dissenting.
The pivotal issue in this case is what is an “appropriate public education” for a particular child, and who the decision maker should be — the parents, the courts, or the public school educators. In this case the parents assert, and this court agrees, that this particular child can only gain an appropriate public education by placement in a regular classroom of non-handicapped students (mainstreaming) together with a full time one-to-one aide. The court concludes that such a procedure is mandated by federal legislation and regulations, and decisions of federal courts. On the other hand, the school district maintains that because of the handicaps of this particular child, an appropriate public education may only be gained by placement in a public school which provides a special classroom environment designed for a maximum learning experience for the child, and which also provides opportunities for interaction with non-handicapped children. I disagree with and dissent from the conclusions of the majority which override and supplant the decision of the educational specialists, both at the local and the state level, as to what is an appropriate public education for this particular child.
I regret the length of this dissent, but perceive it to be necessary because the majority opinion suffers so many serious flaws. I submit that the core question— what is an appropriate public education for this particular child? — must be examined in the light of the individual child. The majority opinion furnishes no such information, but rather attempts to apply principles of law in a vacuum. Hence, it provides no guidance whatsoever for future decisions of public educators. The majority opinion either overlooks or ignores the clear case law regarding the standard of appellate review in such cases. The majority erroneously holds that no individual education program was developed for this particular child. The record speaks otherwise. The majority’s muddled process is confused and confusing in failing to state whether its ultimate result is required by (1) the alleged failure to develop an individual education program (IEP), or (2) whether reversal is required because of the failure of the school district to offer the mainstreaming educational process in accordance with the majority’s perception of federal requirements. The majority also erroneously concludes that the school district breached a duty mandated by federal legislation, although the parents had placed the child in a private school.
The child, Gabriel, was born in 1973 with a portion of his brain missing, and with multiple other handicaps. The family resided within the Meridian school district and prior to November 1981 Gabriel was enrolled in that district’s segregated facility for children identified as having severely or profoundly handicapping conditions. In November of 1981, Gabriel was enrolled in a private preschool in Meridian. In August, 1982, at the parents’ request, the Boise school district began special education related services to Gabriel on a contract basis with the Meridian district for *478occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy. Testing w 's requested to determine Gabriel’s level of functioning, and for recommendations for appropriate educational placement and planning. That report summarized previous evaluations dating back to November, 1977, as well as those tests currently administered. The then current evaluations included the Stanford Binet Intelligence Test, the Visual Motor Integration Test, Draw-A-Person, the Woodcock-Johnson Psyco-Educational Battery, and the AAMD Adaptive Behavior Scale.
Gabriel’s intelligence quotient was determined to be 37. He functioned in the trainable mentally retarded category. Although his chronological age was then nine years and seven months, his mental age was three years and four months. Other tests indicated mental ages of between two and three years. Evidence indicated that the intellectual achievement of such a child may reach as high as six years of age. Gross motor skills were functioning at a two to three-year-old level, and indicated spasticity in all extremities. His speech and language skills were at an age level between 28 and 32 months, with one and two-word utterances.
In the fall of 1982 Gabriel’s parents resided in the Meridian school district, but they had decided to enroll Gabriel in a parochial school located within the Boise school district boundaries and were making tuition payments to that institution. At that : stitution Gabriel was placed in a regular third grade classroom but the school required the assistance of a one-to-one aide.
All of the above evaluations of Gabriel were performed under the auspices of the Boise school district, and hence the Boise school district had an extensive knowledge of Gabriel’s ability. In June, 1983, Gabriel’s parents changed their residence to the Boise school district, and they requested the Boise district to pay the costs of special education-related services including the services of a full time one-to-one aide. A “child study team” was convened and met in August and November of 1983 with Gabriel’s parents. As a result, the Boise district offered to place Gabriel in a classroom for “special education” children. The parents contended that such proffered placement was inferior to that at the parochial school and that the district was required to place Gabriel in a “regular” classroom with the assistance of a full time one-to-one aide. The district offered to pay for special education services in the private school, but refused to pay for the full time one-to-one aide. At no time did the parents request that Gabriel be placed in the district’s public schools.
The majority errs in its focus on what the district allegedly failed to do. IEPs were in place, and it is admitted that the district had the resources for and proffered a free appropriate public education. The only question is whether the district’s proffer was “appropriate” absent the “mainstreaming” demanded by the parents.
Thereafter administrative proceedings were instituted wherein the parents sought reimbursement for the tuition at the private school and the cost of the one-to-one aide. In such administrative proceeding the hearing officer ruled in favor of the school district. That decision was appealed to the State Department of Education where the decision was affirmed. Judicial review was sought in the district court, which reversed and ruled in favor of the parents.
Initially, it is my view that the district court erred in determining the appropriate standard of review under the Education For All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. The district court stated: “Rowley required that due weight be given to the proceedings before the hearing officer, not to the subsequent decision by the hearing officer.” I disagree.
Rowley required that due weight be given to the proceedings before the hearing officer, not to the subsequent decision by the hearing officer. This would indicate that the evidence presented in *479the hearing be considered as much a part of the record as any proceedings before the Court as long as those proceedings comply with 20 U.S.C. § 1415. (Tr., p. 67).
The due weight requirement is clearly spelled out in School Board of Prince William County, Virginia v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1217, 1218 (4th Cir.1985):
The second issue raised by the School Board is whether the district court improperly gave deference to the decision of the state hearing officers....
... The district court ... viewed the decision of the state hearing officers, reviewing the decision of the School Board pursuant to federal and state statutes and regulations, as the decision to which deference was due.... [then quoting the language from Rowley at 102 S.Ct. 3051, the court continues] The district court properly gave due weight to the results of the state administrative proceedings. To give deference only to the decision of the School Board would render meaningless the entire process of administrative review. Roncker on Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864, 104 S.Ct. 196, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983). That is certainly not a result contemplated by the Act. (emphasis added).
The United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 736 F.2d 773, 781, 791-92 (1st Cir.1984), aff'd sub nom, Burlington School Committee v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985), approached the due weight issue thus:
The appellants urge as error the district court’s refusal to give any weight to the hearing officer’s determination that the Town violated numerous state substantive and procedural regulations plus several federal provisions in its handling of the child’s special education....
Because Congress intended courts to make bounded, independent decision— bounded by the administrative record and additional evidence, and independent by virtue of being based on a preponderance of the evidence before the court— the question of the weight due the administrative findings of fact must be left to the discretion of the trial court.... This does not mean, however, that the findings can be ignored. The court, in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency, must consider the findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer’s resolution of each material issue. After such consideration, the court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole....
Under the approach we have outlined, these findings by the state hearing officer must be reviewed as bearing on the federal right to an appropriate education and must receive the court’s specific consideration. Further, because the hearing officer found the Town’s proposed IEP invalid as a matter of state law, the district court should have circumscribed its review and accorded the state findings deference, (emphasis added).
That due weight should be given to the decision of the hearing officer, as well as to the proceedings before the officer, has also been recognized by the Appeals Court of Massachusetts in School Committee of Franklin v. Commissioner of Education, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 683, 462 N.E.2d 338, 345 (1984), rev’d on other grounds, 395 Mass. 800, 482 N.E.2d 796 (1985):
... the department’s and the parents’ principal remaining objection is that the judge did not give sufficient consideration to the agency record_ The objection finds little support in the judge’s careful analysis of the weight to be accorded the agency record. The judge anticipated the holding in [Rowley ], reasoning that the requirement in § 1415(e)(2) that “the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings” implies that the agency judg*480ment be accorded weight, (emphasis added).
The ruling of the trial judge was affirmed.
In Pascagoula Municipal Separate School District v. Doe, 508 So.2d 1081, 1086 (Miss.1987), it was stated:
The act ... allows the trial judge to exercise his discretion to entertain additional evidence in reviewing the hearing officer’s decision. This ... does not authorize witnesses at trial to repeat or embellish their prior administrative hearing testimony; this would be entirely inconsistent with the usual meaning of “additional.” We are fortified in this interpretation because it structurally assists giving due weight to the administrative proceedings, as Rowley requires, (citations omitted, emphasis added).
The trial court must make an independent ruling based upon a preponderance of the evidence, but the act contemplates that the source of the evidence generally will be the administrative hearing record ... Thus, the procedure followed by a trial court falls “something short of a trial de novo.” (citations omitted).
Finally, in Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.1987), the standard applicable to both the trial court and the appellate court in these cases was discussed. As to the deference to be given state administrative findings, the Gregory court noted:
As the Supreme Court has held, courts must give “due weight” to judgments of education policy when they review state hearings under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Citing Rowley, we have held that “courts should not substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Wilson v. Marana Unified School Dist., 735 F.2d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir.1984). How much deference to give state educational agencies, however, is a matter for the discretion of the courts: The traditional test of findings being binding on the court if supported by substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence, does not apply. This does not mean, however, that the findings can be ignored. The court, in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency, must consider the findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer’s resolution of each material issue. After such consideration, the court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole.
Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Ed., 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985) (emphasis added).
The aforementioned cases clearly require that due weight be given to both the proceedings before the hearing officer as well as the subsequent decision. The district court failed to give such due weight or consider or respond to the decision.
In refusing to consider the decision of the administrative hearing officer the following findings by the hearing officer were either ignored or not discussed:
7. By response dated August 24, 1983, Dr. Woychick confirmed that at the August 16, 1983 meeting the parents had indicated that they had already re-enrolled Gabriel in St. Joseph’s third grade and had begun making tuition payments to St. Joseph’s School. The consistent testimony at the hearing, and the documentary evidence introduced, indicate that Mrs. Baugh and her husband had decided on placement in St. Joseph’s School. At no time did Mr. and Mrs. Baugh make application to the District for public school placement. In fact, the testimony of Mr. Baugh was that the family preferred and had selected a private setting with an individual aide, and would continue that placement so long as the family could afford it. Mr. Baugh stated that if the family could no longer afford pri*481vate placement with an individual aide, he and Mrs. Baugh would need to consider a public setting. Mr. Baugh further testified on rebuttal that he informed the Boise District officials in the August, 1983 meeting that at some future point in time the family could run out of money, and would at that point have to consider public school placement.
10. There is no dispute in this hearing as to whether or not the District can provide a free appropriate public education to Gabriel. Mr. and Mrs. Baugh conceded that they had never questioned the ability, resources, and personnel available to the District to provide free appropriate public education to Gabriel. Based on the testimony and evidence introduced at the hearing, I find that the Boise School District could provide, and that Gabriel would have available to him, were he placed in the public schools, a free appropriate public education. However, because Gabriel has been placed, by his parent and stepparent, into a private school, I find that the Boise District has not been required to, and has not been given the opportunity, to provide a free appropriate public education to Gabriel.1
Findings, Conclusions and Decision of Hearing Officer, pp. 6, 8, 9.
I submit that when the district court failed to consider and address the findings of the hearing officer, it did not follow the standard of review contained in 20 U.S.C. § 1415, as interpreted by Rowley, supra. To hold as does the majority would make a meaningless charade of all administrative proceedings. Hence, in my view the district court’s decision is insupportable and should be reversed.
The majority opinion also concludes that the school district failed in its obligation to offer a free appropriate public education.
The purpose of the Act is to assure all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate education. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).
In an effort to define FAPE, the Supreme Court in Rowley first recognized the 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) definition:
The term “free appropriate public education” means special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section llfH(a)(5) of this title, (emphasis added).
The Court then adds this to the definition: Thus, if personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied, the child is receiving a “free appropriate public education” as defined by the Act.
102 S.Ct. at 3042.
A FAPE is tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped child by means of an individual education program (IEP) prepared by local education officials in conjunction with the child’s parents. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(18), (19). The Act specifies the components of an IEP as follows:
The term “individualized education program” means a written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, *482specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual ■goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation proce-, dures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis, whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (emphasis added). See also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340-300.349; and IDAPA 08.02.E.15, 3.h and i.
The United States Supreme Court in Honig v. John Doe & Jack Smith, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988), has characterized the “individualized educational program” as the primary vehicle for implementing Congressional goals, and as “the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled children.” The child study team concept is delineated in 34 C.F.R. § 300.342-300.345 and IDAPA 08.02.E.15.
Contrary to the assertions of the majority, the record herein contains four IEPs for Gabriel dated September 30, 1982, December 14, 1982, December 9, 1983, and January 12, 1984. The essential components of those four IEPs are similar. The evaluations done by the Boise Independent School District in the form of psychological, physical therapy, and speech language evaluations formed the basis of the “Present Level of Student Performance” section. The education goals are similar and repetitive, and include activities such as recognizing letters of the alphabet, writing the letters in his name, and identifying colors. Evaluation procedures and schedules for review are noted on the IEPs. The “specific education services” are those provided by the Boise school district as outlined in programs designed especially for Gabriel, and include occupational therapy, physical therapy, and speech therapy.
It is asserted that all of the IEPs are deficient in that they fail to provide that mainstream placement in regular classrooms is appropriate for Gabriel. That assertion, of course, begs the question posed by the demands of the parents. They contend that the school district’s proposed placement in a special education class with some limited interaction with non-handicapped children is by law inappropriate. The school district, on the other hand, contends that Gabriel’s individualized education program is more appropriately delivered in that special class. Hence, the pivotal issue is whether the district’s offer is appropriate under the Act, or whether in all cases mainstreaming is the only appropriate public education under the Act. The district court concluded that there is a preference for mainstreaming, and that such is a presumptive requirement of an appropriate public education under the Act, “thus absent evidence that the child cannot meet the academic requirements of his IEP in a mainstreamed environment, any non-mainstreamed placement is legally insufficient and cannot possibly constitute a free appropriate public education.”
The record indicates that a Ph.D. psychologist, Christine Pickford, recommended that Gabriel be placed in a special education classroom because of her opinion that a trained special education teacher is required to provide appropriate programs. Concerning mainstreaming, she testified:
I also had some concerns that in the regular classroom the act of mainstreaming ... is not necessarily beneficial to his optimum education and my concern about that is that Gabriel benefits most from systematic instruction. And being in a classroom with other ... with 3rd grade students ... is normalized in that he’s not surrounded by other *483handicapped children, however he also does not have the benefit of the precision teaching that would occur in a small classroom. (Tr., at 64) (emphasis added).
The special education teacher of the class to which Gabriel would have been assigned, testified as to the extent of the "mainstreaming” contacts that special education children have with non-handicapped children. It should be noted that the district did not propose that Gabriel be placed in a segregated facility exclusively for mentally retarded children. Gabriel would have been placed in Franklin Elementary School in a special education classroom. He would have had interaction with non-handicapped children during lunch, recess, physical education, and other classes as he was able to handle them. As indicated in Roncker, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.1983), a child’s FAPE as determined by his IEP must be structured to permit him to benefit from instruction. In the instant case it is asserted that Gabriel should be placed in a regular third grade classroom. There is no assertion that Gabriel would have benefitted by that regular instruction, but would benefit only from the assistance of the one-to-one aide. On the other hand, the school district asserts that Gabriel would only benefit from instruction by specially-trained teachers in the special education class.
I disagree with the conclusion of the district court which is essentially affirmed by the majority opinion here that mainstreaming of handicapped children is required.
The United States Supreme Court in Rowley, supra, stated: “The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be afforded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs, was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the [child’s] parents.” Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 3051. The Rowley court also stated: “The Act’s use of the word ‘appropriate’ [reflects] Congress’ recognition that some settings simply are not suitable environments for the participation of some handicapped children.” Rowley, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 3046, n. 21. At 102 S.Ct. page 3049 the Rowley court indicated that mainstreaming is preferred (not required) and states:
Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child with a “free appropriate public education,” we hold that it satisfies this requirement by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State’s educational standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the State’s regular education, and must comport with the child’s IEP. [Emphasis added.] In addition, the IEP, and therefore the personalized instruction, should be formulated in accordance with the requirements of the Act and, if the child is being educated in the regular classrooms of the public educational system, should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade, (emphasis added).
Hence, I would hold that while the Act requires that handicapped children receive specialized education, it does not necessarily require “mainstreaming” in cases where the child would receive no educational benefits therefrom. See Roncker, supra; Gregory, 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.1987).
As stated in Wilson v. Marana Unified School District No. 6 of Pima County, 735 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir.1984):
We are well aware of the importance of this [mainstreaming] policy; however, it is a policy which must be balanced with the primary objective of providing handicapped children with an “appropriate” education. See Johnston by Johnston v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 569 F.Supp. 1502, 1508-09 (E.D.Mich.1983) (transferring child from a regular classroom to a special education classroom does not violate the EAH-*484CA’s goal of mainstreaming so long as special education is necessary and appropriate). See also Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181, n. 4, 102 S.Ct. at 3038, n. 4. (emphasis added).
In Mark A. v. Grant Wood Area Education Agency, 795 F.2d 52 (8th Cir.1986), the court stated:
We reject the view that the mainstreaming provisions of the Act are satisfied only if a handicapped child is educated in the same classroom with nonhandi-capped children. Springdale School District # 50 v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41, 43 (8th Cir.1982). Alleah, at the very least will be educated in the same school with nonhandicapped children. (emphasis original).
The court in Rowley stated: “The primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child’s needs was left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents.” 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051 (emphasis added).
The majority provides no insight into any “evidence” presented to the district court which amplified, modified, or contradicted any evidence presented at the administrative hearing. In fact, no evidence was presented before the district court, and hence, the district court had only the transcript of the testimony presented at the administrative hearing.
The evidence at the administrative hearing, contrary to the assertions of the majority, supports the findings of the hearing officer that IEPs were developed for Gabriel, and that based thereon the district developed a free appropriate public education program for Gabriel. That FAPE was declined by Gabriel’s parents.
The majority opinion states: “The school district argued that its segregated education was appropriate — an argument that is entirely irrelevant and superfluous to any discussion of the real issue in this case.” In my view that statement of the majority is clearly erroneous, and results in its subsequent and murky attempted analysis. The crux of the case is indeed whether the program tendered by the district was “appropriate.” If that which was tendered by the district was not appropriate, the majority is correct. The majority arrogates to itself, as did the district judge, the authority to substitute its judgment for that of the local school and state educators as to what is, or is not, an appropriate education for this particular child. Such action by the majority flies squarely in the face of the strictures laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Rowley.
The evidence tendered at the administrative hearing indicates that a free appropriate public education was tendered by the school district. As noted by the hearing officer, the parents “conceded that they had never questioned the ability, resources, and personnel available to the district to provide free appropriate public education to Gabriel.” Thus, the hearing officer concluded that the district “could provide, and that Gabriel would have available to him, were he placed in the public schools, a free appropriate public education.”
The majority opinion states at page 476, 767 P.2d at 1251:
By affirming the district court, we do not mean to denigrate the expertise of the school authorities for determination as to the appropriateness of various forms of education. Courts must consider the determinations of school authorities regarding the most appropriate form of education and courts must recognize that the school authorities may validly find mainstreaming inappropriate where the educational experience would/could not be productive or enriching to the student, or where it would disrupt the classroom.
I suggest that such statement is a correct view, but in the instant case the Court has failed to apply it, and in fact has overturned the determinations of the school authorities regarding the most appropriate form of education. The district court and *485this Court have substituted their judgments as to the most appropriate form of education for this particular child.
From that point on the majority’s opinion slides off into murky waters inevidently holding that the district failed in its responsibilities for an IEP, and an offer of a FAPE. The opinion of the majority utterly fails to discuss the validity or invalidity of the IEP or the FAPE except as to the factor of mainstreaming. As to mainstreaming, the Court in the above quotation recognized its responsibility as per Rowley to refrain from substituting its judgment for the expertise of the local and state education authorities for determination as to the appropriateness of the various forms of education, and that the school authorities may validly find mainstreaming inappropriate. In the instant case the school authorities determined that mainstreaming full time in a regular classroom would not be appropriate for Gabriel. The evidence is clear that such determination was made on the basis that Gabriel’s needs would be best served in a special class conducted by teachers specially educated, trained, and possessing expertise in the education of mentally handicapped children.
As enunciated by the majority, and clearly held by the previously-cited authorities, mainstreaming is not appropriate for every child under all circumstances. In the instant case the only evidence before the district court and this Court is that full time mainstreaming was not appropriate for Gabriel. The majority opinion faults the school district and bases its decision on the district’s alleged failure to provide a valid IEP, and hence an offer of a FAPE. The harsh facts of the case are these. At that time Gabriel, while of a chronological age of more than eight years, functioned at best at a pre-school level. He had a lack of comprehension of the academic subjects offered in a third grade classroom. Whether it be at the parochial school or the Boise public schools, Gabriel’s education was to consist of identification of colors, identification of letters, increasing speech utterances to beyond one or two words, and a control of disruptive or abusive behavior. Hence, placement in a regular third grade classroom would be essentially a warehousing process with the exception of any training from a one-to-one aide, who would not be a trained and licensed teacher, much less one trained in educating handicapped children. The crux of the matter is whether such a warehousing situation is best for Gabriel, or whether he will be better served by the proposal of the district.
The district made its decision based on its view of the best placement for Gabriel, and tendered such a program. Gabriel’s parents unilaterally rejected such a proposal, deciding rather to continue the third grade regular classroom experience in the parochial school. There is no argument that the school district could override the decision of the parents. However, the fact that the parents placed Gabriel in a private school does not serve to demonstrate that the decision of the school district was erroneous.
As previously discussed herein, the school district engaged in voluminous testing and evaluation to determine the abilities and capacity of Gabriel. Using a valid IEP based on those abilities and capacity, the district proffered a free appropriate public education. The proffer was refused by Gabriel’s parents who opted instead to retain Gabriel in the parochial school program. There is no assertion, much less a showing, that the district acted arbitrarily, capriciously or with any intent to deprive Gabriel of a free appropriate public education. The record clearly demonstrates that the parents refused to accept the district’s decision as to what was “appropriate” education for Gabriel, refused the proffer of the district, and placed him in a private institution.
Since in my view the district offered a free appropriate public education, the district had no responsibility to provide funding for an education which was not appropriate. The district, in effect, tendered fi*486nancial assistance for all portions of Gabriel’s education in the private parochial school except that part relating to the one-to-one aide. As noted herein, the total funding for the parochial school program has been continued during the course of this appeal. It is now the year 1988, the matter should be resolved, and guidance should be given to the public school educators in this state. I would reverse the decision of the district court, and reinstate the decisions of the administrative agencies.
BAKES, J., concurs.. The majority opinion has engaged in a crass lifting out of context in its suggestion that the hearing officer held that Gabriel was not entitled to a free public education. As the above findings make crystal clear, the language of the hearing officer was premised on the placement in a private school, and the district "had not been given an opportunity" but could have and would have provided a FAPE.