dissenting.
Enumeration of Error No. 3 complains of a charge to the jury approving use of the value of substituted or replacement land that may or may not be acquired to offset the part taken, as a measure of ascertaining consequential damages. This requires reversal by this court.
*163Decided April 9, 1986 Rehearing denied May 22, 1986 Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Marion O. Gordon, Roland F. Matson, Beryl H. Weiner, J. Mathew Dwyer, James S. S. Howell, Assistant Attorney Generals, for appellant. W. Lyman Dillion, Leslie A. Dent, for appellees.In reading Wright v. MARTA, 248 Ga. 372, 376 (283 SE2d 466) (1981); Dept. of Transp. v. Gunnels, 175 Ga. App. 632 (334 SE2d 197) (1985) (overruled on March 4, 1985 in Supreme Court opinion Dept. of Transp. v. Gunnels, 255 Ga. 495 (340 SE2d 12) (1986)); McArthur v. State Hwy. Dept., 85 Ga. App. 500 (69 SE2d 781) (1952); and Jotin Realty v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 809 (331 SE2d 605) (1985), I find no authority for allowing the value of substitute or replacement land that may or may not be acquired in lieu of that taken, to be considered as an element in arriving at consequential damages. While, if substantially similar, it may be relevant in ascertaining the market value of the part actually taken, in my opinion it has no bearing and would be irrelevant and inadmissible as to the consequential damages or benefits to the remainder. See the excellent special concurrence of Justice Weltner in the latter cited Gunnels case.
The trial judge at one point said, “This case is so flawed now no matter who wins it’s going to be reversed.” I would reverse the judgment of the trial court so that a new trial may be had.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Banke, Presiding Judge McMurray, and Judge Pope join in this dissent.