dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The problem posed is accented dramatically by the transcript in this case. A thorough and complete examination of that transcript does not reveal what act or acts were done by the defendants. The complaint itself alleges only that on a given date, and within the county, the defendants “did then and there contribute to the delinquency” of a named female child under 18,. “so that the child will tend to become a delinquent child.”
The district court specifically found that the statute was vague and uncertain, and also constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The demurrer of the defendants was sustained for the reason that section 28-477, R. S. Supp., 1965, was unconstitutional.
The majority opinion discusses only the question of whether the statute itself is unconstitutional since that issue was the only one directly presented and argued, but the majority opinion reverses the judgment of the district court sustaining the demurrer. Impliedly or directly, the majority opinion, therefore, holds that it is *498sufficient if an information or a complaint charges the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor in the statutory language. It would seem toi be well established that in this state all public offenses are statutory and no act is criminal unless the Legislature has in express terms declared it to be so. “An information must inform the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the charge being made against him in order that he may prepare his defense thereto and also be able to plead the judgment rendered thereon as a bar to a later prosecution for the same offense.” State v. Coomes, 170 Neb. 298, 102 N. W. 2d 454. State v. Buttner, 180 Neb. 529, 143 N. W. 2d 907, quoted the above language and also the following: “The information (or indictment) must expressly and directly state each fact that is an essential element of the crime intended to, be charged so that the accused will not be required to go- beyond the information to learn the nature of the charge against him or the issue he must meet.”
The, majority opinion quotes with approval 31 Am. Jur., Juvenile Courts, Etc., § 95, p. 345. The same authority states: “In such a prosecution (contributing to delinquency of a minor) the indictment, information, or complaint should allege the particular facts, acts, words, conduct, or omissions which it is contended causes the accused to be guilty of the offense. Thus, it has been held that in order to charge a defendant with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, an indictment or information must not only allege generally in the language of the statute that he committed such a crime but it must further allege a specific act or conduct on his part which directly tended to render the minor delinquent.” § 97, p. 346.
Even though the general statute itself be deemed constitutional, it is completely impossible for any court to determine whether an act of commission or omission does or does not constitute the offense of contributing to delinquency if the court does not even know what par*499ticular act or acts were done or omitted.
It should be noted also that section 28-477, R. S. Supp., 1965, does not require any element of knowledge or intent, and any person may be charged with the offense, regardless of age. That statute also specifically ties the crime to the sole and specific definition of delinquent child set out in section 43-201, R. S. Supp., 1965. Most citizens would be amazed and shocked to learn that section 43-201, R. S. Supp., 1965, defines a delinquent child as: “* * * any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance.” This change in definition occurred in 1965. That definition does not even differentiate between civil or criminal statutes of the state nor between ordinances of cities or villages civil or criminal in nature. Neither is it limited in any way to statutes or ordinances requiring criminal intent, or guilty or wrongful purpose, nor does it require any part of the old concept of mens rea. The same is true of section 28-477, R. S. Supp., 1965. On its face, therefore, the statute now makes criminal “any act,” regardless of intent or purpose, which “encourages, causes, or contributes to” the violation of “any law of the state or any city or village ordinance” by any child under the age of 18 years.
Under the facts and circumstances here, even though the majority opinion holds the statute itself constitutional, the judgment should nevertheless be affirmed on the ground that a complaint or information in such a case is not sufficient unless it alleges the particular facts, acts, words, conduct, or omissions on the part of the defendant which cause him to be guilty of the offense. Anything less does not approach the most basic concepts of due process nor permit a proper judicial determination of whether or not an information or complaint is sufficient.
The foregoing only emphasizes the basic issue of constitutionality. Traditionally such statutes have been aimed at the protection of minors in the area of morals *500and health. There is substantial authority to support the position that generally such statutes dealing with contributing to the delinquency of minors in the traditional areas of morals and health are constitutional. There is also authority to support the opposite view. For example, see, State v. Vallery, 212 La. 1095, 34 So. 2d 329 (1948). A change of one word in the act following that decision was held sufficient to support constitutionality. State v. Fulmer, 250 La. 29, 193 So. 2d 774 (1967).
Various states have taken varied approaches to the problem. Until 1965, Nebraska statutes were reasonably within the pattern. The amendments to section 28-477, R. R. S. 1943, and section 43-201, R. S. Supp., 1963, both made in 1965, however, introduced the problem which exists here. Nebraska’s statutes now stand virtually alone in defining a delinquent child specifically and solely as one “who has, violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance.” This is the only criterion for determining delinquency. This applies both to juvenile proceedings under section 43-201, R. S. Supp., 1965, and also to criminal proceedings for contributing to delinquency under section 28-477, R. S. Supp., 1965, by specific incorporation. It would seem crystal clear that such a broad and sweeping classification would be arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable and would violate the equal protection clause as well as elementary due process. If any court were required to hold that one violation of a city or village curfew or parking ordinance by a minor was alone sufficient to classify the child as delinquent, remove him from the custody of his parents, and invoke the punitive action of the juvenile court, the consequent hue and cry would be fully justified. I do not believe the Legislature had any such intention.
I believe that subsection (4) of section 43-201, R. S. Supp., 1965, is so broad, general, and unreasonable as to be unconstitutional in itself. When directly attached by specific reference to section 28-477, R. S. Supp., 1965, *501the constitutional problems are compounded. How could any court determine what act would tend to cause a child to violate any law of the state or any city or village ordinance? Such statutes go far beyond any traditional concepts.
As early as 1921 this court said: “Under the statute involved in this case, the person who causes or contributes to the delinquency of a child is made guilty of a misdemeanor. Prosecution upon that charge is clearly a criminal prosecution. It is not a proceeding to determine a status, but to establish guilt and inflict punishment. It is not such a proceeding as is within the general purview of the jurisdiction of a juvenile court, nor one in which special procedure or summary punishment can be logically justified.” Swanson v. State, 105 Neb. 761, 181 N. W. 921. Incidentally, in that case, the charge specified the act done by the defendant.
Under the provisions of section 28-477, R. S. Supp., 1965, a minor might himself be guilty of contributing to the delinquency of another minor. It should be noted here also that the ages of the defendants in this case are not shown.
This court has said repeatedly that a criminal statute should operate uniformly throughout the jurisdiction. Where the only definition of delinquency includes the violation of any city or village ordinance, it is apparent on the face of the statute that some acts might contribute to the delinquency of a minor if done within a city or village while the. same acts done outside the city limits or in another city or village, even in the same county, would not subject the actor to criminal responsibility under the statute.
■ This court in State ex rel. English v. Ruback, 135 Neb. 335, 281 N. W. 607, quoted the following: “Reasonable certainty, in view of the conditions, is all that is required, and liberal effect is always to be given to the legislative intent when possible; but where the legislature declares an offense in words of no determinate *502signification, or its language is so general and indefinite that it may embrace not only acts commonly recognized as reprehensible but also others which it is unreasonable to presume were intended to be made criminal, the statute will be declared void for uncertainty. (Citing text.)
“The test to determine whether a statute defining an offense is void for uncertainty (1) is whether the language may apply not only to a particular act about which there can be little or no difference of opinion, but equally to other acts about which there may be radical differences, thereby devolving on the court the exercise of arbitrary power of discriminating between the several classes of acts. (Citing case.) (2) The dividing line between what is lawful and what is unlawful cannot be left to conjecture.” See, also, Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618, 83 L. Ed. 888.
While I recognize that the moral welfare of children must be protected, constitutional imperatives require that no citizen should be held to answer charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so far-reaching, all-encompassing, arbitrary, and uncertain.