dissenting.
In my view, the district court committed a significant procedural error by failing to *911recognize the full extent of its sentencing authority. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I
Hayes’s attorney recognized Hayes would be subject to consecutive federal and state sentences if the district court did not order the federal sentence be served concurrently with the yet-to-be-imposed state sentences. Accordingly, at sentencing, counsel asked the district court to order the federal sentence run concurrently. In arguments to the court, counsel referenced the statutory authority which allows district courts to impose such concurrent federal sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). The district court, however, mistakenly concluded it lacked authority to impose a federal sentence which runs concurrent to a yet-to-be-imposed state sentence.
In addition, counsel recognized that designating the sentence to run concurrent with the future state sentences was insufficient to ensure Hayes would actually serve concurrent sentences. Counsel was aware Hayes would be returned to state custody after the federal sentencing, and therefore, unless the court recommended the federal sentence commence immediately, it would not matter whether the court designated it as concurrent or consecutive; the federal sentence would not begin running until the state sentence was served and Hayes was turned over to federal authorities. Thus, the district court would have to order a concurrent sentence and allow Hayes to serve the federal sentence while in state custody. Accordingly, counsel asked the court to recommend 1) Hayes’s federal sentence begin immediately while in state custody awaiting disposition of the state charges, and 2) Hayes be allowed to serve his federal sentence in state prison.
The district court recognized that ordering Hayes’s sentence to begin running immediately — while in state custody — would have the same effect as imposing a concurrent sentence. As noted, the court mistakenly believed it did not have the authority to impose a concurrent sentence and denied counsel’s request, interpreting it as an attempt to circumvent the limitation on the court’s sentencing authority.
The sentencing transcript also demonstrates the district court mistakenly believed it could pass the issue of consecutive versus concurrent sentences onto the state court. In doing so, the district court failed to recognize that if it did not grant counsel’s requests, the federal sentence would not begin to run until Hayes completed his state sentences and was released to federal authorities. Accordingly, even if the state court ordered the state sentences to run concurrently with the federal sentence, the federal sentence could not run while Hayes remained in state custody.
II
We review a district court’s sentence for an abuse of discretion, giving due deference to the district court’s decision. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007); Rita v. United States, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). First, we determine if the district court committed a significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain why a sentence was chosen. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.
If a procedural error is identified, the amount of deference owed the district *912court’s sentence will depend on the type of procedural error asserted on appeal. United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir.2008). For example, a district court abuses its discretion if its sentencing decision was based on a clearly erroneous factual conclusion or an erroneous legal conclusion. Id. (citing United States v. McComb, 519 F.3d 1049, 1052-53 (10th Cir.2007)). If the procedural error is purely factual, review is highly deferential and the district court only abuses its discretion if its findings are clearly erroneous. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Conversely, the district court’s sentence is owed no deference when the asserted procedural error is purely legal, as, for example, when it misinterprets the Guidelines. Wise, 515 F.3d at 217.
Here the district court misapprehended its sentencing authority by concluding it was prohibited from designating Hayes’s federal sentence as concurrent to the yet-to-be-imposed state sentences. In United States v. Mayotte, 249 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir.2001), “we conclude[d] that the authority to impose such a federal sentence to be served consecutively to a yet-to-be-imposed state sentence falls within the broad discretion granted to the court.” Mayotte dealt specifically with the authority to impose a consecutive sentence, but the decision was based on the “district court[’s] broad discretion to determine whether a sentence should be consecutive or concurrent within the constraints of the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3584.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Thus, the district court had the authority to order a concurrent sentence.
■ The district court compounded the sentencing error by mistakenly concluding it could leave the concurrent versus consecutive decision to the state court. The state court had no authority to designate the federal sentence as concurrent to the state sentence, and its imposition of a sentence to run concurrent to the federal sentence would have no effect since the federal sentence would not run so long as Hayes remained in state custody. Therefore, no matter how the state court designated the sentences to be served they would effectively be consecutive.
Finally, the district court’s refusal to recommend the federal sentence begin running immediately while Hayes was in state custody was grounded in its original misapprehension of its sentencing authority. As a result of these errors, the district court failed to consider the full range of authorized sentencing options when it sentenced Hayes. Accordingly, I would vacate the sentence and remand for resen-tencing.