This case is before us on a petition by Curtis Lumber Co. to review a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed summary judgment and dismissal of a lien foreclosure sought by appellant Curtis Lumber Co. against respondents Sortor et al., in the Thurston County Superior Court.
The facts are not in dispute. In May 1971, Curtis Lumber Co. (hereinafter “Curtis”) delivered building materials to a construction site near Lacey, Washington. Respondent Washington Mutual Savings Bank recorded its mortgage on the property on June 22, 1971. Curtis filed its notice of lien on August 26, 1971, and exactly 8 months thereafter, on April 26, 1972, filed a complaint to foreclose that lien. Respondent bank was subsequently served with a copy of the summons and complaint on April 28, 1972. In answer, the bank moved for summary judgment alleging that Curtis had failed to timely commence its action, and its lien was barred, citing City Sash & Door Co. v. Bunn, 90 Wash. 669, 156 P. 854 (1916). Whereupon, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Curtis Lumber Co. v. Sortor, 9 Wn. App. 762, 515 P.2d 554 (1973).
RCW 60.04.100, which governs the expiration of mechanics’ liens, provides in pertinent part:
No lien created by this chapter binds the property subject to the lien for a longer period than eight calendar months after the claim has been filed unless an action be commenced in the proper court within that time to enforce such lien; . . .
(Italics ours).
The sole issue is whether a mechanics’ lien asserted under RCW 60.04.100 expires when a complaint is timely filed but service of summons upon necessary parties is not made within 8 months of the filing of the claim of lien. The Court of Appeals relied upon the 1916 decision in City Sash *766& Door Co. v. Bunn, supra, which held that the statute antedating RCW 60.04.100 limited the life of a mechanics’ lien to 8 months unless service was made upon all necessary parties. When the statutory antecedent of RCW 60.04.100 was enacted in 1893, actions were commenced by the service of a summons. Laws of 1893, ch. 127, § 1, p. 407. Shortly thereafter, Laws of 1895, ch. 86, § 1, p. 170 (similar in substance to the current court rule, CR 3),1 was enacted to provide for the commencement of actions by the service of a summons or the filing of a complaint. Nevertheless, in City Sash & Door Co., the court reasoned that commencement of an action for purposes of a mechanics’ lien was not modified by the revision in the general statute governing commencement of actions. Thus, the court held that necessary parties must be served prior to the expiration of the 8-month period to validly commence an action to foreclose on a mechanics’ lien.
In 1967, this court completely revised the Washington rules of civil procedure. The goal, as stated at the time, was “[t]o eliminate many procedural traps now existing in Washington practice;” Foreword to Civil Rules for Superior Court, 71 Wn.2d xxiii, xxiv (1967). The instant case provides a prime example of an anomalous, purely accidental, unnecessary but fatal procedural snare for the unwary or less fleet of foot. The new rules should serve as a manual or bible of civil procedure. Hopefully, careful adherence to the rules of the manual will avoid embarrassment to members *767of the bar because of delay and even the loss of lawsuits occasioned by unnecessarily complex and vagrant procedural technicalities. In other words, the basic purpose of the new rules of civil procedure is to eliminate or at least to minimize technical miscarriages of justice inherent in archaic procedural concepts once characterized by Vanderbilt as “the sporting theory of justice.”
Whatever purpose it was thought was served by the interpretation rendered in City Sash & Door Co. in 1916 certainly seems no longer particularly pertinent in today’s era of modern, streamlined rules of civil procedure. CR 81, adopted in 1967, is addressed to the scope of the modern rules:
Applicability In General
(a) To What Proceedings Applicable. Except where inconsistent with rules or statutes applicable to special proceedings [which are governed by SPR 90.04W-98.20W], these rules shall govern all civil proceedings. Where statutes relating to special proceedings provide for procedure under former statutes applicable generally to civil actions, the procedure shall be governed by these rules.
(b) Conflicting Statutes and Rules. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (a) of this rule, these rules supersede all procedural statutes and other rules that may be in conflict. [Adopted May 5, 1967, effective July 1, 1967.]
(Italics ours.)
There seems to us no question that the rule pronounced in the City Sash & Door Co. case was displaced and rendered inoperative by the adoption of the new rules of civil procedure. Cf. Galvanizer’s Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 8 Wn. App. 804, 509 P.2d 73 (1973). CR 3 clearly and unmistakably provides that an action is commenced today by service of a summons or by the filing of a complaint.
We must conclude, therefore, that RCW 60.04.100 is a statute of limitations upon the duration of a mechanics’ lien. According to the statutory language of RCW 60.04.100 *768the lien expires 8 months after filing a claim of lien unless an action to foreclose is commenced. An action is properly commenced under CR 3 by the filing of a complaint or the service of summons. In the instant case, Curtis -filed its complaint upon the final day of the 8-month period. Hence under RCW 4.16.170, the statute of limitations is tolled by the filing of a complaint, and, thus, Curtis’ action was timely commenced.
The Court of Appeals and the Superior Court are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Hamilton, Wright, Utter, and Brachtenbach, JJ., concur.
Current CR 3 provides as follows:
“Commencement Op Action
“(a) Methods. A civil action is commenced by service of a summons as provided in Rule 4 or by filing a complaint. If no service of summons is had upon a defendant before the complaint is filed, one or more defendants shall be served personally, or service by publication shall be commenced within 90 days after complaint is filed. Upon written demand by any other party, the plaintiff instituting the action forthwith, shall pay the filing fee and file the summons and complaint. If the summons was served without the complaint being attached, the plaintiff shall file the complaint within 5 days after the first service of the summons upon a defendant. . . .
“(b) Tolling Statute. [Reserved — See RCW 4.16.170.]”