concurring.
As in Ritter v. State, 269 Ga. 884 (506 SE2d 857) (1998), I must again concur reluctantly in the dismissal of this appeal by the prosecution of the denial of its motion to recuse the trial judge presiding over a criminal proceeding. In my concurrence in Ritter, I encouraged “the General Assembly to follow the example of our sister state of Louisiana and to amend OCGA § 5-7-1 so as to permit the *421State to bring an appeal from the denial of its motion to recuse in a criminal case.” Ritter v. State, supra at 887.
Decided September 27, 2004. PaulL. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Marc A. Mallon, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Hasty, Pope & Ball, Marion T. Pope, Jr., for appellant. Thomas M. West, Robert H. Citronberg, Holly L. Geerdes, James C. Bonner, Jr., for appellee. Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Dana J. Norman, Assistant District Attorney, Carl P. Greenberg, amici curiae.Since then, a Pennsylvania court has held that an order denying the prosecutor’s motion for recusal is appealable under a rule which permits appeal from collateral orders. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 829 A2d 701, 704 (Pa. Super. 2003). I also think that it is noteworthy that the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has recognized the importance of this issue by holding that the prosecutor, in the absence of a right to appeal from the denial of a motion to recuse, may be entitled to mandamus relief. State ex rel. Millsap v. Lozano, 692 SW2d 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc) (cited in De Leon v. Aguilar, 127 SW3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
Accordingly, I again urge the General Assembly to permit the State to appeal from the denial of a motion to recuse in a criminal case, since the correct determination of the issue of recusal, regardless of who raises it, is critical to the integrity of the entire trial process.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this concurrence.