(concurring for constitutionality). The provision of medical services is one of the most important and, in many aspects, one of the most difficult concerns of our day. One particularly difficult problem connected with the provision of medical services is medical malpractice dispute resolution. Medical malpractice litigation, as many will remember, reached crisis proportions. The consequences of the failure to adequately address this situation seemed incalculable.
The Legislature in the Medical Malpractice Ar- ' bitration Act of 1975, MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq., in its wisdom, attempted to address this serious problem. This litigation raises the question whether that act deprives litigants of a fair procedure in a fair tribunal because of the presence of a physician or health-care provider on the arbitration panel.
While I believe my brother M. F. Cavanagh makes a strongly reasoned case that the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975 unconstitutionally deprives plaintiffs of their due process rights to a fair and impartial decisionmaker, I am *443not wholly persuaded that plaintiffs’ proofs of bias are strong enough to overcome the presumption' of constitutionality of legislative action. I therefore concur with my brother T. G. Kavanagh’s conclusion that in these cases the arbitration panels have not been shown to be constitutionally biased by the presence of medical representatives.
Ryan, J.We are asked to determine whether the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act (MMAA) of 1975, MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq., violates the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution, US Const, Am XIV, § 1, or of the Michigan state constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 17, by requiring that a doctor or representative of a health-care provider serve as a member of the three-person arbitration panel. The plaintiffs claim that the MMAA violates their due process rights by denying them an impartial decisionmaker since the statute mandates that a medical person participate as a panel member. In Jackson v Detroit Memorial Hospital, 110 Mich App 202, 204; 312 NW2d 212 (1981), the Court of Appeals agreed that the MMAA did violate plaintiff Jackson’s due process rights by
"forcing the litigant to submit his or her claim to a tribunal which is composed in such a way that a high probability exists that such tribunal will be biased against the claimant without mandating the use of an arbitration form explicitly detailing the nature of the panel’s makeup.”
However, in Morris v Metriyakool, 107 Mich App 110; 309 NW2d 910 (1981), the Court held that the MMAA did not violate the Due Process Clause of the federal or state constitution.
We hold that the MMAA does not violate the *444Due Process Clause of either the federal or the state constitutions since the composition of the arbitration panel does not involve "state action” implicating the Due Process Clauses.
The plaintiffs also allege that even if the MMAA is constitutional, the arbitration agreements in these cases must not be enforced since they are contracts of adhesion and involve constructive fraud. We hold that the arbitration agreements are not contracts of adhesion, involve no fraud, and are enforceable.
Jackson v Detroit Memorial Hospital and Bloom
On November 3, 1977, plaintiff Jackson entered Detroit Memorial Hospital for non-emergency dental treatment by Dr. Bloom. At the time of her admission, the plaintiff executed an arbitration agreement which provided that, should she have any dispute with the hospital or the doctor concerning her care or treatment, the dispute would be submitted to arbitration. In accordance with the Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act, the plaintiff received a copy of the agreement which stated, in bold print above the signature line, that:
"This Agreement to Arbitrate Is not a Prerequisite to Health Care or Treatment, and May Be Revoked Within 60 Days After Execution by Notification in Writing to: Medical Records Director * * * >>
Along with a copy of the agreement, the hospital gave the plaintiff a booklet promulgated by the Michigan Commissioner of Insurance which more fully explained the arbitration system. Specifically, the booklet stated that a doctor or health-care provider would sit as a member of the arbitration *445panel. The plaintiff has never revoked the arbitration agreement.
On August 22, 1979, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Third Judicial Circuit Court alleging that the hospital and the doctor were guilty of malpractice in the manner in which the plaintiff was treated. On October 9, 1979, the defendants moved for accelerated judgment, asserting that the court had no jurisdiction over the case. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for accelerated judgment, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction because of the arbitration agreement.
The plaintiff appealed the grant of accelerated judgment to the Court of Appeals and raised three issues:
1) That the MMAA violated the plaintiff’s right to a hearing before a fair and impartial decision-maker.
2) That the MMAA, as applied, was unconscionable.
3) That the arbitration agreements conforming with the MMAA were contracts of adhesion.
The Court of Appeals held that the MMAA was unconstitutional as a violation of the plaintiff’s due process right to a fair and impartial decision-maker because one member of the arbitration panel was required to be a doctor or health-care provider’s representative, but that the statute was not unconscionable and did not constitute a contract of adhesion. Jackson v Detroit Memorial Hospital, 110 Mich App 202; 312 NW2d 212 (1981).
Morris v Metriyakool and South Macomb Hospital
Plaintiff Morris entered South Macomb Hospital on November 9, 1976, for non-emergency surgery under the care of defendant Dr. Metriyakool. In *446the course of her admission to the hospital, the plaintiff executed an arbitration agreement which provided that, should she have any dispute with the hospital or the doctor concerning her care or treatment, the dispute would be submitted to arbitration. In accordance with the MMAA, the arbitration agreement the plaintiff signed stated, in bold print above the signature line, that:
"This Agreement to Arbitrate Is not a Prerequisite to Health Care or Treatment, and May Be Revoked Within 60 Days After Execution by Notification in Writing to: Medical Records Director * * * >>
The plaintiff does not allege that she did not receive a copy of the agreement or that it was not accompanied by the booklet promulgated by the Commissioner of Insurance which fully explained the arbitration system, including the fact that a doctor or health-care provider would sit on the arbitration panel. The plaintiff did not revoke the arbitration agreement.
On July 19, 1977, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Macomb Circuit Court, alleging that the hospital and the doctor were guilty of malpractice in the care and treatment she received during or following the plaintiffs surgery át South Macomb Hospital. On October 25, 1977, the defendant hospital moved to submit the matter to arbitration. On July 19, 1979, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the MMAA did not violate the Due Process Clause, that the MMAA was not unconscionable, and that the MMAA did not involve contracts of adhesion. Morris v Metriyakool, 107 Mich App 110; 309 NW2d 910 (1981).
*447I. The Challenged Act: Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975
It may be helpful to examine the relevant provisions of the MMAA in some detail. The statute provides that a "health care provider” may, and a "hospital” must, offer to arbitrate disputes arising from the provision of health care. The offer, to be enforceable under the MMAA, must be made in compliance with the following statutory conditions:
1) the offer to arbitrate must be in writing;
2) the offer, if accepted by the patient, must be revocable for 60 days if revoked in writing;
3) the agreement must state, above the signature line in 12-point boldface type, that "This Agreement to Arbitrate Is not a Prerequisite to Health Care or Treatment and May Be Revoked Within 60 Days After Execution by Notification in Writing to: * * *”;
4) the patient must be given a booklet detailing the specific provisions of the arbitration agreement;
5) the patient must be given a copy of the arbitration agreement; and
6) the offer to arbitrate must not precede the provision of emergency medical care. MCL 600.5041; MSA 27A.5041, MCL 600.5042; MSA 27A.5042.
However, the MMAA does not require that the patient accept the doctor’s or the hospital’s offer to arbitrate. The decision whether or not to arbitrate is left entirely to the patient.
The statute delineates the structure in which medical malpractice arbitration will occur in cases in which the patient accepts the offer to arbitrate disputes arising from the care or treatment. The statute provides that the dispute will be heard by *448a three-person panel composed of an attorney, a doctor or hospital administrator, and a person who is neither a doctor nor an attorney. MCL 600.5044; MSA 27A.5044. Candidates for arbitrator positions are required to be screened by the American Arbitration Association or "other entity organized to arbitrate disputes pursuant to this chapter”. The screening includes consideration of a biographical statement by the proposed arbitration panel member and completion of a disclosure statement signed under oath. The candidate may also be personally interviewed by representatives of the association. MCL 600.5044; MSA 27A.5044, MCL 600.5045; MSA 27A.5045. From a roster of accepted candidates, the association compiles a list of five candidates in each of the three categories of panel members and sends the lists to the parties who agreed to arbitrate. MCL 600.5044; MSA 27A.5044. The parties are also given the candidates’ biographical sketches and may submit questions to the prospective panelists through the association. The parties then pick the arbitrators by striking from the lists the name of any candidate who is not satisfactory. No showing of cause is required. The first candidate in each list who is mutually agreeable to the parties is placed on the panel. If none can be agreed upon from the first set of lists, a second set of lists is provided and the process is repeated. If the parties still cannot agree upon a candidate for each category, the association proposes a single candidate to fill each remaining vacancy. This candidate can be challenged only for cause which requires that facts be produced to "establish that unusual community or professional pressures will unreasonably influence the objectivity of the panelist”. Additionally, if the parties elect, they may agree upon a person to sit on the arbitration panel who is not a candidate suggested *449by the association. The panel must still, in any event, be composed of a lawyer, a doctor or hospital administrator, and a person who is neither. MCL 600.5044; MSA 27A.5044.
Once the arbitration panel is chosen, the arbitration hearing is procedurally much like civil litigation. The parties may be represented by counsel, may present material evidence, may testify, and may cross-examine witnesses. The concepts of duty and care and practice are identical to those used in civil litigation. There are no limits on the award of damages except as provided by law. MCL 600.5043; MSA 27A.5043. Expert testimony is admissible, but is not required. The hearing is informal and in accordance with the rules promulgated by the association except that the federal rules of civil procedure must be followed where not following them would result in substantial prejudice. MCL 600.5050; MSA 27A.5050. Pretrial discovery and subpoenas are available essentially as allowed in civil litigation. MCL 600.5048; MSA 27A.5048, MCL 600.5051; MSA 27A.5051.
A majority of the panel may grant any relief deemed equitable and just. In reaching its decision, the panel may order written briefs, but must decide within 30 days of the termination of the hearing or of the submission of written briefs. The decision must be in writing, must be signed, and must include the panel’s determination of all issues submitted for arbitration which are necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The panel’s written opinion must include the reasons for a finding of liability or nonliability, the reasons for the award, and, where applicable, a determination of the degree of fault of each of the parties. A dissenting panel member may file a written dissent. MCL 600.5055; MSA 27A.5055. The decision of the *450arbitration panel is appealable according to the procedures and the grounds available under the arbitration law and applicable court rules.
The MMAA also includes numerous provisions concerning the arbitration process which are not directly applicable to this case.
II. State Action
The plaintiffs’ primary contention is that the challenged act violates their due process rights. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that a three-step analysis is required to determine whether there has been a due process violation.1 For a due process violation to exist, as *451the plaintiffs assert, there must be:
1) a deprivation by the state or a private person who may be fairly treated as the state;
2) of a constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest;
3) without due process of law.2
If any one of these elements is missing, the challenged conduct is not a violation of due process no *452matter how "discriminatory or wrongful”. Blum v Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 1002; 102 S Ct 2777; 73 L Ed 2d 534 (1982), citing Shelly v Kraemer, 334 US 1, 13; 68 S Ct 836; 92 L Ed 1161 (1948).
We begin then with the "state action” element of the Due Process Clause analysis.
Background United States Supreme Court Case Law
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the task of determining whether state action exists is not as simple as might appear since few cases raise the issue in instances in which a state acts directly or a private person acts without any involvement of the state. Rather, the issue is usually raised on middle ground facts where the challenged action is neither purely state action nor purely private action. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co, 419 US 345, 349-350; 95 S Ct 449; 42 L Ed 2d 477 (1974):
"While the principle that private action is immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment is well established and easily stated, the question whether particular conduct is 'private’, on the one hand, or 'state action’, on the other, frequently admits of no easy answer.”
Although no easy answer is always evident, the United States Supreme Court has identified three situations in which "private action” rises to the level of "state action” so as to involve the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment:
First, the "state action”/ "private action” nexus *453is formed when the challenged conduct "has sufficiently received the imprimatur of the State so as to make it 'state’ action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment”. Blum, supra, p 1003.
Second, the "state action”/ "private action” nexus is formed where the challenged "private” conduct involves the exercise of powers that are "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State”. Jackson v Metropolitan Edison, p 353.
Third, the "state action”/ "private action” nexus is formed where the challenged conduct necessitates a "symbiotic relationship” between the state and the private party.
The case law under each of these situations will be discussed separately before applying them to the facts of these cases.
1. State Command or Encouragement of Private Action
A state will be held responsible for "private” action only if the state has placed its "imprimatur” on the challenged action "so as to make it 'state’ action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment”. Blum, supra, p 1003. The state places its "imprimatur” upon "private action” when it "commands or encourages” the questioned activity. However, "command or encourage” is a term of art.
"[United States Supreme Court] precedents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State. * * * [But] [m]ere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State *454responsible for those initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment”. Blum, pp 1004-1005.
The precedent upon which the United States Supreme Court makes this statement illuminates the statement, which might otherwise offer only dark and abstruse conclusions.
In Jackson v Metropolitan Edison Co, supra, Metropolitan Edison, a public utility, filed a general tariff statement with the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission which regulates all public utilities in Pennsylvania. Included in Metropolitan Edison’s general tariff statement were a series of provisions which allowed the utility to discontinue service to nonpaying customers following reasonable notice. Pursuant to these provisions, Metropolitan Edison discontinued the plaintiff’s utility service. She sued, alleging a violation of the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the United States Supreme Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated since, despite the fact that the deprivation procedure was "passed” by the state public utility commission, there was no "state action”. As the United States Supreme Court stated:
"Here, on the other hand, there was no such imprimatur placed on the practice of Metropolitan about which petitioner complains. The nature of governmental regulation of private utilities is such that a. utility may frequently be required by the state regulatory scheme to obtain approval for practices a business regulated in less detail would be free to institute without any approval from a regulatory body. Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility *455and approved by the Commission into 'state action’. At most, the Commission’s failure to overturn this practice amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired. Respondent’s exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so 'state action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Jackson, supra, p 357.
In Flagg Bros, Inc v Brooks, 436 US 149; 98 S Ct 1729; 56 L Ed 2d 185 (1978), the United States Supreme Court found that there was no state action when Flagg Brothers, a bailor-warehouse, sold plaintiff’s goods pursuant to a New York Uniform Commercial Code provision allowing "self-help” sales.3 The provision under which Flagg Brothers acted delineated the situations in which "self-help” was available and prescribed the exact manner in which the sale was to be carried out. The plaintiff, whose goods were sold by Flagg Brothers, sued, alleging that the sale violated due process since Flagg Brothers was acting at the *456"command or encouragement” of the state. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed:
"Our cases state 'that a State is responsible for the * * * act of a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.’ * * * This Court, however, has never held that a State’s mere acquiescence in a private action converts that action into that of the State. The Court rejected a similar argument in Jackson [p 357]:
" 'Approval by a state utility commission of such a request from a regulated utility, where the commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission into "state action.” (Emphasis added.)’
"[Likewise,] the State of New York is in no way responsible for Flagg Brothers’ decision, a decision which the State in § 7-210 permits but does not compel, to threaten to sell these respondents’ belongings.
"Here, the State of New York has not compelled the sale of a bailor’s goods, but has merely announced the circumstances under which its courts will not interfere with a private sale. Indeed, the crux of respondents’ complaint is not that the State has acted, but that it has refused to act. This statutory refusal to act is no different in principle from an ordinary statute of limitations whereby the State declines to provide a remedy for private deprivations of property after the passage of a given period of time.” Flagg Bros, supra, pp 164-166.
Finally, and most recently, in Blum, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that nursing home decisions to alter the level of ’care of Medicaid patients and thus affect their Medicaid benefits does not involve state action despite the fact that the state has an interest in and oversees the nursing home determinations. After noting that "[fjaithful adherence to the 'state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment requires care*457ful attention to the gravamen of the plaintiffs complaint”, Blum, supra, p 1003, the United States Supreme Court declared:
"[T]he Court of Appeals’ finding of state action cannot stand. The court reasoned that state action was present in the discharge or transfer decisions implemented by the nursing homes because the State responded to those decisions by adjusting the patient’s Medicaid benefits. Respondents, however, do not challenge the adjustment of benefits, but the discharge or transfer of patients to lower levels of care without adequate notice or hearings. That the State responds to such actions by adjusting benefits does not render it responsible for those actions. The decisions about which respondents complain are made by physicians and nursing home administrators, all of whom are concededly private parties. There is no suggestion that those decisions were influenced in any degree by the State’s obligation to adjust benefits in conformity with changes in the cost of medically necessary care.
"* * * [Additionally, the respondents] argue that the State 'affirmatively commands’ the summary discharge or transfer of Medicaid patients who are thought to be inappropriately placed in their nursing facilities. Were this characterization accurate, we would have a different question before us. However, our review of the statutes and regulations identified by respondents does not support respondents’ characterization of them.” Blum, supra, p 1005.
The Court supported its conclusion as follows:
"We cannot say that the State, by requiring completion of a form, is responsible for the physician’s decision.
"In any case, respondents’ complaint is about nursing home decisions to discharge or transfer, not to admit, Medicaid patients. But we are not satisfied that the State is responsible for those decisions either.
*458"[State] regulations do not require the nursing homes to rely on the forms in making discharge or transfer decisions, nor do they demonstrate that the State is responsible for the decision to discharge or transfer particular patients. Those decisions ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State.” Blum, supra, pp 1006-1008.
Therefore, to constitute state "command or encouragement” or state "imprimatur”, the state’s action must be more prominent and pervasive than that present in Jackson, Flagg Bros, or Blum. To the extent that the state’s involvement is equal to or less than that in those cases, there is no "state action” for Due Process Clause purposes.
2. Performance of a Traditionally Exclusively Governmental Function
"State action” of Due Process Clause magnitude is also present where a private person is performing "traditionally exclusively governmental functions”. As with "imprimatur” state action, "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State”, state action is best understood through its application in specific cases.
In Jackson, supra, pp 352-353, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission case, the United States Supreme Court held that the public utility did not exercise a state power which was traditionally exclusively a governmental function.
"If we were dealing with the exercise by Metropolitan of some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our case would be quite a different one. But while the Pennsylvania statute imposes an obligation to furnish service on regulated utilities, it imposes *459no such obligation on the State. The Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that the furnishing of utility services is either a state function or a municipal duty. * * *
"Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the supplying of utility service is not traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State, petitioner invites the expansion of the doctrine of this limited line of cases into a broad principle that all businesses 'affected with the public interest’ are state actors in all their actions.
"We decline the invitation.”
Since the provision of utility service is not a state governmental function, it cannot be either traditional or exclusive as required for state action under the Due Process Clause.
In Flagg Bros, supra, pp 158-163, the bailorwarehouse sale case, the United States Supreme Court again held that there was no violation of the Due Process Clause because there was no "state action”. Specifically, the Supreme Court refused to hold that the private resolution of disputes was a "traditionally exclusively governmental function”. It noted that while "many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State’ ”. While the Supreme Court recognized that Flagg Brothers acted pursuant to a state statute which detailed a course of action, the Court held that the statutory "system of rights and remedies, recognizing the traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships in the commercial world, can hardly be said to have delegated to Flagg Brothers an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign”. The Supreme Court obviously was not impressed with the argument that the rights were created by state statute, so it held that "our sovereign-function cases do not support a finding of state action here”. Here, the United States Su*460preme Court placed emphasis on the exclusive nature of the challenged action.
Finally, in Blum, supra, p 1011, the nursing-home care case, the United States Supreme Court refused to find that the nursing homes performed functions which were traditionally and exclusively governmental functions.
"Respondents’ argument in this regard is premised on their assertion that both the Medicaid statute and the New York Constitution make the State responsible for providing every Medicaid patient with nursing home services. The state constitutional provisions cited by respondents, however, do no more than authorize the legislature to provide funds for the care of the needy. * * * They do not mandate the provision of any particular care, much less long-term nursing care. Similarly, the Medicaid statute requires that the States provide funding for skilled nursing services as a condition to the receipt of federal monies. * * * It does not require that the States provide the services themselves.”
Therefore, to find state action based upon a private party exercising sovereign powers, the powers exercised must be both traditionally and exclusively the power of government. As noted in Flagg Bros, while "many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State’ ”. Flagg Bros, supra, p 158. The challenged action must satisfy both requirements to constitute "state action” of Due Process Clause magnitude.
3. Interdependent Symbiotic Relationship
Finally, the "state action”/ "private action” nexus is formed where the state and the private entities have a mutually dependent or symbiotic relationship. The Supreme Court created this basis *461for finding state action in Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715; 81 S Ct 856; 6 L Ed 2d 45 (1961). The Court has applied the test, but has not found that it was met in three other cases: Moose Lodge No 107 v Irvis, 407 US 163; 92 S Ct 1965; 32 L Ed 2d 627 (1972), Jackson, supra, and Blum, supra.
In Burton, the state parking authority built a parking facility which included commercial shop space which private parties could rent from the parking authority. One of the parking authority’s lessees ran a restaurant which served only white persons. After noting that the parking authority relied very heavily on the shop rental funds to pay for the facility and that the parking authority could have prohibited the discrimination by lease provision, the Supreme Court stated:
"By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle [the restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so 'purely private’ as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Burton, supra, p 725.
In the more than 20 years since Burton, the Supreme Court has not found another "symbiotic” relationship constituting "state action”. In Moose Lodge, supra, the Court discussed whether a symbiotic relationship existed where the state liquor commission gave a liquor license to a racially discriminatory club. It decided that there was no "state action” since "there is nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship between lessor and les*462see that was present in Burton”. Moose Lodge, supra, p 175. The Supreme Court in Jackson, supra, also reviewed the symbiotic relationship test and applied it to the regulation of a public utility. As in Moose Lodge, the Court found "absent in the instant case the symbiotic relationship presented in Burton”. Jackson, supra, p 357. In Blum, supra, pp 1010-1011, the Court reviewed the nursing home case for any symbiotic relationship between the state and the nursing home.
"Finally, respondents advance the rather vague generalization that such a relationship exists between the State and the nursing homes it regulates that the State may be considered a joint participant in the homes’ discharge and transfer of Medicaid patients. * * * Respondents argue that State subsidization of the operating and capital costs of the facilities, payment of the medical expenses of more than 90% of the patients in the facilities, and the licensing of the facilities by the State, taken together convert the action of the homes into 'state’ action. But accepting all of these assertions as true, we are nonetheless unable to agree that the State is responsible for the decisions challenged by respondents. As we have previously held, privately owned enterprises providing services that the State would not necessarily provide, even though they are extensively regulated, do not fall within the ambit of Burton.”
The symbiotic-relationship basis for attributing private action to the state is therefore the most limited of the three bases. The Supreme Court has not found it present in any recent case.
III. Application of the State Action Tests to the Facts of These Cases
A. State Command or Encouragement of Private Action
As indicated above, the plaintiffs object on due *463process grounds to the state’s enforcement of their private arbitration agreement since the agreement complies with the MMAA provisions regulating the arbitration process. The issue is whether the state has "commanded or encouraged” or placed its "imprimatur” on the private actions so as to transform them into "state actions”.
It is uncontroverted that the state, by enacting the MMAA, does not require anyone to arbitrate. It does, however, establish and regulate an acceptable process of arbitration of medical malpractice claims. In effect, the state enforces the private decision to elect complying arbitration over traditional litigation. In doing so, the state sets the standard for enforceable arbitration agreements in medical malpractice cases and establishes the acceptable procedure for medical malpractice arbitration. The question is whether such action constitutes "command and encouragement” sufficient to attribute the private parties’ agreement to arbitrate according to state law to the state.
The answer, we think, according to analogous United States Supreme Court cases, is clearly no. In providing that if a private person elects to arbitrate a medical malpractice claim the claim shall be heard by a three-member panel which includes a doctor or a hospital administrator, the statute does not constitute state action through "command or encouragement”. The result is the same whether one relies primarily upon Flagg Bros, Jackson, or Blum.
In Flagg Bros, the state enacted a statute which provided that an individual bailee could sell a bailor’s property to pay an overdue bill if the bailee complied with the statute by giving notice, holding the sale in a párticular way, and meeting *464other requirements. The state did not require that the bailee sell the bailor’s goods; it only provided that the bailee could elect to do so without intervention by the state. But, when the bailee sold the bailor’s goods, the state would not use its courts to correct the sale or punish the bailor.4 As the United States Supreme Court noted:
"Here, the State of New York has not compelled the sale of a bailor’s goods, but has merely announced the circumstances under which its courts will not interfere with a private sale. Indeed, the crux of respondents’ complaint is not that the State has acted, but that it has refused to act. This statutory refusal to act is no different in principle from an ordinary statute of limitations whereby the State declines to provide a remedy for private deprivations of property after the passage of a given period of time.” Flagg Bros, supra, p 166.
In the cases before us, the state has not compelled the private parties to arbitrate before a panel composed of a lawyer, a doctor or hospital administrator, and a layperson. Instead, it has created a system which private persons may elect to use. If arbitration is elected, and if there is compliance with the statute, the state will not allow a party to void the arbitration agreement by suing in an ordinary civil action. To paraphrase the United States Supreme Court in Flagg Bros:
*465 Here, the State of Michigan has not compelled the parties to arbitrate their disputes concerning medical malpractice, but has merely announced the circumstances under which its courts will not interfere with a private agreement to arbitrate medical malpractice disputes. Indeed, the crux of plaintiffs’ complaint is not that the state has acted, but that the state has refused to act to prohibit private agreements to arbitrate before a three-person panel, one of whom is a doctor or a hospital administrator. The statutory refusal to act is no different than an ordinary statute of limitations by which the state declines to provide a civil trial remedy for medical malpractice after the passage of a given period of time.
In Jackson, supra, p 357, the United States Supreme Court held that the public utility acted "privately” when it cut off plaintiff’s service despite the fact that the state had approved the practice when it approved the utility’s general tariff.
"At most, the Commission’s failure to overturn this practice amounted to no more than a determination that a Pennsylvania utility was authorized to employ such a practice if it so desired. Respondent’s exercise of the choice allowed by state law where the initiative comes from it and not from the State, does not make its action in doing so 'state action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
As applied to these cases, Jackson supports the conclusion that the State of Michigan, through the MMAA, merely afforded an alternative to private parties who have medical malpractice disputes. The initiative to accept the state-regulated medical malpractice arbitration system does not constitute "state action”. It merely constitutes a private choice which is permitted and, if chosen, is enforced by the state.
*466Finally, in Blum, supra, p 1005, the United States Supreme Court explicitly distinguished between state response to private actions and state responsibility for private actions.
"That the State responds to such actions by adjusting benefits does not render it responsible for those actions. The decisions about which respondents complain are made by physicians and nursing home administrators, all of whom are concededly private parties. There is no suggestion that those decisions were influenced in any degree by the State’s obligation to adjust benefits in conformity with changes in the cost of medically necessary care.”
Here, the state certainly responds to private decisions to arbitrate medical malpractice claims. Those which conform with the state’s statutory standard are enforced; those which do not conform with the statutory standard are not enforced. This is not, however, a situation in which the state is responsible for the private decision. Whether private parties choose to arbitrate and what terms they agree upon are not controlled by the state. Private parties may do as they please. However, the state responds according to its stated position which is articulated in the MMAA. The decisions about which the plaintiffs complain, whether to arbitrate and the composition of the arbitration panel, are private decisions of private parties. There is no suggestion that those decisions are mandated in any degree by the state’s decision to enforce medical malpractice arbitration agreements which comport with the MMAA.
Therefore, there is no "imprimatur” or "command or encouragement” state action in these cases. The state’s regulation of medical malpractice arbitration does not alter this conclusion. For *467purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state’s enforcement of or response to private decisions does not constitute "state action”.
B. Performance of a Traditionally Exclusively Governmental Function
The private choice to arbitrate as allowed by state law does not constitute private performance of a "traditionally exclusively governmental function”. While resolution of private disputes has traditionally been performed by the state through its courts, the state was not the only entity performing private dispute resolution. As the United States Supreme Court recognized, a statutory "system of rights and remedies, recognizing the traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships in the commercial world, can hardly be said to have delegated to [the private party] an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign”. Flagg Bros, supra, p 160. There the state allowed self-help sales in bailor-bailee situations; here the state allows and enforces private agreements to arbitrate. In both cases, the method of self-help or arbitration is closely regulated. But, the fact remains that the state has not and is not the exclusive decisionmaker concerning private disputes. This is another instance which proves correct the Supreme Court’s statement that while "many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State’.” Flagg Bros, supra, p 158.
Private civil dispute resolution is not a traditionally exclusively governmental function for which the state’s acquiescence in performance by private parties constitutes state action. The deprivation occurs because of a private decision which does not *468constitute the performance of a governmental function.
C. Symbiotic Relationship
The private decision to arbitrate as allowed by the MMAA does not create a symbiotic relationship between the state and the private parties to the arbitration agreement. The state’s relationship with the private decision is merely to enforce the private decisions which are in accordance with state law.
In Blum, supra, p 1010, the United States Supreme Court held that no such
"relationship exists between the State and the nursing homes it regulates that the State may be considered a joint participant in the homes’ discharge and transfer of Medicaid patients.”
The Court found no relationship even though the state subsidized the capital and operating expenses of the nursing homes, the state paid for the medical expenses of 90% of the nursing home patients, and the state licensed the nursing homes.
In these cases, the state’s participation in the challenged activity does not reach the level of regulation and subsidization involved in Blum, let alone the level of lessor-lessee involved in Burton. The state’s relationship to the activity challenged in these cases is like that in Jackson and Flagg Bros. The state allows or enforces the private decision, but does not seek direct benefit from the challenged activity. Therefore, there is no symbiotic relationship "state action” in these cases.
D. Conclusion
We conclude, therefore, that since there is no *469"state action” of Fourteenth Amendment proportions in these cases, the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process concerns are not implicated. Consequently, we need not consider whether there is a constitutionally cognizable life, liberty, or property interest, or whether there is a deprivation without due process of law. The MMAA, with its requirement that a doctor or hospital administrator sit on the arbitration panel, does not deprive the plaintiffs of an impartial decisionmaker in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
*471IV
The plaintiffs have raised three additional challenges to the enforcement of the arbitration agreements they signed. They contend, first, that the arbitration agreements should not be enforced because they are contracts of adhesion. Second, they contend that the arbitration agreements should not be enforced since they involve constructive fraud. Third, they contend that the arbitration agreements should not be enforced since the defendants have not carried their burden of proof that the plaintiffs voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived their right to a jury trial. We reject all three contentions.
A
A contract of adhesion is a contract which has some or all of the following characteristics: the parties to the contract were of unequal bargaining strength; the contract is expressed in standardized language prepared by the stronger party to meet his needs; and the contract is offered by the stronger party to the weaker party on a "take it or leave it” basis. Zurich Ins Co v Rombough, 384 *472Mich 228, 232-233; 180 NW2d 775 (1970). Therefore, the essence of a contract of adhesion is a nonconsensual agreement forced upon a party against his will.
As is obvious, the arbitration agreements involved in this case do not satisfy any of the characteristics of contracts of adhesion. First, the arbitration agreements are not contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power. The plaintiffs were free to accept or reject the contract without any negative consequences since the agreements must explicitly and clearly provide that "[t]his agreement to arbitrate is not a prerequisite to health care or treatment”. Moreover, even after the plaintiffs signed the arbitration agreements, they were free to revoke the agreements within 60 days since the agreement "may be revoked within 60 days after execution by notification in writing to: Medical Records Director”. Consequently, the arbitration agreements signed by the plaintiffs do not involve the unequal bargaining power characteristic of contracts of adhesion. Second, while the arbitration agreements are expressed in standardized language, their essential provisions are not written by the defendants nor are they designed for the exclusive benefit of the defendants. Rather, the Legislature determined the essential provisions of the arbitration agreements to provide a fair alternative to medical malpractice litigation. Third, while the arbitration agreements were offered to the plaintiffs on a yes or no basis, they were not offered on what would traditionally be considered a "take it or leave it” basis. The arbitration agreements were not a necessary prerequisite to health care and were not offered to the plaintiffs under any threat of negative consequences for deciding not to sign the arbitration agreements. The plaintiffs were free to accept the *473contracts with an option to reject them within 60 days or to reject them with the opportunity to enter into arbitration later by agreement.
Therefore, the arbitration agreements involved in these cases are not contracts of adhesion.
B
This Court has defined constructive fraud as "receipt and retention of unmerited benefits”. Goodrich v Waller, 314 Mich 456, 469; 22 NW2d 862 (1946). The unmerited benefit is generally obtained as a result of the breach of a legal or equitable duty. In this case, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants are guilty of constructive fraud since the arbitration agreements did not disclose the composition of the arbitration panel, did not disclose the attitudes and biases of persons in the medical profession against plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases, and did not disclose the relationship between medical malpractice awards and medical malpractice insurance costs. The plaintiffs believe that these nondisclosures constitute an "unmerited benefit” which makes their arbitration agreements unenforceable. We disagree.
We note at the outset that the composition of the arbitration panel was disclosed to the plaintiffs in the booklet which must accompany a valid arbitration agreement. Therefore, that portion of the plaintiffs’ argument does not support a finding of constructive fraud. Additionally, the plaintiffs do not provide any legal support for their contention that the defendants were under a legal or equitable duty to disclose the attitudes of doctors in general, the biases of the medical profession against plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases, or *474the effect of medical malpractice arbitration awards as opposed to medical malpractice litigation awards upon medical malpractice insurance rates. Finally, we do not accept the plaintiffs’ unsupported blanket assertion of professional bias rising to the level of constructive fraud.
Therefore, the arbitration agreements involved in these cases are not based upon unconscionable constructive fraud.
C
Finally, we reject the plaintiffs’ contention that their arbitration agreements are unenforceable since the defendants did not adequately prove that the plaintiffs voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived their constitutional right to jury trial. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ contention, we do not reach the merits of their argument. We reject it instead because the argument was not raised in the trial court, in the Court of Appeals, or in this Court in the plaintiffs’ applications for leave to appeal. It is axiomatic that an issue not properly raised and preserved will not ordinarily be considered on appeal in this Court. Dale v Whiteman, 388 Mich 698; 202 NW2d 797 (1972); Gordon Grossman Building Co v Elliott, 382 Mich 596; 171 NW2d 441 (1969); Therrian v General Laboratories, Inc, 372 Mich 487; 127 NW2d 319 (1964). This is, or course, a general rule. However, we reject the application of the Johnston v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 337 Mich 572, 580; 60 NW2d 464 (1953), exception to the facts of these cases. The Johnston exception, which was without authority when announced, and which has not until today been cited by this Court since it was laid down 30 years ago, should not be expanded and applied to this case.
*475V
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in Jackson v Detroit Memorial Hospital and the case is remanded to the trial court for action consistent with this opinion.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in Morris v Metriyakool.
The MMAA is constitutional and the arbitration agreements signed by the plaintiffs are not contracts of adhesion, are not unconscionable, and do not involve unconstitutional irrebuttable presumptions.
Brickley, J., concurred with Ryan, J.The United States Supreme Court has traditionally spoken of a two-step due process violation test. In Ingraham v Wright, 430 US 651, 672; 97 S Ct 1401; 51 L Ed 2d 711 (1977), the Court stated the test as follows:
"The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Application of this prohibition requires the familiar two-stage analysis: We must first ask whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of 'life, liberty or property’; if protected interests are implicated, we then must decide what procedures constitute 'due process of law’.”
The Court apparently spoke in terms of a two-stage analysis because there was no dispute in the case concerning the existence of "state action”.
However, in Martinez v California, 444 US 277, 284-285; 100 S Ct 553; 62 L Ed 2d 481 (1980), the Court applied a three-stage analysis to due process challenges.
"[T]he Fourteenth Amendment protected her only from deprivation by the 'State * * * of life * * * without due process of law’. Although the decision to release Thomas from prison was action by the State, the action of Thomas five months later cannot be fairly characterized as state action. * * * [W]e hold that, taking these particular allegations as true, [the State] did not 'deprive’ appellants’ decedent of life within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment”.
The Martinez due process analysis is, therefore, divided into three steps: 1) was there state action, 2) which deprived the person of life, liberty, or property, 3) without due process of law.
In Parratt v Taylor, 451 US 527, 536-537; 101 S Ct 1908; 68 L Ed 2d 420 (1981), the Court articulated the due process test in terms of four steps:
*451"Unquestionably, respondent’s claim satisfies three prerequisites of a valid due process claim: The petitioners acted under color of state law; the hobby kit falls within the definition of property; and the alleged loss, even though negligently caused, amounted to a deprivation. Standing alone, however, these three elements do not establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nothing in that Amendment protects against all deprivations of life, liberty, or property by the State. The Fourteenth Amendment protects only .against deprivations 'without due process of law’.”
We note that the "tests” have the following common elements, regardless of the particular articulation of the analysis: 1) an act by the state, 2) which deprives the person of life, liberty, or property, 3) without due process of law. Since this three-step analysis is most direct and logical, we have stated the analysis in three steps.
We recognize that Justice Kavanagh and Chief Justice Williams have chosen to decide the case upon the basis of the third element of the test: "without due process of law”. We believe, that such an analysis is inappropriate.
There can be no due process concern without state action. "[T]he commands of the Fourteenth Amendment are addressed only to the State or to those acting under color of its authority”. District of Columbia v Carter, 409 US 418, 423; 93 S Ct 602; 34 L Ed 2d 613 (1973). Until there is a finding, implicit or explicit, of state action, the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment are not implicated and should not be addressed. Even the language of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment leads to this organization of the evaluation of a due process challenge:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”.
Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court which has not, so far as our research shows, ever passed over the state action issue to reach a later step of the test, we shall not assume state action and decide this case on "without due process of law” grounds.
Justice Cavanagh declares:
"Second, although it is not a truly distinguishing feature, it appears to me that the United States Supreme Court was wrong in concluding that the procedures outlined in UCC 7-210 to enforce a warehouseman’s lien did not involve state action. Indeed, that conclusion did not easily or naturally follow from its prior case law. See Flagg Bros, supra, pp 168-179 (Stevens, J., dissenting)”. Post, 482.
The plaintiffs raise an objection to the MMAA based upon the federal Due Process Clause. In evaluating that claim, this Court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. "[T]he decisions of [the United States Supreme Court], in cases involving Federal questions, áre conclusive authorities in the State courts”. Provident Institution v Massachusetts, 73 US (6 Wall) 611, 628; 18 L Ed 907 (1867). This rule has continued to the present. See Fletcher v Weir, 455 US 603; 102 S Ct 1309; 71 L Ed 2d 490 (1982). Therefore, we cannot agree with our brother Cavanagh that we are free to disregard the majority decision in Flagg Bros, supra, because we might think that "the United States Supreme Court was wrong” in favor of the dissenting position of Justice Stevens. Moreover, that Court, not this one, is the final arbiter concerning the scope of federal constitutional rights.
Justice Cavanagh would distinguish Flagg Bros on the further basis that the plaintiff in Flagg Bros did not challenge the procedure afforded by the state statute, but only challenged the state court’s refusal to intervene, while in this case the plaintiffs challenge the procedure afforded by the state statute. This "distinction” is incorrect. As the United States Supreme Court said in Flagg Bros, "[the plaintiff] initiated this class action * * * seeking * * * [a] declaration that such a sale pursuant to § 7-210 would violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment”. It is therefore clear that the plaintiff in Flagg Bros was indeed challenging the procedure afforded by the state statute.
Our brother Cavanagh contends that if we find that the MMAA does not involve state action, we must also conclude that judicial promulgation, use, and enforcement of court rules regulating proceedings in our courts does not involve state action. We respectfully suggest that such a conclusion is unsound for three reasons:
First, our colleague focuses narrowly upon a single factor of the state-action analysis. That factor, whether the state promulgates the rules controlling the party’s challenged actions, is relevant but not controlling in the state-action analysis. As is evident from Flagg Bros and Blum, the state may promulgate rules under which private parties act without automatically transforming private action into state action. Likewise, as is evident in the "traditionally exclusively governmental function” cases and the "interdependent symbiotic relationship” cases, the absence of state-promulgated rules regulating private action will not prevent private action from rising to the level of state action. Therefore, the presence or absence of state-promulgated rules is not the distinguishing characteristic which differentiates state action from private action.
Instead of being the sole and controlling factor as our colleague appears to assume, promulgation by the state of rules regulating the challenged private action is merely one factor which must be considered in light of other relevant factors. It is these other factors, together with the fact of state rule promulgation, which determine whether or not private action pursuant to state-promulgated rules is regarded as state action. Among the other factors are:
1) the content and scope of the rules themselves,
2) whether the rules require or merely allow private action,
3) whether the rules are carried out and enforced by the state or someone else who is not related to the state,
4) whether the rules provide for or require active state involvement or merely involve state involvement at the promulgation stage.
In focusing only upon the fact that the state promulgated the rules, our colleague fails to suggest a context in which to determine whether the challenged private action should be treated like state action.
*470Second, we think our colleague misinterprets the purpose of our analysis. In this case, the Court was required to determine whether or not private action (arbitration pursuant to the MMAA) rose to the level of state action so as to violate due process. In our colleague’s hypothesis (promulgation, use, and enforcement of court rules), the Court would not be required to determine whether or not private action rose to the level of state action. Rather, in the hypothetical case, the challenged actions would be the direct action of a branch of state government and would not require vicarious ascription to the state. The action would be state action of a branch of state government because the court rules are not self-enforcing; they do not have authority independent of a court decision or order, and they are intended to regulate the actions of the judicial branch of state government and the actions of private parties before the judicial branch of state government. Therefore, in the hypothesis, the issue would not require application of our present analysis since where state action is' clearly present, there is no occasion to determine whether private action rises to the level of state action.
Third, even if one were somehow able to concoct a hypothesis in which the application of a court rule allegedly deprived a person of due process or equal protection without any direct state action (court order or court proceeding), our analysis in this case would not inevitably require a finding in the hypothetical case that there was no state action. As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in Jackson, supra, pp 349-350, the determination whether a challenged action is private or state "frequently admits of no easy answer”. Therefore, the decision whether private action rises to the level of state action necessarily turns upon the particular facts of the case. As we have indicated, the facts necessarily include those relevant "other” factors as well as whether the state promulgated the rules regulating the challenged private conduct. Obviously, both this case and our colleague’s hypothetical case involve rules promulgated by the state. The "other” factors, however, demonstrate that this case (MMAA) and the hypothetical case (court rules) differ in several significant ways:
1) In both cases, the state-promulgated rules regulate a dispute resolution process. In the MMAA case, both parties mutually agree upon the forum. In the court rules case, only one party chooses the forum (as a general rule).
2) Both cases involve a dispute resolution forum. In the MMAA case, the forum is independently administered. In the court rules case, the forum is a branch of state government administered by the state.
3) In the MMAA case, the forum exists because parties mutually agree to use it. In the court rules case, the forum is constitutionally mandated. Const 1963, art 6, § 1.
4) In the MMAA case, the state does not involve itself in the forum beyond promulgating the rules for its use. In the court rules case, the state is the forum.
5) In the MMAA case, the state promulgates the rules, then stays its hand. In the court rules case, the state promulgates the rules and then affirmatively acts to enforce them.
*471While these factual differences might or might not lead to a finding of state action in the unusual hypothetical case in which the court rules affect a private person without any direct state action, that case is not presently before the Court and the United States Supreme Court has said that the scope of the Due Process Clause should be determined by a "gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion” in actual cases. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695, AFL v Vogt, Inc, 354 US 284, 287; 77 S Ct 1166; 1 L Ed 2d 1347 (1957), citing Davidson v New Orleans, 96 US 97, 104; 24 L Ed 616 (1877).
In the last analysis, however, it is not our disagreement with our colleague which is determinative of the issue. The fact is that the United States Supreme Court, which is exclusively empowered to define the scope of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, has declared in Flagg Bros and Blum that state promulgation of rules, without more, does not automatically amount to state action.