White v. State

Hunt, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. Under the broad standard cited by the majority, the acquittal of the principal in this case may indeed be “relevant.” However, the trial court excluded this evidence not on relevancy grounds but because “to allow into evidence either a conviction or acquittal of [the principal] would be so prejudicial that any curative instructions or a charge of OCGA § 16-2-21 would not be sufficient to overcome same.” I agree with the trial court that regardless of the “relevancy” of evidence of an acquittal or conviction of the principal to the trial of an accessory, the evidence should be excluded because the prejudicial effect of a verdict of a separate fact-finding body cannot be overcome. Moreover, the great weight of authority excludes this evidence for considerations of policy because it does not suggest an inference of fact that it is more probable than not that the principal perpetrator is innocent. Rather, an acquittal is a determination of nonliability of the defendant by one set of fact-finders. See State v. Wilson, 483 S2d 23 (Fla. App. 2 Dist., 1986); People v. Paige, 345 NW2d 639 (Mich. App., 1983); People v. Jones, 518 P2d 819 (Colo. 1974); Roberts v. People, 87 P2d 251 (103 Colo. 250, 1938); People v. Beintner, 168 NYS 945 (1918); see also 22 CJS 295, Criminal Law, § 105. As stated by the Colorado Supreme Court in Roberts v. People, supra at 255, “[i]nnocence is a factual status. Non[-]liability ... resulting from acquittal is a legal status. The guilt [or] innocence of an accessory after the fact depends as to one element on the factual status of the principal as to guilt or innocence; not on his legal status as regards liability or non-liability to suffer a penalty.” (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing authorities are consistent with the policy of this state to exclude from evidence in one proceeding a determination of liability by a different fact-finding body in any prior proceeding involving the same issue. See, e.g., Smith v. Goodwin, 103 Ga. App. 248 (119 SE2d 35) (1961) (adjudication in traffic court inadmissible in case against defendant in civil suit); Security Life Ins. Co. v. Blitch, 155 Ga. App. 167, 168 (2) (270 SE2d 349) (1980) (verdict of coroner’s jury inadmissible in subsequent actions on the issue of the cause of death); OCGA § 22-2-110 (award of special master in condemnation case inadmissible in subsequent jury trial). It is no longer the law that the conviction of a principal perpetrator is a prerequisite to the conviction of an accessory. Now, under OCGA § 16-2-21, an indirect party to a crime may be convicted of the crime even if the direct perpetrator is acquitted. Accordingly, the acquittal or conviction of the *238principal perpetrator, not being conclusive in a trial of the accessory, has no bearing on the question of whether an accessory is guilty. “If [the jury] could consider the judgment, what weight should they give to it? How could they know upon what proof it was rendered, and, without knowing that, what value would it be as evidence, unless as a matter of law it was held to be conclusive? ... If it is evidence at all, it must be conclusive; otherwise, it should not be admitted. If a judgment is not res adjudicata [sic] on the questions involved it is nothing. [Cits].” People v. Beintner, supra.

Decided June 19, 1987 Reconsideration denied July 8, 1987. Smith & Harrington, Will Ed Smith, for appellant. Beverly B. Hayes, District Attorney, for appellee.

Under the majority’s holding, the following would be admissible: the verdicts of guilty of voluntary manslaughter in previous trials of this defendant and the principal perpetrator; the conviction of a principal perpetrator in a trial of an aider-abettor; the indictment against a defendant in his trial for the offense charged; a previous verdict in any case which for any reason must be retried. The relevancy test cited by the majority was not intended to be the standard by which such matters would be included as evidence. In my view, the trial court ruled properly that the principal’s acquittal should be excluded because of its overwhelming prejudicial effect.

I am authorized to state that Justice Weltner joins in this dissent.