concurring specially.
I concur with the conclusion of the majority in Case No. A91A1601 but not for the reasons set forth by the majority. I find the case presented by the Thompsons stated a claim for negligent inspection and repair, not fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation.
The Thompsons’ original complaint alleged claims of fraud, negligence, and breach of warranty against Hardy Chevrolet. The trial court subsequently granted partial summary judgment to Hardy Chevrolet on the fraud claim because Hardy Chevrolet made no representations to the Thompsons on which they could have relied and on the breach of warranty claim because of a lack of privity. Thus, at trial the only claim remaining against Hardy Chevrolet was the Thompsons’ allegation that Hardy Chevrolet negligently failed to inspect the brakes and negligently failed to discover the defect before delivering the car to the Fallses.
Although as a general rule no privity is required to support a tort action, OCGA § 51-1-11 (a), “if the tort results from the violation of a duty which is itself the consequence of a contract, the right of action is confined to the parties and those in privity to that contract, except in cases where the party would have a right of action for the injury done independently of the contract.” Id.; see Sims v. American Cas. Co., 131 Ga. App. 461, 479-481 (5) (206 SE2d 121) (1974). Since the Thompsons’ claim arose from the contract between Hardy Chevrolet and the Fallses, they are entitled to recover only if they can establish *507the violation of a duty independent of the contract. Such an independent duty may arise at common law “because of the relationship between the parties, or because of defendant’s calling or because of the nature of the harm. [Cit.]” Sims, supra at 480.
Our courts have recognized that automobile dealers who are not manufacturers have no obligation to test vehicles they purchase for resale for the purpose of discovering latent or concealed defects. Holman Motor Co. v. Evans, 169 Ga. App. 610, 613-614 (2) (c) (314 SE2d 453) (1984). However, if a dealer does undertake to inspect or test its merchandise, it must do so nonnegligently, and it will “ ‘be liable for any patent defect which the inspection(s) might reveal and could be negligent for not discovering such defects as might reasonably have been unearthed.’ [Cits.]” Id. at 614. Likewise, when a dealer undertakes to repair a vehicle it sells, the dealer “ ‘owes an original duty to the public to use ordinary care in making repairs so as not to endanger the person or property of others by his negligent performance, when the consequences of such conduct may be foreseen.’ ” General Motors Corp. v. Jenkins, 114 Ga. App. 873, 879 (152 SE2d 796) (1966). Both Holman and GMC v. Jenkins extended liability of car dealers for negligent inspection or repairs to third party passengers injured in collisions resulting from defects in vehicles sold by the dealers.
At trial, evidence was adduced that Hardy Chevrolet claimed to have inspected the car and made all necessary repairs, and specifically that Hardy Chevrolet claimed to have inspected the brakes and found them to be in good condition. The Thompsons also presented evidence that the brakes were defective, that they had not been inspected, and that an inspection would have uncovered the defect. Additionally, the jury would have been authorized to conclude that the injuries Christopher Thompson suffered were a foreseeable result of the brake failure. The Thompsons thus set forth a negligence claim sufficient to be presented to the jury, see Holman, supra; J. C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Simmons, 128 Ga. App. 113 (195 SE2d 781) (1973), and accordingly the direction of a verdict for Hardy Chevrolet was error.