dissenting.
Mrs. Fannie Lou Perkins was recuperating from surgery performed by Doctor S. C. T. Su at Candler-General Hospital in Savannah, Georgia. Doctor Su had prescribed injections of vistaril and morphine. Julia T. Baughman, a licensed practical nurse, who was an employee of the hospital, administered an injection of this medication to the patient’s left buttock, resulting in pain, discomfort, discoloration and requiring further surgery and removal of a part of her left buttock.
Mrs. Perkins and her husband sued Doctor Su and Candler-General Hospital for damages for failure to exercise reasonable care in looking after and protecting the patient as her condition required, and in failing to so protect her.
Discovery was had, after which Doctor Su filed a motion for summary judgment, contending it was the hospital’s responsibility to see that Nurse Baughman properly administered the injection. (Plaintiffs complaint however went further than as described in defendant’s motion for summary judgment; and specifically in Paragraph 9 alleged as follows: "Plaintiffs further say that said Defendants, under the circumstances in which Plaintiff patient was injured, are charged with the duty to exercise reasonable care in looking after the patient and protecting the patient as the patients condition may require and said defendants did fail to so protect Plaintiff patient.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The motion for summary judgment was by the lower court denied. He appeals, and a majority of this court holds that the lower court should be reversed, the effect of *484which is to absolve Doctor Su of all liability in this case. I vigorously dissent and set forth the reasons for such dissent hereafter.
1. The burden is upon the movant in a summary judgment proceeding to demonstrate the absence of any issue of substantial fact. Brown v. Sheffield, 121 Ga. App. 383 (173 SE2d 891). Further, the respondent is given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and favorable inferences that may arise from the evidence. McCarty v. National Life &c. Ins. Co., 107 Ga. App. 178 (129 SE2d 408); Candler General Hospital v. Purvis, 123 Ga. App. 334 (181 SE2d 77); Burnette Ford v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551 (181 SE2d 866).
2. Doctor Wade, the surgeon who removed the dead tissue from the plaintiffs left buttock, testified that in bis opinion her condition was due to the improper administration of a medication into the subcutaneous tissue (just under the outer layer of skin) instead of intramuscular (into the muscle) as required by the medication. This witness also testified that because of obesity (she was 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighed 165 pounds and was 48 pounds overweight) the patient needed a longer needlé to insure that the injection went into the muscle instead of the subcutaneous tissue.
3. The patient was left in charge of Nurse Baughman, a licensed practical nurse, and although she professed not to remember administering the injection, the weight of evidence indicates that she did so.
4. Doctor Su admitted that obese patients require greater care after surgery than normal patients; that they are subjected to a greater risk of complications after surgery. Doctor Su also admitted that he gave no special instructions to the nurse as to the way and manner in which the medication should be administered; did not discuss with her whether it should be a subcutaneous injection or a muscular injection; or the danger inherent in failing to properly inject same intra-muscularly; nor was the required length of the needle discussed. Doctor Su, defendant, in his sworn response to interrogatories on November 3, 1973 (more than two years after the injection) made the following admission: "Defendant does not know the exact cause of such complication and *485therefore does not contend that any other party was responsible for such complication.” (Tr. p. 96) (Emphasis supplied.)
Doctor Su further testified by answer to interrogatories: "7i is unknown whether plaintiffs complications could have been avoided by reason of any action taken by others.” (Tr. p. 97) (Emphasis supplied.) He testified that the manufacturer of this drug printed instructions thereon, as follows: "Intended for intramuscular administration and should not under any circumstances be injected subcutaneously, intraarterially or intravenously.” but that he did not so instruct the nurse (Tr. pp. 226-227). When asked as to what explanation he had for the patient’s trouble, he answered: "One guess—she couldhave had a subcutaneous injection of vistaril; she could have had a sensitivity reaction. She could have formed a hematoma — hemorrhage inside.” (Tr. p. 227) (Emphasis supplied.) Again he was asked as to any thought he had as to what caused the necrosis (deadening effect) of the tissue and he answered: "7 thought it was the injection but the result I’m not sure.” (Tr. p. 234) (Emphasis supplied.)
Doctor Su, asked as to his knowledge of the patient’s higher risk of complications following surgery because of her obesity and as to what special instructions he gave as to such possible complications, remembered no instruction except prescribing support stockings for her lower extremities (Tr. pp. 236-237).
5. Thus, this case for plaintiff shows that the patient received a serious injury, while she was a patient of Doctor Su, because of an injection of vistaril, which he had prescribed; that he knew of her high risk of complications because of her extreme obesity following surgery but gave no instructions to combat same except the wearing of support hose; that he did not give the nurse any instructions as to the danger of injecting vistaril into the inner layer of skin, rather than into the muscle, although the manufacturer plainly warned against same; and most important, that Doctor Su, defendant, "does not contend that any other person was responsible for (her) complication.” (Emphasis supplied.) Doctor Su admitted that he thought the injection while plaintiff was his *486patient, caused the trouble.
6. As against the above statement — and remembering that all conflicts in and inferences arising from testimony in summary judgment cases must be construed most strongly against movant — Doctor Su and one other doctor testified generally that the custom and practice is to leave the administering of drugs to the nurses, and that doctors have no responsibility therefor.
But the defendant, Doctor Su, in his sworn answer to interrogatories, stated that he did not contend any other person — (which includes the nurse) — was responsible for plaintiffs complication. Having so testified, this admission remains in the case until the end, and it is too late now to recant and blame the nurse, even though he might swear to the contrary therein ten times or more, as all testimony (and more especially all conflicting testimony) must be construed most strongly against movant for summary judgment. Holland v. Sanfax, 106 Ga. App. 1, 5 (126 SE2d 442). Further, as a party to the case, where his testimony is ambiguous, it must be construed most strongly against him, and will deny him the right of recovery. Southern R. Co. v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 428 (1) (49 SE 294).
In this case, therefore, there are two rules of law which require the testimony of Doctor Su, defendant and movant for summary judgment, construed most strongly against him. First, this is the rule in all summary judgment cases, as to the testimony of the movant. See Sanfax, supra. Next, it is the rule as to a party to a case, where his testimony is ambiguous or vague. See Hobbs, supra.
Some confusion exists as to these two rules of law because of the cases of Burnette Ford v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551, 552 (181 SE2d 866); send. Burnette Ford v. Hayes, 124 Ga. App. 65 (183 SE2d 78) (upon return of the case to this court). But what the Supreme Court there held is simply that regardless of which party would have the burden upon the trial before a jury, in motions for summary judgment the movant has the burden of proof, and his testimony, and all testimony on his side of the case, shall be construed most strongly against the movant. Thus, if the respondent in a summary judgment case should testify *487in a vague and ambiguous fashion, the rule in the Hobbs case, supra, would give way to the rule in the San fax case; but where the party who testifies vaguely is also the movant in a motion for summary judgment case, this affords a double reason for construing his testimony most strongly against him.
7. Therefore, with admissions by defendant in the record that the plaintiff was injured while under his care as a patient; that he did not contend any other person was responsible for the patient’s complications; that it was his guess that the reason for her complications was that she could have had a subcutaneous injection of vistaril (instead of intramuscular injection); and that he thought her trouble resulted from the injection, is sufficient to create issues for solution by the jury as to whether Doctor Su exercised reasonable care in looking after and protecting the patient as her condition required, and in failing to so protect her.
8. The attempt by Doctor Su to absolve himself of responsibility in other parts of his sworn testimony will not avail toward the grant of a summary judgment in his behalf, as the conflicting statements in his sworn testimony must be construed most strongly against him and most strongly in favor of respondent in said motion for summary judgment. Holland v. Sanfax, 106 Ga. App. 1, supra.
9. Whether a physician has used the requisite degree of care and skill for protection of his patient (Code § 84-924) is a question for determination by a jury. Norton v. Hamilton, 92 Ga. App. 727 (89 SE2d 809). And such physician is required to keep himself informed by proper examination as to the condition of the patient, and as to whether he has done so is a decision to be made by a jury. Word v. Henderson, 220 Ga. 846 (142 SE2d 244); Howell v. Jackson, 65 Ga. App. 422 (2) (16 SE2d 45).
For the above reasons, I dissent from the judgment of reversal and insist that the lower court properly denied the motion for summary judgment.