(concurring specially) :
*394I agree with the proposition that the attempt of the legislature to confer authority upon itself (its officers) to make appointments in the Executive Department, the effect of which could lead to legislative control of executive functions, is contrary to constitutional principles. And I am appreciative of the efforts of Justice Ellett in setting forth the reasoning and authorities which so demonstrate. But I think that, consistent with the principle of the separation of powers, and our own duty of judicial restraint arising therefrom, that the proposition just stated above fulfills the purpose of this case. Accordingly, I do not see either necessity or wisdom in making further observations or indulging in conjecture as to what other method of selection of the members of the Board of Higher Education, or whether the legislation would have been enacted at all, if the legislature had thought the method it did prescribe was improper. This is said notwithstanding the savings clause referred to. Such clauses are effective only as to separate provisions of an act which can stand independently. But if the parts of the Act are so interrelated that the voiding of one portion would so substantially change the nature of the legislation that it cannot fairly be determined what the legislative intent would have been, nor whether the legislation would have been enacted, it is not within the prerogative of the court to rule that certain portions of the Act are invalid and assume that the legislature would have enacted other interrelated portions of the Act without them. See Carter v. Beaver County, 16 Utah 2d 280, 399 P.2d 440; Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake County, 13 Utah 2d 183, 370 P.2d 399; and State By and Through Hansen v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P.2d 691. I therefore do not believe that under this act either the Legislature or the Governor can make the six appointments which were designated to be made by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the blouse of Representatives.