dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as it is my view that the superior court inappropriately declared rights and duties under a policy of insurance based on an unaccrued state of facts and that the majority inappropriately avoids this omission, basing its holding on a prediction that no claim will ever be filed that will give rise to coverage under the workers’ compensation policy of insurance. Further, I do not agree with the majority’s holding that the superior court has jurisdiction of this matter because the issue is one of contract interpretation.
1. Lumber Transport seeks reimbursement of Georgia workers’ *591compensation benefits based on a policy provision requiring International to pay all claims arising under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act.1 This claim is dependent upon (derivative of) a determination of the amount, if any, the injured employee is entitled to recover under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act, a matter outside subject matter jurisdiction of the superior court. Fireman’s Fund Ins. v. Crowder, 123 Ga. App. 469, 471 (1) (181 SE2d 530). In other words, no determination of the employer’s contractual rights is possible until such time as the rights of the employee are determined by the Georgia Board of Workers’ Compensation. However, the record in the cases sub judice reveals no award or approved settlement by the Georgia Board of Workers’ Compensation. Consequently, it is my view that any decision by the superior court as to International’s liability under the insurance contract is premature. There must first be a determination by the Georgia Board of Workers’ Compensation that such a claim exists and, if so, how much. See Labouseur v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 397 SE2d 526, 528 (1) (SC 1990).
2. I do not agree with the majority’s holding that the superior court has jurisdiction of this matter because the issue is one of contract interpretation, not a claim for benefits under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act.
The State Board of Workers’ Compensation is not authorized to render judgments on contracts or render declaratory judgments. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Crowder, 123 Ga. App. 469, 471 (1), supra. However, when disputes over workers’ compensation coverage are “ancillary to the determination of the employee’s right, the compensation commission has authority to pass upon a question relating to the insurance policy, . . . including . . . existence or validity of an insurance contract . . . coverage of the policy at the time of injury, . . . and construction of extent of coverage. ...” 4 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation, § 92.41, 17-44. In the cases sub judice, Lumber Transport’s claim against International is ancillary to any claim for benefits under Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Act. Under these circumstances, it is my view that any administrative determination of Lumber Transport’s liability under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act would authorize an administrative resolution of Lumber Transport’s claim against International. See Labouseur v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 397 SE2d 526, 528 (1), supra. Compare National Union Ins. Co. v. Mills, 99 Ga. App. 697 (109 SE2d 830), where it was held that the State Board of Workers’ Compensation had no jurisdiction to resolve a dispute between insurers after the *592board approved a settlement awarding an employee workers’ compensation benefits.
Decided March 6, 1992 Reconsideration denied March 30, 1992 Mozley, Finlayson & Loggins, Robert M. Finlayson II, Deborah A. Finnerty, Wm. Mark Amos, for appellant. Hopkins & Gresham, H. Lowell Hopkins, for appellee.International challenges liability because no award has been rendered under the Georgia Workers’ Compensation Act.