dissenting: At the preliminary hearing, Jacobs testified that he was not familiar with the two traffic tickets in question. Jacobs said that he knew Donlay. He also indicated that the signature at the bottom of the citations was not his and that he never received the tickets. Jacobs stated that he first became aware of the tickets when he received a letter in the mail saying that there was a warrant for his arrest.
Trooper Mayfield testified that he had issued the two citations to an individual he had assumed was Jacobs. He identified Donlay in the courtroom as the person to whom he had actually issued the tickets. Mayfield testified that Donlay admitted he had signed the tickets using Jacobs’ name.
The State contends that the basis for the charge was. Donlay’s act of signing Jacobs’ name on the two traffic, tickets. According to the State, Donlay falsely represented himself as Jacobs when he gave Mayfield Jacobs’ name and driver’s license. The State reasons: “In the course of the trooper giving the two (2) tickets to the Defendant, the Defendant committed another act of deception by signing and accepting the two (2) tickets as Matthew J. Jacobs. By the Defendant signing the two (2) tickets, he made Matthew J. Jacobs liable for whatever actions could arise from the prosecution of these traffic offenses. Mr. Jacobs may be liable for the payment of the fine and costs of the traffic tickets, may have his license suspended for not paying the fine and costs, and may be arrested for not appearing in court.” The State believes Donlay was trying to avoid both liability for the tickets and being arrested for operating a vehicle while his license was suspended. I agree. ' ' ■ >
The gist of the offense under K.S.A. 21-3825(d) is the actual or potential harm caused to the person impersonated. See State v. Banks, 14 Kan. App. 2d 393, 394, 790 P.2d 962 (1990).
*139The use of either K.S.A. 8-260(a)(3) or K.S.A. 21-3825(d), as authority for the prosecutor charging Donlay, is at issue in the case at bar. The better view is that the legislature intended a lesser punishment for the simple misuse of a license (K.S.A. 8-260) rather than in the instant situation (where the use produces negative results for a third party as required under the aggravated false impersonation statute, K.S.A. 21-3825[d]). The State acted within its discretion when it charged Donlay under K.S.A. 21-3825(d).
Under K.S.A. 8-2108, a citation is deemed a lawful complaint for the purpose of prosecution when filed. However, K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 22-2202(8) indicates:
“ ‘Complaint’ means a written statement under oath of the essential facts constituting a crime, except that a citation or notice to appear issued by a law enforcement officer pursuant to and in compliance with K.S.A. 8-2106 and amendments thereto or a citation or notice to appear issued pursuant to and in compliancé with K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 32-1049 shall be deemed a valid complaint if it is signed by the law enforcement officer.”
K.S.A. 21-3825(d) prohibits: “[d]oing any other act in the course of a suit, proceeding or prosecution.” The term “in the course of” used in the context of a criminal charge may be broadly construed to include the event of criminal impersonation giving rise to and connected with a prosecution.
I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 21-3825(d). Reason suggests that the impersonation which placed Jacobs at risk constitutes impersonation in the course of a prosecution. The majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 21-3825(d) has narrowed application of that statute to the point of questionable viability. To what set of circumstances does it now apply? Jacobs, who has been impersonated by Donlay, is summoned to court, not Donlay. What impersonating will Donlay do of Jacobs after the complaint is filed in court? Jacobs is the person the State is looking for. Donlay, in his initial performance as Jacobs, successfully eluded the trooper. Realistically, Donlay playing Jacobs will not seek a return engagement.
I acknowledge the concept of strict construction in favor of the accused; however, the facts in the case at bar fit the criminal *140misconduct K.S.A. 21-3825(d) was designed to address. The legislature did not intend the result reached by the majority.
Lockett and Davis, JJ., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.