In this criminal case, defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that the state had failed to bring him to trial within 90 days of receipt of his speedy trial notice, as required by ORS 135.763(1), set out infra. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the continuance of the trial beyond the 90-day period had been “reasonable and fair.” The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that neither defendant nor the state had requested a continuance. State v. Person, 113 Or App 40, 831 P2d 700 (1992). We allowed review and now affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
On October 31,1989, defendant was charged with a seven-count indictment in Linn County. Subsequently, he was imprisoned on unrelated charges in the Oregon State Correctional Institution. On January 30, 1990, the Linn County District Attorney received defendant’s “Speedy Trial Notice,” in which defendant requested trial on the Linn County charges within 90 days pursuant to ORS 135.7601 and 135.763(1), discussed infra. At that time, trial already had been set for April 11, 1990, a date within the 90-day period.
On March 16, 1990, defendant’s counsel moved for permission to withdraw from the case due to a conflict of interest. Following that motion, the district attorney communicated to court staff that the state would be ready for trial on April 11 and that the court should appoint a defense attorney who also could be prepared on that date. On March 26, the court allowed defendant’s counsel to withdraw and issued an *588order appointing new counsel for defendant on the following day. On that order, however, a notation of the April 11 trial date was lined through and the notation “Trial date needs to be reset” was inserted below, apparently by court staff. Similarly, a letter from the court to defendant’s new counsel dated March 27, 1990, stated: “Trial — 4/11/90 at 9:30 a.m. (will be reset).”
Without a motion by either party, the court then rescheduled defendant’s trial for July 25, 1990. On June 25, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment pursuant to ORS 135.765,2 on the ground that he had not been brought to trial within 90 days of the date that the Linn County District Attorney received his speedy trial notice. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the district attorney “did everything it could per the statute to bring the defendant to trial within the 90 days” and that “any fault in the case not goingto trial on April 11” was that of defense counsel and the court staff. The court also concluded that “[t]he continuance of the April 11, 1990, trial was reasonable and fair to the defendant.” Consequently, the trial went forward on July 25, and defendant was convicted of four of the seven counts against him.
On appeal from his convictions, defendant assigned as error the denial of his motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals, sitting in banc, reversed. The court’s decision turned on the interpretation of ORS 135.763, which states:
“(1) The district attorney, after receiving a notice requesting trial under ORS 135.760, shall, within 90 days of receipt of the notice, bring the inmate to trial upon the pending charge.
“ (2) A continuance may be granted upon the request of the district attorney and with the consent of the inmate. The court shall grant any continuance with the consent of the defendant. The court may grant a continuance on motion of the district attorney for good cause shown. The fact of imprisonment is not good cause for purposes of this subsection.”
*589Regarding that statute, the court’s six-member majority wrote:
“A court cannot grant a continuance pursuant to ORS 135.763(2) unless the defendant consents or the state requests one, for good cause shown. * * *
“Neither the district attorney nor the defendant requested a continuance. Therefore, under the express terms of ORS 135.763(2), the court did not have the authority to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss and permit the case to go to trial.”
State v. Person, supra, 113 Or App at 43.
Four dissenting judges disagreed with the majority’s reading of ORS 135.763(2):
“Reading that statute to require the district attorney to move for a continuance even though the state is prepared to proceed to trial within the 90-day period produces an absurd result, because district attorneys have no direct control over court docketing. * * *
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“* * * There is evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the district attorney did everything within his power to comply with defendant’s request for a trial within the 90-day period. I would hold that the state’s actions satisfied the requirements of ORS 135.763 and that defendant is not entitled to a dismissal of the indictment under the circumstances.”
Id. at 46-47 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). We allowed review to address the proper interpretation of ORS 135.763.
As this court noted in State v. Hunter, 316 Or 192, 199-200, 850 P2d 366 (1993), once the district attorney receives an inmate’s request for speedy trial under ORS 135.760 to 135.765, four scenarios are possible:
(1) The inmate is brought to trial within 90 days.
(2) The inmate is not brought to trial within 90 days because of one or more continuances of the trial granted in accordance with ORS 135.763(2).
(3) The inmate is not brought to trial within 90 days, but the inmate has waived his or her right to speedy trial under ORS 135.760 to 135.765.
*590(4) The inmate is not brought to trial within 90 days, but the delay is not the result of a continuance of the trial granted in accordance with ORS 135.763(2), and the inmate has not waived his right to speedy trial.
Only in the event of the fourth scenario does ORS 135.765 require dismissal. Id. at 200.
In this case, the Linn County District Attorney received defendant’s speedy trial notice on January 30,1990. Defendant’s trial did not occur within 90 days of that date. The state argues, however, that, for purposes of ORS 135.763(1), the district attorney “brought the inmate to trial” within the 90 days because the trial court found that the district attorney “did everything [he] could * * * to bring the defendant to trial within the 90 days.” According to the state, “[t]he district attorney did all he was required to do under the terms of the statute.”
“In interpreting a statute, this court’s duty is to discern the intent of the legislature.” Teeny v. Haertl Constructors, Inc., 314 Or 688, 694, 842 P2d 788 (1992). We attempt to discern the legislature’s intent by examination of both the text and the context of the statute. Southern Pacific Trans. Co. v. Dept. of Rev., 316 Or 495, 498, 852 P2d 197 (1993) (citing State v. Trenary, 316 Or 172, 175, 850 P2d 356 (1993)).. The text of the statutory provision itself “must always be the starting point in any interpretive endeavor” and is the best evidence of the legislature’s intent. Roseburg School Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or 374, 378 & n 4, 851 P2d 595 (1993) (citing State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Ashley, 312 Or 169, 174, 818 P2d 1270 (1991)).
ORS 135.763(1) states that “[t]he district attorney, after receiving a notice requesting trial under ORS 135.760, shall, within 90 days of receipt of the notice, bring the inmate to trial upon the pending charge.” (Emphasis supplied.) By its terms, ORS 135.763(1) requires the district attorney to “bring the inmate to trial.” Until the trial actually has commenced, the district attorney has not fulfilled that duty.
It follows that, because defendant was not “brought to trial” within 90 days of the receipt of his speedy trial notice, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss was *591correct only if either (1) one or more continuances of the trial were granted in accordance with ORS 135.763(2) or (2) defendant waived his right to speedy trial. No claim of waiver is involved here. Consequently, the issue in this case is whether any continuance of the trial in this case that carried the trial date beyond the 90-day period was granted in accordance with ORS 135.763(2).
As noted above, defendant’s trial originally was scheduled for April 11, 1990, a date within 90 days of the district attorney’s receipt of defendant’s speedy trial notice. The trial then was rescheduled for a date beyond the 90-day period. As the state concedes, the district attorney did not move for this continuance and defendant did not consent to it. Thus, the issue in this case narrows down to whether a continuance granted without motion of the district attorney and without consent of the defendant nonetheless can be one granted in accordance with ORS 135.763(2).
ORS 135.763(2) provides:
“A continuance may be granted upon the request of the district attorney and with the consent of the inmate. The court shall grant any continuance with the consent of the defendant. The court may grant a continuance on motion of the district attorney for good cause shown. The fact of imprisonment is not good cause for purposes of this subsection.”
While ORS 135.763(2) may not be a model of precision, we believe that the legislature’s intended meaning may be determined from the text of the statute. Moreover, as will be discussed infra, an examination of the context of the statute yields the same result. The statute specifies when the trial court shall grant a continuance — “with the consent of the defendant” — and when the trial court may grant a continuance — “on motion of the district attorney for good cause shown.” By its terms, ORS 135.763(2) neither requires nor permits the trial court to grant a continuance in any other situation.
Defendant did not consent to the continuance at issue here, and the district attorney did not move for a continuance. Thus, neither of the circumstances that permitted the granting of a continuance described in ORS 135.763(2) existed here. The state, however, would have this *592court read into the statute a third, implicit circumstance — one that would permit a trial court to grant a continuance on its own motion for what the court finds to be good cause, without the defendant’s consent. The state argues that, because of the trial court’s “general authority [over] and responsibility to control the course of litigation,” the trial court retains the inherent authority to continue a case on its own motion beyond the 90-day period without violating the inmate’s speedy trial right under ORS 135.760 to 135.765.
We decline the state’s (and the dissent’s) invitation to add to the statute what the legislature did not include. See ORS 174.010 (it is not the function of a court that is construing a legislative measure “to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted”). As shown above, ORS 135.763(2) expressly states not only when the trial court shall grant a continuance, but also when the trial court may grant a continuance. If the trial court could grant a continuance on its own motion without the defendant’s consent based on some general authority arising outside the express language of ORS 135.763(2), the wording of the statute permitting the court to grant such a continuance “on motion of the district attorney” would be superfluous. To give meaning to that portion of ORS 135.763(2), the grant of permissive authority within the statute must be read to be exclusive.
Moreover, if, as the state argues, the legislature actually intended to allow for continuances based on the trial court’s own motion, the legislature could have written ORS 135.763(2) to provide for such a procedure. ORS 135.765, the statute that implements ORS 135.763(2) by requiring mandatory dismissal of proceedings not brought to trial in accordance with that statute, provides for dismissal “[o]n motion of the defendant or the counsel of the defendant, or on the own motion of the court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Furthermore, the legislature in the general speedy trial statutes demonstrated its ability to enact an express provision granting the trial court own motion authority to continue cases for good cause when a defendant had not been brought to trial pursuant to the statutory requirements. ORS 135.750.
The legislature’s choice expressly to grant to the trial court authority to exercise the court’s “own motion” authority in the two statutes, ORS 135.765 and 135.750, while *593making no mention of that authority in ORS 135.763(2) (which deals with the same topic), and the fact that ORS 135.765 was enacted as part of the same piece of legislation as ORS 135.763(2),3 satisfies us that the legislature did not intend ORS 135.763(2) to encompass continuances on the court’s own motion. See Emerald PUD v. PP&L, 302 Or 256, 269, 729 P2d 552 (1986) (“ ‘Ordinarily, when the legislature includes an express provision in one statute but omits such a provision in another statute, it may be inferred that such an omission was deliberate.’ ”) (quoting Oregon Business Planning Council v. LCDC, 290 Or 741, 749, 626 P2d 350 (1981)).
The state argues alternatively that an interpretation of ORS 135.763(2) excluding continuances on the trial court’s own motion will lead to “absurd results.” The state poses several hypothetical situations in which, for one reason or another, the trial cannot be held within the required 90-day period, but the district attorney opposes a continuance (because the state is prepared to go to trial), the defendant does not consent to one, and the trial court has no power to order one on its own, despite the presence of good cause. According to the state, “[i]t would be absurd to ascribe to the legislature a purpose to allow criminals to escape prosecution under these circumstances.” The dissent offers other scenarios.
It is true that, under this court’s interpretation of ORS 135.763(2), in cases like the present one (and at least some of those posed hypothetically by the state and by the dissent) a district attorney may have to move for a continuance (even though the state is prepared for trial without one) simply to avoid dismissal under ORS 135.765. We do not agree, however, that such a requirement is “absurd.” One practical effect of requiring the district attorney to make a motion for a continuance whenever the defendant has not consented to a continuance is to allow the defendant an opportunity to argue to the court that good cause for the continuance has not been shown — an opportunity that the *594defendant might lack if the court were to act on its own motion.4
Further, requiring a motion for continuance by the district attorney in circumstances like those of the present case is consistent with the mandate in ORS 135.763(1) that “[t]he district attorney * * * shall, within 90 days of receipt of the [speedy trial] notice, bring the inmate to trial." (Emphasis supplied.) If, for whatever reason, trial is not going to occur within the 90-day period, and the defendant has not waived his or her speedy trial right, it is consistent with the duty imposed by ORS 135.763(1) to require the district attorney either to obtain the defendant’s consent to a continuance or to make a motion for a continuance based on good cause, even if the state is prepared for trial.
We hold that ORS 135.763(2) does not permit a trial court to grant a continuance of the trial beyond the 90-day period of ORS 135.763(1) on its own motion without the defendant’s consent. Because that is exactly what happened in this case, we hold that defendant was not “brought to trial in accordance with ORS 135.763.” Consequently, the trial court had no authority to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment under ORS 135.765. The Court of Appeals majority was correct in so holding. The case must be remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.5
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed. The case is remanded to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.
ORS 135.760 provides:
“(1) Any inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections against whom there is pending at the time of commitment or against whom there is filed at any time during imprisonment, in any court of this state, an indictment, information or criminal complaint charging the inmate with the commission of a crime, may give written notice to the district attorney of the county in which the inmate is so charged requesting the district attorney to prosecute and bring the inmate to trial on the charge forthwith.
“(2) The notice provided for in subsection (1) of this section shall be signed by the inmate and set forth the place and term of imprisonment. A copy of the notice shall be sent to the court in which the inmate has been charged by indictment, information or complaint.”
No issue is raised in this case concerning the requirement that the court be served.
ORS 135.765 provides:
“On motion of the defendant or the counsel of the defendant, or on the own motion of the court, the court shall dismiss any criminal proceeding not brought to trial in accordance with ORS 135.763.”
The original versions of ORS 135.763C2) and ORS 135.765 were enacted together. Or Laws 1955, ch 387, §§ 2-3.
For example, in this case it appears that the trial was continued beyond the 90-day period by court staff without formal motion by either party and without notice to defendant. Thus, defendant was denied the opportunity to argue that good cause for the continuance did not exist.
Defendant argues that this court should order dismissal with prejudice, while the state urges this court to order dismissal without prejudice. We express no opinion on that issue.