dissenting.
I concur with that portion of the majority opinion that finds no prejudicial error in the allegedly improper statements made by the prosecutor at trial. However, because the plain meaning of Chapter 50B of the North Carolina General Statutes necessitates a finding that the temporary restraining order against Defendant does not allow his sentence to be enhanced, I respectfully dissent.
As noted by the majority, “[w]hen the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, a court should go no further in interpreting the statute.” Nelson v. Battle Forest Friends Meeting, 335 N.C. 133, 136, 436 S.E.2d 122, 124 (1993). Thus, “[i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will apply the plain meaning of the words, with no need to resort to judicial construction.” Wiggs v. Edgecombe County, 361 N.C. 318, 322, 643 S.E.2d 904, 907 (2007) (citation omitted)., Nevertheless, this Court will turn to determining the purpose of a statute and “the intent of the legislature in its enactment” when a statute is ambiguous in its language. Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) (citation and quotation omitted). Accordingly, if a statute is unambiguous, as in the instant case, we have no need to speculate as to the legislative intent, as the majority does here.
Chapter 50B of the North Carolina General Statutes explicitly states that, “[a]s used in this Chapter, the term ‘protective order’ includes any order entered pursuant to this Chapter upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-l(c) (2003) (emphasis added). Further, under Chapter 50B, a sentence enhancement may be imposed for “a person who commits a felony at a time *608when the person knows the behavior is prohibited by a valid protective order” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-4.1 (d) (2003) (emphasis added), after “a finding . . . that the person knowingly violated the protective order in the course of conduct constituting the underlying felony.” Id. at § 50B-4.1(e) (emphasis added).
Even if, as reasoned by the majority, the temporary restraining order (TRO) at issue in this case was entered pursuant to Chapter 50B, thereby satisfying the first part of Chapter 50B-l(c), no hearing was held in the instant case, such that the second part of the definition of “protective order” was not met. The record before us shows that the trial court issued the TRO against Defendant in an 11 March 2004 ex parte order, specifically finding that the TRO was “granted without notice to the Defendant for that insufficient time exists during which to provide Defendant notice as otherwise by law provided ...” Moreover, the trial court set a hearing date of 15 March 2004 for Ms. Byrd’s motion for a preliminary injunction and stated that the TRO “shall terminate at 9:00 o’clock A.M. on the tenth (10th) day next following the date hereof, unless extended as by law provided.” On 15 March 2004, when Defendant’s attorney moved for a continuance of the hearing on Ms. Byrd’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the trial court continued the TRO “pending further order modifying the same.”
None of these actions by the trial court constituted a “hearing.” Although, as stated by the majority, an ex parte proceeding may also be called an ex parte hearing, it remains “[a] proceeding in which not all parties are present or given the opportunity to be heard,” regardless of the moniker used. Black’s Law Dictionary 1241 (8th ed. 2004). Indeed, ex parte proceedings are specifically defined as those “[d]one or made at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or argument by, any person adversely interested; of or relating to court action taken by one party without notice to the other, usu[ally] for temporary or emergency relief." Id. at 616 (emphasis added).
Moreover, an ex parte temporary restraining order generally serves the sole purpose of maintaining the status quo until a hearing can be held. Huff v. Huff 69 N.C. App. 447, 450, 317 S.E.2d 65, 67 (1984). As we have previously noted, procedural safeguards such as the definite duration of a temporary restraining order ensure that the “drastic” procedure passes constitutional muster, allowing it to “operate[] within an emergency context which recognizes the need for *609swift action” but still “immediately affords defendants notice and an opportunity to be heard” at a later, scheduled hearing. State ex rel. Gilchrist v. Hurley, 48 N.C. App. 433, 448, 269 S.E.2d 646, 655 (1980), disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 720, 274 S.E.2d 233 (1981). Thus, a TRO is designed to provide immediate relief but serve only as a “stopgap” measure until a court may schedule a hearing to consider both sides and the full merits of a dispute.
The showing required for a TRO reflects the emergency nature of the order. To secure a TRO, a plaintiff need only argue that “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party’s attorney can be heard in opposition^]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 65(b); see also Taylor v. Centura Bank, 124 N.C. App. 661, 663, 478 S.E.2d 226, 227 (1996) (“All TROs must be obtained pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 65.”). A TRO may then be granted and remain in place for ten days, until the trial court can convene a hearing to consider the full merits and whether the TRO should be transformed into a more permanent preliminary injunction, if the plaintiff can show both a likelihood of irreparable injury and of success on the merits of her claim at trial. Iredell Digestive Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 92 N.C. App. 21, 24-25, 373 S.E.2d 449, 451. (1988), aff'd per curiam, 324 N.C. 327, 377 S.E.2d 750 (1989).
Chapter 50B itself allows for such ex parte TROs:
Prior to the hearing, if it clearly appears to the court from specific facts shown, that there is a danger of acts of domestic violence against the aggrieved party or a minor child, the court may enter such orders as it deems necessary to protect the aggrieved party or minor children from such acts[.]
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(c) (2003) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that “[u]pon the issuance of an ex parte order under this subsection, a hearing shall be held within 10 days from the date of issuance of the order or within seven days from the date of service of process on the other party, whichever occurs later.” Id. From its express terms, then, Chapter 50B recognizes that ex parte orders such as the one at issue in this case are remedies available to an aggrieved party “prior to [a] hearing.” As such, the plain meaning of the language used to describe “ex parte orders” in Chapter 50B precludes their inclusion as “protective orders” “entered pursuant to this Chapter upon hearing by the court or consent of the parties.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-l(c).
*610This distinction is particularly significant in the context of the instant case. Here, the ex parte TRO entered against Defendant was used to enhance his sentence for his felony convictions — in other words, the TRO was employed to deprive Defendant of a liberty interest. Perhaps such an outcome would be warranted against Defendant, who was shown at trial to have stalked and severely injured Ms. Byrd and her coworker. Nevertheless, our Constitution requires us to safeguard the liberty of even the most unsavory of defendants, depriving them of such only after due process of law. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. To increase Defendant’s prison term on the basis of a TRO, without affording him the opportunity to be heard as to the allegations of domestic violence against him, would violate his right to due process. I would therefore remand this case for resentencing.