concurring specially.
1. I concur in the first two divisions but not in all that is written in them. Sovereign immunity is a defense rather than an inroad on one of the elements of a tort. Since it is not invoked here, the first question is whether the defendants owed a legal duty to plaintiffs.
The 1983 Constitution of Georgia provides the foundation for such a duty in its second paragraph: “Protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete.” Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II. Whether a duty to Patricia Jordan arose from the circumstances conveyed to the police, considering all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is a jury question. Storer Communications v. Burns, 195 Ga. App. 230 (393 SE2d 92) (1990).
One of the reasonable inferences which could be drawn is that one of the two callers would or did notify appellant that the police were on the way, which would support a finding that the dispatch officer should have known that his assurances would be relied on. There is direct testimony that they were relied on by Patricia Jordan in her actions and inactions with respect to the assailant.
A reasonable inference could also be drawn that harm to plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable, given the information conveyed to the dispatcher, if a police officer was not sent as advised. Ellington v. Tolar Constr., 237 Ga. 235, 238 (227 SE2d 336) (1976); Savannah Bank &c. Co. v. Weiner, 193 Ga. App. 616, 617 (1) (388 SE2d 725) (1989); Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enterprises, 194 Ga. App. 874, 878 (392 SE2d 535) (1990).
*670If a duty was owed and breached, then the issues of proximate cause and injury would have to be reached. As to them, the evidence is in dispute.
2. I fully concur in Division 3.