dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the Court of Appeals properly found Father’s motion for reconsideration was defective under Rule 7(b)(1), SCRCP, and therefore, the motion failed to toll the time for filing the notice of appeal. Accordingly, I would affirm.
The Court of Appeals relied on Martinez v. Trainor, 556 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.1977). In Martinez, the court found that a one-sentence Rule 59(e) motion failed to satisfy the particularity requirement of Rule 7(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P.,4 because the motion “failed to state even one ground for granting the *577motion and thus failed to meet the minimal standard of reasonable specification.’ ”5 Martinez, 556 F.2d at 820 (quoting 2-A Moore’s Federal Practice (3rd ed. 1975)). Although the appellant had later filed a brief in support of the motion, the Martinez court explained that “if a party could file a skeleton motion and later fill it in, the purpose of the time limitation would be defeated.” Id.6
The Court of Appeals in the instant case reasoned that to permit an insufficient post-trial motion to toll the time for filing an appeal would allow a litigant “to buy time without asserting a meritorious claim” which in turn would “further neither justice nor efficiency.” Camp v. Camp, 378 S.C. at 242, 662 S.E.2d at 461. Moreover, the Court of Appeals recognized that Father not only failed to specify the grounds for the motion for reconsideration, but failed to identify the relief that was sought. The Court of Appeals therefore stated the following:
*578Our rules clearly state the requirements for motions and for appeals. Permitting a post-trial motion that identifies neither the grounds on which it relies nor the relief sought to stay the time for appeal under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, would undermine our procedural rules. Moreover, it would encourage parties to file baseless post-trial motions with the expectation of “filling in the blanks” at a later date.
Id. at 243, 662 S.E.2d at 461.
I agree with the Court of Appeals’ analysis. To allow such patently defective motions to stay the time period for filing an appeal would “whittle away at the rules and ultimately render them meaningless.” Riley v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 1 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir.1993).
The majority concludes that as long as “neither party is prejudiced and the court is able to deal fairly with a motion for reconsideration,” then a skeletal motion is proper. I believe this effectively vitiates the plain (and relatively undemanding) requirements of the applicable rules of civil procedure. See Rule 7(b)(1), 59(g), SCRCP. Moreover, it will create unnecessary fact-intensive inquiries by our appellate courts to determine whether parties were — in fact — prejudiced by an insufficient motion.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision to dismiss the appeal.
. The federal rule 7(b)(1) is substantively the same as South Carolina’s Rule 7(b)(1).
. The motion in Martinez stated as follows:
NOW COMES the Defendant James L. Trainor, Director, ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC AID, by and through his attorney, WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General of Illinois, requests this Honorable Court, pursuant to Rule 59(e) FRCP, to alter, amend, or vacate the Declaratory Judgment entered November 11, 1976.
. Other federal and state courts are in accord with Martinez. See Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 611 (6th Cir.2005) ("A party who files a Rule 59(e) motion must comply with the motions filing requirements set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b).”); Talano v. Northwestern Med. Faculty Foundation, Inc., 273 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir.2001) (a Rule 59(e) motion “devoid of specificity” for its reasons for reconsideration does not satisfy Rule 7(b)(1), and therefore does not toll the time period for filing an appeal); Riley v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 1 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir.1993) (where the court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction and stated that "overlooking the defect” of a skeletal motion "would only serve to whittle away at the rules and ultimately render them meaningless and unenforceable”); Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 439 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir.2006) (where Rule 59(e) motion "did not provide a single ground for relief,” it was held insufficient and therefore did not toll the time for filing notice of appeal); N.C. Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 183 N.C.App. 466, 645 S.E.2d 105 (2007) (where a Rule 59 motion fails to list the grounds on which the motion is based, the time for filing an appeal is not tolled); Schaan v. Magic City Beverage Co., 609 N.W.2d 82 (N.D.2000) (where the court deemed invalid a motion for new trial because it was lacking in particularity and thus concluded the time for filing an appeal was not tolled).