The State appeals the order of the juvenile court granting the plea in bar of S. L. H., premised solely on alleged violation of the prohibitions of OCGA § 16-1-8 (a) (2).
Although no transcript of the proceedings at issue has been provided for our review, the transcript of the hearing on the plea in bar reveals that a juvenile petition alleging that S. L. H. was delinquent by virtue of having committed acts which, if done by an adult, would have been aggravated assault, armed robbery, and theft by taking of a motor vehicle. A first hearing was held and the case continued for a week because new counsel was appointed for S. L. H.
On May 31, 1991, at the second hearing, both sides announced ready; all witnesses were sworn; and the first witness took the stand. This witness had been charged with crimes in superior court for the same acts forming the basis of S. L. H’s delinquency petition. The juvenile court therefore asked the witness only preliminary questions about his status and apparently determined that the witness’ counsel should be present despite the fact that the witness had agreed to testify after being advised of his Fifth Amendment rights. However, because the witness could not tell the court if he had legal representation, the judge gave the State one hour to make this determination and contact counsel. A timely determination could not be made and the State understood the judge to rule that the witness would not be allowed to continue with his testimony despite the waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. The State therefore moved for a continuance which the judge granted over the objection of S. L. H. The judge apparently stated the case was “continued or adjourned by the court to be reconvened” to allow the State to resolve the issue with the witness.
During the hearing on the plea in bar, the juvenile court labelled as “accurate” the State’s summarization of the events at the original *279proceeding, including the State’s assertion that the witness was ready to testify, but the juvenile court “felt that we did need to speak to his counsel to be aware of what Fifth Amendment rights would be of the [witness]” and that “it was merely ... a continuation of [the hearing at which the witness was called] and was not one where [the juvenile court] entered some type of adjudication.” The juvenile court also described the events as “we stopped for awhile. Now we’re picking it up again.” But later the court indicated that, without the testimony of this witness, he did not believe the State had a case that day, since another individual also charged and represented by counsel had decided not to testify. The juvenile court concluded at the hearing on the motion that the State “asked for a continuance . . . either you needed to fold your tent and leave and say, we’re going to dismiss it or you’ve got to ask for a continuance because you can’t prove your case.”
The delinquency hearing reconvened 39 days later, on July 9, 1991, when the hearing on the .plea in bar was held on S. L. H.’s claim that it was a violation of OCGA § 16-1-8 (a) (2) to hear the matter after it was continued. The juvenile court dismissed the case based on that section on the ground that it had been “terminated improperly.”
It must first be determined whether OCGA § 16-1-8 (a) (2), which speaks of “prosecution,” “crime,” “conviction,” and “acquittal,” is applicable to juvenile proceedings.
OCGA § 15-11-38 (a) provides that “[a]n order of disposition or other adjudication in a proceeding under this article is not a conviction of a crime.” Treatment and rehabilitation rather than punishment are the goals when delinquency is established. OCGA §§ 15-11-2 (7) and 15-11-1. “The juvenile court is a civil court, not a criminal court. . . . [0]ne under the prescribed age ... is not prosecuted as a criminal, but is dealt with as the law provides for juveniles who violate the law.” K. M. S. v. State of Ga., 129 Ga. App. 683, 684 (200 SE2d 916) (1973).
The legislative history of OCGA § 16-1-8, part of which is contained in Marchman v. State, 234 Ga. 40, 42 (215 SE2d 467) (1975) reversing Marchman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 677, 681 (209 SE2d 88) (1974), gives no indication that it was to apply also to juvenile proceedings. See Ga. Code Ann. § 26-507, Committee Notes. See also the minutes of the meetings of the Criminal Law Study Committee formed in 1961, housed in the State Archives. “[I]t is clear from the entire statute that the General Assembly sought to treat matters of juvenile delinquency as a class of conduct separate and distinct from conventional criminality.” T. L. T. v. State of Ga., 133 Ga. App. 895, 897 (1) (212 SE2d 650) (1975).
However, as this court acknowledged in that case, “From [the Juvenile Court Code] and the decisions we conclude that the juvenile *280charged with ‘delinquency’ is entitled by right to have the court apply those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial. We must not only furnish the ritual of justice, but we must provide its substance.” Id. at 899. (Emphasis supplied.)
Relying on T. L. T., this court in In the Interest of J. H. M., 202 Ga. App. 79, 80 (413 SE2d 515) (1991) found that the evidentiary rule in OCGA § 24-4-8 applies to juvenile delinquency proceedings. This conclusion is buttressed by OCGA § 24-1-3, which provides that the rules of evidence apply in all courts and in all trials unless otherwise expressly provided by statute. This rationale is not available for the construction of OCGA § 16-1-8.
That section “sets out in detail when a second prosecution is barred. These are matters of procedure. They prevent an accused from being unduly harassed by or threatened by successive criminal prosecutions.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316, 319 (206 SE2d 475) (1974). “The 1968 Georgia Criminal Code has expanded the proscription of double jeopardy beyond that provided for in the United States and Georgia Constitutions.” Id. at 317.
While the constitutional protections against double jeopardy apply to juvenile proceedings, the additional and expanded statutory protections afforded by OCGA § 16-1-8 (a) (2) do not rise to the level of “those common law jurisprudential principles which experience and reason have shown are necessary to give the accused the essence of a fair trial.” T. L. T., supra at 898 (2). See generally J. H. M., supra at 81. (Andrews, J., dissenting.)
Judgment reversed.
Carley, P. J., Pope and Johnson, JJ., concur. Sognier, C. J., Beasley and Cooper, JJ., concur specially. McMurray, P. J., and Birdsong, P. J., dissent.