dissenting.
I find it impossible to reconcile the majority opinion with the holdings in NuGrape Bottling Co. v. Knott, 47 Ga. App. 539 (171 SE 151); Crisp v. Wright, 56 Ga. App. 338 (129 SE 390); Hines v. Bell, 104 Ga. App. 76 (3), supra; Marques v. Ross, 105 Ga. App. 133, 138 (123 SE2d 412); Roebuck v. Payne, 109 Ga. App. 525 (3), supra; Lee v. Swann, 111 Ga. App. 88, supra; Saunders v. Vikers, 116 Ga. App. 733, supra; Young v. Kickliter, 213 Ga. 42 (1) (96 SE2d 605); Chattanooga Pub. Co. v. Fulton, 215 Ga. 880, 883 (114 SE2d 138), and others similar, all requiring as a prerequisite to the imposing of liability under the negligent entrustment theory a showing of actual knowledge on the part of the owner that he was turning the vehicle over to an incompetent driver, or that the vehicle had some mechanical defect.
It was held in Hines v. Bell, 104 Ga. App. 76, supra, that “An allegation in the petition that the owner of the car had knowledge, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that the driver whom he allowed to operate the car was a dangerous, reckless and incompetent driver of automobiles and had such a reputation is subject to demurrer. . . Under Georgia law actual knowledge of the incompetency is necessary to impose liability on the owner for negligent acts of a driver operating with the consent of the owner but not as his servant or agent.” And see especially Lee v. Swann, 111 Ga. App. 88, supra. Cf. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Newby, 145 F2d 768.
Although the majority assert that their holding is rested on a matter of circumstantial evidence as showing actual knowledge, it seems to me that the real effect of the holding is to substitute constructive or imputed knowledge for actual knowledge as the test. It is to be noted too, that the circumstance upon which they most strongly rely is an after the fact one—a letter written by the father’s insurance company on December *31320, 1965, reciting that the son had been excluded from the coverage since January, 1962. The collision here involved occurred October 24, 1965, some two months before the letter was written. And although it is stated in that letter that the company “did not wish to provide coverage because of his previous driving record,” that information was apparently not divulged to the father until the writing of this letter. The father positively asserts that he had no such knowledge.