dissenting.
Our law does not authorize or provide that every mentally ill or alcohol-dependent person requires treatment and certainly not by involuntary commitment. Yet the State has proceeded on just that basis. Through its questioning of the two expert witnesses, the State established only that L.B. was alcohol-dependent with associated dementia, that he has a mild passive-aggressive personality disorder, lacks judgment and insight and is on neuroleptic medication. The State also established that L.B. would probably not continue his medication if he were released from the hospital.
The State did not establish, and the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that L.B. is a person requiring treatment under our statutory criteria. Section 25-03.1-02(10), NDCC, defines a person requiring treatment as one who is mentally ill or chemically dependent, and there is a reasonable expectation that if the person is not treated there exists a serious risk of harm to that person, or others. Indeed, Dr. Park testified that L.B.’s recent history indicates only passivity, not aggressiveness, but that she relied on his prior manslaughter conviction as evidence of aggressiveness. However, she also states that L.B.’s passive-aggressive personality disorder is not the reason for hospitalization. Nor does Dr. Park advise hospitalization for alcohol treatment. The problem is, from this record, it is impossible to tell what is the reason for hospitalization other than for L.B. to take medication. But it is far from clear what consequences follow from his not taking medication. While medication may benefit a patient, benefit to the patient is not, without more, a sufficient cause for an involuntary commitment. Radmore v. R.N., 450 N.W.2d 758 (N.D.1990).
In its closing argument to the trial court, the State acknowledged that neither Dr. Park nor Dr. Parker knows what would happen if L.B. were released. They don’t have to “know,” but they must be able to express an opinion and a basis for that opinion that there is a reasonable likelihood of serious risk of harm absent treatment. Neither expert came close to satisfying this statutory requirement. The State argued to the trial court, however, that there was certainly “a possibility of problems” with “his own health” and “possible danger” to others. Our statutes do not authorize involuntary commitments for possibilities. I would reverse.