(dissenting).
I regret that I find myself in disagreement with some of the views expressed, and with the conclusion reached in the leading opinion.
Respondent based his complaint on fraud and deceit, seeking damages, actual and punitive, in the amount of $25,000-.00. The trial judge held that fraud was not inferable from the evidence, eliminated the claim for punitive damages, granted the motion of the respondent for direction of the verdict in his favor for the amount of the actual cash value of the two pieces of equipment (less $250.00 deductible as to each, and less the admitted salvage value, and plus interest) , and submitted for the jury’s determination the question of the amount of the actual cash value. From these rulings no appeal was taken by the respondent.
The issue here involved is simply this: Was the amount of the insured’s recovery controlled by the provisions of Coverage B, Collision or Upset, as shown on the face of the policy, or by the terms of the endorsement attached to the policy as a part of it at the time of its delivery, which expressly amended those provisions?
*617Where the language of an insurance contract is free of doubt, it must be given effect. Resort to rules of construction in such case is neither necessary nor proper, for the meaning of the contract is ascertainable from its express and unambiguous words. “The judicial function of a court of law is to enforce an insurance contract as made by the parties, and not to re-write or to distort, under the guise of judicial construction, contracts, the terms of which are plain and unambiguous.” Newell & Co. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 199 S. C. 325, 19 S. E. (2d) 463, 466.
In the case at bar the amount of collision coverage provided for on page one of the policy is plainly stated to be “actual cash value less $250.00”. The endorsement attached to the policy, bearing the same date as the policy, and delivered with it, as plainly states that the amount of insurance provided under the policy for “Coverage B-l, Collision or Upset”, subject to the deductible amount shown on the policy, is limited to “the stated amount of insurance for other coverages.” The other coverages, as shown in the policy, were “Fire, Lightning and Transportation”, “Theft (Broad Form)”, and “Windstorm, Hail, Earthquake or Explosion”; and the amount of such coverage in each case was stated to be $2,000.00. There is no ambiguity here. The endorsement, in plain language, limits the “Collision or Upset” coverage to $2,000.00, less the deductible $250.00 shown on the policy. It is true, as respondent argues, that to have been strictly accurate the endorsement should have referred to that coverage as “B”, not “B-l”; but the variance was, in the opinion of the trial judge, as it is in mine, immaterial and insufficient to render the meaning of the endorsement ambiguous.
The policy, together with its endorsements, constituted the contract between the parties. Foster v. Canal Insurance Co., 227 S. C. 322, 88 S. E. (2d) 59. Cf. Brown v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 233 S. C. 376, 104 S. E. (2d) 673. The usual purpose of an endorsement is to enlarge, restrict, particularize or otherwise modify some provision of the pol*618icy; and it is well settled that the provisions of the endorsement supersede those of the policy with which they are in irreconcilable conflict. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 13, Section 7537; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Section 256; 44 C. J. S., Insurance, § 300; McIntosh v. Whieldon, 205 S. C. 119, 30 S. E. (2d) 851; Jackson v. British America Assurance Co., 1895, 106 Mich. 47, 63 N. W. 899, 30 A. L. R. 636; Wyatt v. Wyatt, 1953, 239 Minn. 434, 58 N. W. (2d) 873; Prather v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 1949, 2 N. J. 496, 67 A. (2d) 135; Konrad v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 1956, 11 Ill. App. (2d) 503, 137 N. E. (2d) 855. It is to be noted, in passing, that to this rule there is an exception, applicable in the construction of contracts generally, that where a contract is partly printed and partly written, the written provision will prevail over the printed one in case of irreconcilable conflict between them. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. 13, Section 7522; 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, Section 253; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Sections 255, 256. But the exception is of no help to the respondent’s case here, for the collision coverage in the policy itself for “Actual Cash Value less $250-.00” is printed, except for the figure $250.00, which is typewritten, and that figure is expressly given effect in the endorsement, which appears to be printed except for typed-in date, place of issue, policy number and name of insured.
The trial judge based his denial of appellant’s motion upon the ground that the endorsement was ineffectual because without consideration. I fully agree that this ruling was erroneous. There was but one contract, consisting, as before stated, of the policy and its endorsements; the consideration was the total premium stipulated.
There is no merit in the suggestion that the endorsement limiting the amount of recovery under the collision coverage should be ignored because the premium for that reduced coverage was based upon the cost of the equipment when new and was in the same amount that would have been charged had the coverage been for actual cash value less *619$250.00. The testimony is undisputed that under the standard manual of rates as determined by the National Automobile Underwriters’ Association and filed with and approved by the South Carolina Insurance Commission the rate for collision coverage of long-haul vehicles, such as those here involved, is calculated on cost new regardless of the actual or stated value at the time of coverage; and that the amount of the premium for such coverage is the same whether the coverage is for actual cash value less $250.00 or for a smaller stated amount. It is undisputed that the premium for such coverage here was properly computed in accordance with the prescribed rating manual. It further appears, without contradiction, that the premium for coverage against “Fire, Lightning and Transportation”, “Theft (Broad Form)”, and “Windstorm, Hail, Earthquake or Explosion”, is based not upon cost new but upon the stated amount of such coverage. It would thus appear that had the respondent taken coverage of the vehicles against fire, theft and windstorm in the amount of actual cash value or in any amount higher than the stated amount of $2,000.00, paying the additional premium for such higher coverage, he would, under the endorsement, have obtained coverage against collision or upset up to the stated amount of the other coverages, without additional premium for the higher collision coverage. It is at least arguable that a contract requiring for collision coverage the same premium whether such coverage be for actual cash value less $250.00 or for the lower stated amount of other coverage, is harsh and inequitable. But that is a matter beyond the proper scope of our inquiry. It is for the parties, not this court, to make the contract; our function is to interpret it and, where its provisions are unambiguous, as they are here, to decree its enforcement. McElmurray v. American Fidelity Fire Insurance Co., 236 S. C. 195, 113 S. E. (2d) 528.
I respectfully suggest that the leading opinion strays afield from the single issue before noted, vis.: Was the insured’s recovery for loss resulting from “Collision or Upset” to be *620controlled by the provisions of the “Collision or Upset” coverage stated on the face of the policy, or by the provisions of the endorsement limiting that coverage, subject to the deductible amount shown on the policy, to the Stated Amount of insurance for the other coverages, to wit: $2,-000.00? -
For example, the statement in Item 2 of the Declarations, that the policy period is “Subject to Premium Payment Endorsement Attached,” has nothing whatever to do with the issue here involved. That endorsement was not attached to the policy as presented to this court; but we understand counsel to have conceded in argument that it simply provided that the premium for the policy year should be payable in monthly instalments rather than in one lump sum.
No less irelevant, it seems to me, is the discussion of Paragraphs II, IV (b), and V of the “Insuring Agreements”. As quoted in the leading opinion, the “Insuring Agreements” are prefaced by the express statement that they are “subject to the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions and other terms of this policy”, which of course include the endorsements “attached to and forming a part of” it. Paragraph II of the “Insuring Agreements” relates to reimbursement for loss of use resulting from theft and, as its language plainly states, the liability of the insurer thereunder is limited to $150.00, unless the actual cash value of the automobile at the time of theft was less than that amount. Paragraph IV (b) of the “Insuring Agreements” relates to automatic coverage of newly acquired automobiles at actual cash value instead of the limit of liability stated in the declarations, and following the portion quoted in the leading opinion, goes on to provide that “the insured shall pay any additional premium required because of the application of the insurance to such other automobile.” In other words, under this paragraph of the insuring agreements, a newly acquired automobile would have been covered for its actual cash value against Collision or Upset, Fire, Lightning and Transportation, Theft, Windstorm, Hail, Earthquake or Explosion, and the *621insured'would have had to pay whatever additional premium was properly required for such coverage. And Paragraph V of the “Insuring Agreements” expressly relates only to private passenger automobiles.
By the same token, the quoted policy provisions under the caption “Conditions”, relating to “Insured’s Duties When Loss Occurs”, “Appraisal”, “Limit of Liability”, “Settlement Options”, “No Abandonment”, and “Other Insurance”, are, I think, wholly beside the point.
The endorsement with which we are properly concerned relates only to the amount of coverage against “Collision or Upset”; the sole issue is whether that endorsement prevails over the provision in the face of the policy as to the amount of that coverage. As before stated, there is no ambiguity in either of the two conflicting provisions. The rule seems clear that in such case the endorsement controls.
I cannot follow the suggestion that the endorsement fixes the “Collision or Upset” coverage at the total of the three other coverages, i. e., $6,000.00. The insured valued each of the two pieces of equipment (tractor and trailer) at $2,000-.00 for the lesser hazards of fire, theft and windstorm. That amount, $2,000.00, is the “stated amount” for those coverages, as to each piece of equipment; to construe the endorsement limiting coverage against the greater hazard of- collision or upset as effecting coverage for three times that amount seems hardly logical.
As pointed out in the leading opinion, the policy under review is a standard form of automobile policy, and the endorsement in question was used because the property covered was not an automobile of the kind normally contemplated by such form of policy, but long-haul trucking equipment. It is also true that instead of using an endorsement the insurer could have crossed out, on the face of the policy, the printed words ‘“Actual Cash Value”, and typed in the figure $2,000.00, in the space for “Limits of Liability” for collision or upset. It is also true that the endorsement in question, in*622stead of limiting the coverage for collision or upset to the amount of the other coverages, could have been phrased to state that the amount of such coverage was $2,000.00 less $250.00 deductible. But discussion of what might have been done is hardly a persuasive approach to the solution of the issue here. Our task should be to construe what is written, not to speculate on what might or should have been written.
In my opinion, respondent’s own testimony furnishes no basis for the claim that he was misled. He was neither ignorant nor illiterate; on the contrary, the undisputed evidence reveals him as an experienced businessman; he testified that he made it a practice to read his insurance policies, including their endorsements; that he knew the purpose of endorsements and that they were frequently used to modify the terms of a policy; that endorsements similar to the one in controversy had been attached to policies previously issued to him; and that he had read the endorsement in controversy here, but did not think that it “applied” to his policy. He testified that it was “a little bit confusing”, and that it was “possible” that he did not understand it; but his reasons, according to his testimony, for concluding that he was not bound by it, were as follows: (1) that it referred to coverage “B-l”, when in fact there was no coverage so designated; and (2) that it led him to believe that it was intended to make the collision coverage the total of the other three coverages, or $6,000.00. The lack of material basis for the first of such reasons, and the illogic of the second, have already been pointed out. And since the endorsement was attached to the policy, his suggestion that it “did not apply” to that policy is equally insubstantial.
Respondent submits, as an “Additional Sustaining Ground”, that the trial judge should have submitted to the jury the question of fraud, which had been alleged in the complaint. But this is not a proper “Additional Sustaining Ground”; its acceptance would not lead to the same result that was reached by the trial court. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 233 *623S. C. 129, 103 S. E. (2d) 908; Supreme Court Rule 4, Section 7.
I think that the judgment appealed from should be reversed and the cause remanded for entry of judgment in favor, of respondent in the amount of $3,500.00.
Moss, J., concurs.