dissenting.
Because I would hold that the 2004 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 is unconstitutional, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
*620As this Court stated in Johnson, we apply a two-part test to analyze whether a law imposes punishment retroactively:
First, the court must determine whether it was the legislature’s intent to impose a punishment or merely enact a civil or regulatory law. In reaching this determination, the court may consider the structure and design of the statute along with any declared legislative intent. Second, where it appears the legislature did not intend to impose a punishment, we must then consider whether the effect of the law is so punitive as to negate any intent to deem the scheme civil. Stated another way, the second prong of the test focuses upon whether the sanction or disability that the law imposes may rationally be connected to the legislature’s non-punitive intent, or rather appears excessive in light of that intent.
Johnson, 169 N.C. App. at 307, 610 S.E.2d at 743-44 (quotations and citations omitted).
In Johnson, on which the majority bases much of its opinion, we held that the 1995 statute was constitutional. At that time, it was clear to this Court that the intent of legislature was to regulate the possession of dangerous weapons. Likewise, we held “that the law [was] not so punitive in effect that it should be considered punitive rather than regulatory.” Id. at 308, 610 S.E.2d at 744. In so holding, this Court relied on the following facts: “[The law] continuefd] to exempt the possession of firearms within one’s home or lawful place of business. The prohibition remained] limited to weapons that, because of their concealability, pose a unique risk to public safety.” Id. (quoting Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555) (citations, quotations, and alterations omitted).
Applying the same analysis to the statute as amended, I would reach a different result. The amended statute does not exempt the possession of firearms within one’s home or business. Furthermore, rather than limiting the proscription “to weapons that, because of their concealability, pose a unique risk to public safety,” the legislature broadened the ban to essentially all weapons.2 Id. (citations and *621quotations omitted). The result is that the statute is no longer “narrowly tailored to regulate only the sorts of firearm possession by felons that, because of the concealability, power, or location of the firearm, are most likely to endanger the general public,” as it was when the Farrow court reached its decision. Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555 (citation and quotations omitted).3 The exceptional broadness of the statute serves to undermine the legislature’s stated intent of regulation and serves instead as an unconstitutional punishment.
I would also hold that the application of the statute to plaintiff violated plaintiff’s due process rights. I recognize that “the right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation.” Johnson, 169 N.C. App. at 311, 610 S.E.2d at 746 (quoting State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1968)). Despite the majority’s attempted reliance on Johnson for support of a rational relationship test, however, I believe that the proper standard, as articulated in Johnson, requires “that the regulation must be reasonable and be related to the achievement of preserving public peace and safety.” Id. (citing Dawson, 272 N.C. at 547, 159 S.E.2d at 10). Rather than simply requiring that the statute be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, I therefore would require that the regulation also be reasonable.
The major differences between the 1995 and current versions of the statute lead me to conclude that the statute in its current form is no longer a reasonable regulation. Instead, I would hold that the current statute operates as an outright ban, completely divesting plaintiff of his right to bear arms without due process of law. Cf. id. (holding that the Johnson .defendant was not “completely divested of his right to bear arms as [the then current] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 allow[ed] him to possess a firearm at his home or place of business.”).
In enacting the 2004 amendment, the legislature simply overreached. Thereafter, the statute operated as a punishment, rather than a regulation. Moreover, the statute as amended stripped plaintiff of his constitutional right to bear arms without the benefit of due process. I would therefore reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
. I note that the State made much at oral argument of the exception for “antique firearms” added to the statute in its latest amendment. I would hold that this exception merely serves to underscore the unreasonableness of the law. There is no rational basis, in my view, for allowing felons to possess some deadly weapons because they are old (or replicas thereof) while forbidding the use of equally conspicuous firearms based purely on the fact that they are new.
. Although the Fourth Circuit stated that its Farrow decision also applied to the 2005 amendment in United States v. Newbold, 215 Fed. Appx. 289, 295 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007), it did so without comment or analysis. Additionally, I note that federal case law is not binding on this Court.