dissenting.
I agree with the majority in its implicit holding that the “amended” affidavits were admissible for the purpose of correcting typographical errors in earlier affidavits. I also agree with the majority’s observation of the well established principle that OCGA § 33-24-44 “only requires proof of mailing, not receipt by the insured of the notice of cancellation.” (Majority opinion p. 828) I further agree that this case must be resolved on the basis of Maddox v. Allstate Ins. Co., 164 Ga. App. 21 (296 SE2d 84) (1982). However, I cannot concur with the majority’s holding because I am unable to find from the record *829that the copy of the PORS list submitted by appellant in this case is probative and admissible under the statute.
It does not appear that there was any issue in Maddox as to the underlying admissibility of the PORS list attached to the affidavit therein. Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 151 Ga. App. 542, 543 (260 SE2d 370) (1979) was cited as authority in Maddox. The Hill decision, in turn, specifically recognized that a PORS list is a “compilation prepared in [the insurer’s] ordinary course of business containing the names, addresses, and policy numbers of all those policyholders whose policies were to be cancelled by mail. ... As to the admissibility of this list, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ga. App. 376 (100 SE2d 142) [(1957)].” (Emphasis supplied.) This earlier holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Buck, supra, as to the admissibility of a PORS list was to the effect that such a document would be “admissible as a business record under the Business Records Act, Ga. L. 1952, p. 177; ([OCGA § 24-3-14]). . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Harris v. U. S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 134 Ga. App. 739, 745 (216 SE2d 127) (1975). “[S]ince the evidence shows that the list in fact was made by the employees of [the insurer] in the regular course of its business, that it was the regular course of its business to make such record, and that it came from the files of the [insurer] where such records were kept, it is such a business record as should be admitted in evidence under [OCGA § 24-3-14].” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Buck, supra at 378-379.
As noted, there is a stamped copy of a purported PORS list bearing Mr. Taylor’s name and address attached as an exhibit to both an original and an “amended” affidavit submitted by State Farm. However, neither of those affidavits sufficiently identifies the attached document as a business record so as to render it admissible pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-14. “ ‘Preliminary proof is necessary before the writing or record is admissible under this exception (to the hearsay rule). The evidence should include identification of the writing or record by a witness who is familiar with the method of keeping records and who can testify thereto and to facts which show that the entry was made in the regular course of business and that it was the regular course of the business to make such memorandum or record at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter.’ [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Harris v. Collins, 149 Ga. App. 638, 640 (255 SE2d 107) (1979). As mere hearsay, the purported PORS list in the instant case would have no probative value. “Absent the preliminary proof required under [OCGA § 24-3-14], the affiant’s statements as to facts, the knowledge of which he obtained from records not personally kept by him, were hearsay and had no probative value. [Cits.]” Thomasson v. Trust Co. Bank, 149 Ga. App. 556, 559 (254 SE2d 881) (1979). This is true even in the absence of a specific objection to State Farm affidavits. “The absence of objection does not increase the probative value *830of hearsay evidence.” Gallman v. State, 127 Ga. App. 849, 852 (195 SE2d 187) (1973). On summary judgment, it is presumed “that the trial court recognized the inadmissible evidence and disregarded it.” Spell v. Bible Baptist Church, 166 Ga. App. 22, 24 (303 SE2d 156) (1983). “We are thus unable to consider [the PORS] document because it would not be admissible as evidence. [Cit.]” Carlos Jones Constr. Co. v. FDIC, 169 Ga. App. 899, 901 (315 SE2d 458) (1984).
Decided January 31, 1986 Rehearing denied February 17, 1986. William A. Turner, Jr., for appellant. Roy E. Harkleroad, Dewey N. Hayes, Terry A. Dillard, for appellees.Accordingly, under its existing evidentiary posture, all that can be said about the instant case is that State Farm has produced a copy of the written notice that it allegedly sent to Mr. Taylor but, unlike Maddox v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra at 22, State Farm has not produced an admissible probative Post Office receipt for the mailing “within the contemplation of [OCGA § 33-24-44].’ [Cit.]” “[W]hen utilized by the insurance company, the language of the statute must be strictly construed. [Cit.]” Travelers Indem. Co. v. Guess, 243 Ga. 559, 560 (255 SE2d 55) (1979). As against State Farm’s showing, Mr. Taylor denies receiving any notice of cancellation. Compare Guess v. Travelers, supra. Under this state of the record, it is clear that State Farm was not entitled to summary judgment. See generally Travelers Indem. Co. v. Guess, supra at 561, fn. 2; Lumbermen’s Invest. Corp. v. American Modern Home Ins. Co., 158 Ga. App. 705 (282 SE2d 178) (1981). I believe that the trial court did not err in denying State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.