Central Power should this Court on appeal from the final judgement in this matter reverse the finding of necessity made by the trial court.
I am persuaded by the majority opinion that under these circumstances we should not exercise our supervisory jurisdiction and I therefore concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.
. The procedure used by Central Power — and approved by the trial court — to obtain possession of the property before the damages were ascertained by a jury and paid into court and the procedure to appeal the trial court's order are the crux of the issue before us. The substantive issues of whether or not there was a necessity for the taking and whether or not the sum deposited by Central Power ultimately proves adequate compensation are immaterial at this juncture. It is not the prerogative of Central Power or the trial court to ascertain damages. It is for the jury. Until the jury has determined the damages and that amount is paid into court, Central Power is not entitled to possession of the property.