concurring in the result.
The reason for affirming the judgment of the trial court is not mutuality of prospective testimony as indicated in the majority opinion, that is, if Holtan could call favorable witnesses at the sentence hearing, then the State could call witnesses adverse to Holtan for such hearing.
The trial court fully explained the consequences of Holtan’s plea of nolo contendere, including the possible imposition of the death penalty for the execution-type murder committed by Holtan during a robbery *602and shooting in which one died but two victims survived. See State v. Holtan, 197 Neb. 544, 250 N.W.2d 876 (1977).
After the court’s explanation and without any comment by the court or representation by the prosecution about any sentence hearing, Holtan entered his plea. Holtan’s plea was prompted by his miscalculation that a surviving victim of the shooting would not testify at the sentence hearing. At some point between conviction upon his plea but before sentencing and as a result of concern about sentencing (presumably the possible appearance of a surviving victim at such hearing), Holtan alleges he instructed his attorney to request withdrawal of Holtan’s plea, but no such request was made.
In the federal habeas corpus proceedings the circuit, court was concerned that, when Holtan entered his plea, there was no reference to possible testimony from surviving witnesses at a sentence hearing, namely, “at no time during this colloquy did the parties or the court discuss the possibility that witnesses to the shooting could and would testify at the sentence hearing.” Holtan v. Parratt, 683 F.2d 1163, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982). The federal court then wondered whether the missing mention of possible witnesses at the sentence hearing was a suitable basis for allowing Holtan to withdraw his plea under Nebraska law.
At the time of Holtan’s plea Nebraska law provided: “In the proceeding for determination of sentence, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances set forth in section 29-2523. Any such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death. . . .” Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2521 (Reissue 1979).
Nebraska has adopted the ABA Standards Relat*603ing to Pleas of Guilty (Approved Draft 1968). These standards provide: “2.1 Plea withdrawal. . . . (b) . . . Before sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.”
Withdrawal of a guilty plea before imposition of sentence should be freely granted in order to protect a defendant’s right to a jury trial for determination of guilt or innocence. See, Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1963); Commonwealth v. Hayes, 462 Pa. 291, 341 A.2d 85 (1975).
Underlying a request to withdraw a guilty plea, there must be a fair and just reason and not a mere desire to have a trial. See, Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976); Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1964). “Were withdrawal automatic in every case where the defendant decided to alter his tactics and present his theory of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim. In fact, however, a guilty plea is no such trifle, but ‘a grave and solemn act’ which is ‘accepted only with care and discernment.’ ” United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Although a defendant is not required to allege innocence in order to request withdrawal of a guilty plea, the reason for the request to withdraw a plea must be reasonably related to the existence of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. See, ABA Standards, supra § 2.1(a) (iii); cf. United States v. Needles, 472 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1973).
The issue in this case involves a hypothetical and becomes: If a timely request had been presented to the trial court, would Holtan have been allowed to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere? Before that question can be answered, there is a preliminary question presented, namely, Does a defendant have *604a protected right of expectation in the quantity of adverse information which can be presented at a sentence hearing?
Before conviction, the defendant’s voice — and his alone — dictates the course of action for determination of guilt or innocence, i.e., to plead guilty or stand trial. If the defendant chooses to give up his right to a trial, especially a jury trial, unreasonableness or inequity producing the plea are reasons for allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. However, after conviction upon a defendant’s plea there is another voice to be heard — society’s expressed sanction for commission of the crime. In our system of criminal justice and for imposition of an appropriate sentence upon conviction, the sentencing judge, and in this case the three-judge panel convened pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2520 (Reissue 1979), must have as much relevant information as possible for determination of a suitable sanction for criminal conduct, that is, an appropriate penalty to fit the offender. See Neely v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 330, 177 N.W.2d 79 (1970).
Relevant information for a sentencing court should include facts of the crime itself and facts which tend to aggravate or mitigate the offense. See People v. Schleyhahn, 4 Ill. App. 3d 591, 281 N.E.2d 409 (1972). Testimony from an eyewitness is quite essential in an accurate description of the crime and, therefore, is necessary for a sentencing court’s clear understanding of the circumstances surrounding commission of the crime. Cf. State v. Leckis, 79 N.J. Super. 479, 192 A.2d 161 (1963) (in reference to a “good presentence report” containing interviews of witnesses).
If Holtan were allowed to withdraw his plea because adverse information moved from mere possibility to probability, then our procedure for determining criminal penalties would become ironically undermined by efficient accumulation and presentation of all relevant information bearing upon the na*605ture and extent of the penalty to be Imposed. The incongruity in that situation is found in the equation: Allowance to withdraw a presentence guilty plea is in direct proportion to the prospective quantity of adverse information presentable at a sentence hearing. Recognition of that ratio as a reason to allow withdrawing a guilty plea frustrates reasonably expeditious finality of proceedings as one of the objectives of our criminal justice system.
Courts have repeatedly held that expected but unreceived leniency not indicated by the court or promised by the prosecution or a harsher sentence than anticipated are not reasons for allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing. See, Dudrey v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 480, 247 N.W.2d 105 (1976); United States v. Maggio, 514 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1975); State v. Hanson, 627 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981); State v. Pettigrew, 284 S.E.2d 370 (W. Va. 1981).
At a sentence hearing a defendant can question, contradict, or explain adverse information presented by the State. Such procedure ensures the basic fairness required in the criminal justice system. However, a defendant having received a sentence more harsh than expected is not allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty because a defendant “chose to test the water and found it too fervid.” United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1976). By analogy to Prince, in a presentence situation a defendant cannot be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea simply because the prospective adverse information indicates that the water is deeper than a defendant has calculated.
In conjunction with a defendant’s guilty plea, a court should not be required to foretell the quantity, quality, or source of potentially damaging information presentable at a sentence hearing. To require a court to forecast the contents of a sentence hearing would only open avenues of alleged judicial error if the prediction did not materialize. That could hardly be called a system, much less justice.
*606In the absence of some expectancy founded on a comment by the court or promise by the prosecution, a defendant does not have a protected right of expectation in the quantity of adverse information which can be presented at a sentence hearing.
Holtan’s request for withdrawal of his plea, had such a request been timely made, presented no fair and just reason to the trial court for allowing the plea to be withdrawn. In the absence of any fair and just reason presented to the trial court for withdrawal of the plea, we need not consider the presence or absence of substantial prejudice to the prosecution regarding withdrawal of Holtan’s plea. Cf., United States v. Rasmussen, 642 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rodriguez-DeMaya, 674 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1982).
Under the circumstances, had Holtan’s request for withdrawal of his plea been submitted to the trial court, there would have been no abuse of discretion in denying such request.