While an invitee at appellee-defendant’s business establishment, appellant-plaintiff Mrs. Stanger fell. The fall was allegedly caused by appellee’s dog. Mrs. Stanger and her husband sued appellee for damages allegedly resulting from the fall. Appellee answered and subsequently moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee and appellants appeal.
Appellants urge that genuine issues of material fact remain as to appellee’s liability under two legal theories. They rely upon OCGA § 51-2-7, which provided, at the time relevant to this case, as follows: “A person who owns or keeps a vicious or dangerous animal of any kind and who, by careless management or by allowing the animal to go at liberty, causes injury to another person who does not provoke the injury by his own act shall be liable in damages to the person so injured.” “Proof that the owner of a dog either knew or should have known of the dog’s propensity to do the particular act which caused injury to the complaining party is indispensable to recovery against the owner. [Cit.]” Fitzpatrick v. Henley, 154 Ga. App. 555-556 (269 SE2d 60) (1980). Construing the evidence of record most strongly in favor of appellants, there is absolutely no genuine issue of any material fact remaining upon which appellee’s liability under OCGA § 51-2-7 could be predicated. To the extent that Carr v. Young, 120 Ga. App. 464 (170 SE2d 834) (1969) holds that the dog’s breed and size and the fact of the dog’s general restraint is evidence of the owner’s knowledge of the dog’s vicious or dangerous propensities, it is inconsistent with the correct rule. See McCree v. Burks, 129 Ga. App. 678 (200 SE2d 491) (1973); Wright v. Morris, 143 Ga. App. 571 (239 SE2d 225) (1977). Accordingly, Carr v. Young, supra, is overruled and summary judgment in favor of appellee was correctly granted as to this theory of recovery.
*499Appellants also rely upon OCGA § 51-3-1, which provides: “Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe.” With regard to any claim under OCGA § 51-3-1, there is absolutely no evidence of any superior knowledge upon which to base a finding of appellee’s foreseeability of the incident which occurred. Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 178 Ga. App. 157 (342 SE2d 468) (1986). Therefore, summary judgment was also correctly granted to appellee under this theory of recovery.
Judgment affirmed.
Birdsong, C. J., Deen, P. J., Banke, P. J., Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., Benham and Beasley, JJ., dissent.