concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I concur in parts I, III, IV and V of the majority’s opinion. I respectfully dissent from part II of the majority’s opinion. Plaintiff fails to show that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial.
II. Extraneous prejudicial information
Plaintiff moved for a new trial pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 59(a)(2) on the grounds of jury misconduct. In support of the motion, plaintiff tendered four affidavits from jurors concerning dictionary definitions of “willful” and “wanton” brought into the jury room during deliberations. Plaintiff demands a new trial and argues that these definitions constitute extraneous information which was prejudicial to him.
Appellate review of an order of a trial court granting or denying a new trial pursuant to G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 59 is limited to the question of whether the record discloses a manifest abuse of discretion or that the ruling was clearly erroneous. Pinckney v. Van Damme, 116 N.C. App. 139, 447 S.E.2d 825 (1994).
The general rule is that, once rendered, a verdict may not be impeached by the jurors. See In Re Will of Hall, 252 N.C. 70, 87-88, 113 S.E.2d 1, 13 (1960) (“It is firmly established in this State that jurors will not be allowed to attack or overthrow their verdicts, nor will evidence from them be received for such purpose.”) (citations omitted); Carolina-Virginia Fashion Exhibitors, Inc. v. Gunter, 291 N.C. 208, 222, 230 S.E.2d 380, 389-90 (1976) (jurors will not be allowed by testimony or affidavit to impeach, to attack, or to overthrow their verdicts) (quoting State v. Hollingsworth, 263 N.C. 158, 139 S.E.2d 235 (1964)) (citations omitted).
Rule 606(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence creates an exception to the general rule. Berrier v. Thrift, 107 N.C. App. 356, 364, 420 S.E.2d 206, 210-11 (1992). Rule 606(b) permits testimony by a juror as to whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly before the jury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 606(b) (1999). A juror may not testify as to the subjective effect of the extraneous information upon the jury’s decision. State v. Lyles, 94 N.C. App. 240, 245, 380 S.E.2d 390, 394 (1989) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 606(b)). *179Extraneous information is “information dealing with the defendant or the case being tried, which information reaches a juror without being introduced in evidence. It does not include information which a juror has gained in his experience which does not deal with the defendant or the case being tried.” State v. Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 832, 370 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1988). No presumption of prejudice arises in a civil action from a showing that extraneous information or perceived extraneous information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention. Pinckney, 116 N.C. App. at 148, 447 S.E.2d at 831. Plaintiff, as the moving party, must demonstrate “actual” prejudice. Id.
The trial court in its findings of fact and conclusions of law stated: “[t]he jury did not ignore the instructions of the Court, nor did it apply extraneous definitions or information in reaching its verdict. Furthermore, while the jury was exposed to the above definitions, the Court finds that this was not ‘extraneous information’ pursuant to Rule 606, and the Court finds no prejudice to the movant.”
I agree with the trial court that the contents of the affidavits in this case do not fall within the exception as extraneous prejudicial information. The definitions do not specifically concern the defendant or the evidence presented in this case. Rosier, 322 N.C. at 832, 370 S.E.2d at 363.
The majority opinion states that it is “apparent” that the definitions of “willful” and “wanton” in a case involving a claim for punitive damages constitutes “extraneous information” because they pertain to the case being tried and the governing law at issue. I find that the reading of the dictionary definitions by Juror Couch is analogous to a situation where one of the jurors informs the jury what “willful” and “wanton” mean, according to his knowledge of the English language. The definition of words in our standard dictionaries has been considered a matter of common knowledge which the jury is supposed to possess. State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227, 252 (Conn. 1984); Dulaney v. Burns, 119 So. 21, 25 (Ala. 1928), rev’d on other grounds, Whitten v. Allstate Ins. Co., 447 So.2d 655 (Ala. 1984).
The information received in this case does not fall within the definition of extraneous information contemplated by our Supreme Court. See generally Rosier, 322 N.C. 826, 370 S.E.2d 359 (1988) (juror affidavit showed that juror watched prohibited program on child abuse, held not extraneous information because the matters reported to the jury did not deal with the defendant or the evidence introduced); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306 (1994) *180(affidavits from jurors that they were mistakenly informed about defendant’s eligibility for parole, found to be internal influences and not extraneous information); Berrier, 107 N.C. App. 356, 420 S.E.2d 206 (1992) (juror affidavits that foreman misinformed them that punitive damages were only a statement of what decedent’s life was worth rather than a money judgment, did not fall within the exception as extraneous information). But See Lyles, 94 N.C. App. 240, 380 S.E.2d 390 (1989) (writing at bottom of photograph uncovered by juror indicating that defendant was in the area on the date of the crime, held inadmissible evidence which affected defendant’s alibi and was extraneous information).
Even if the “willful” and “wanton” definitions were determined to be extraneous information, courts cannot presume prejudice. Plaintiff must also demonstrate that he suffered “actual” prejudice. Pinckney, 116 N.C. App. at 148, 447 S.E.2d at 831. The majority’s opinion states that the dictionary definitions had the “potential to prejudice the plaintiff.” Potential prejudice is not actual prejudice.
Our Supreme Court addressed a similar issue where a juror brought into deliberations an encyclopedia containing the definition for “undue influence.” In Re Will of Hall, supra. The court stated that “it generally is ground for reversal that the jury obtained and took into the jury room a dictionary which they consulted to determine the meaning of legal or other terms, which they do not understand.” Id. at 87, 113 S.E.2d at 13. The court held, however, that the definition of “undue influence” did not prejudice the caveators and was more favorable to them. Id. at 88, 113 S.E.2d at 13.
This Court addressed a similar issue where a juror brought a definition of “uttering” from a dictionary into the jury room during deliberations in a criminal trial. State v. McLain, 10 N.C. App. 146, 148, 177 S.E.2d 742, 743 (1970). Although it was improper for the jury to obtain and read the definition, we held that no reversible error had occurred. Id. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the definition and defendant had not shown any prejudice by the jury conduct. Id.
Other states have addressed the issue of dictionary definitions brought before the jury and found no prejudice. In State v. Klafta, 831 P.2d 512 (Haw. 1992), the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the conduct of three jurors in looking up terms in Black’s Law Dictionary was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the verdict was not shown to be influenced by the misconduct. The Supreme Court of *181Alabama stated that actual prejudice may not be inferred merely from exposure, and found no prejudice where jurors obtained a dictionary definition of “standard.” Pearson v. Fomby By and Through Embry, 688 So.2d 239, 242-43 (Ala. 1997). The court noted that there was no evidence that any juror stated that the collective decision of the jury had been influenced. Id. The Iowa courts have also addressed the issue of jurors looking up dictionary definitions and found no prejudice. See Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821 (Iowa 1993) (no competent evidence that the misconduct improperly influenced the jury); In the Matter of Estate of Cory, 169 N.W.2d 837 (Iowa 1969) (juror looked up and shared the definitions of “undue” and “undue influence” in a will contest case, held the dictionary definitions were no different than the jurors’ common knowledge of the terms); Harris v. Deere & Co., 263 N.W.2d 727 (Iowa 1978) (juror looked up “control” and “lever” in a products liability case, held no error in denial of a new trial), overruled on other grounds, Ryan v. Ameson, 422 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1988).
At bar, it was unknown to the trial court, during deliberations, that the jury had obtained the dictionary definitions. After receiving a question regarding the definitions of “willful” and “wanton,” the trial court further instructed the jury “the definition is in that [jury] charge of what willful and wanton means . . . there’s no other option . . . that’s what the law is,.so, you have to go by what’s in that charge.” The trial court essentially gave the same instruction as given in McLain, which this Court held cured any potential prejudice, and that defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced. McLain, 10 N.C. App. at 148, 177 S.E.2d at 743. Additionally, the affidavit of Juror Couch, offered by plaintiff, states that upon returning to deliberations, the law contained in the court’s instructions was applied.
The majority’s opinion lists several factors which it contends establish prejudice to plaintiff. First, the fact that Juror Jackson submitted a note after receipt of the dictionary definitions. This merely indicates that the jury was grappling with the issue of whether defendant’s conduct was willful or wanton. Second, the fact that the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard the definitions. The trial court instructed the jury that they must apply the law and definitions of the jury charge which they had in their possession. Finally, the failure to award any punitive damages despite evidence of twenty-five similar incidents does not establish prejudice. The jury heard evidence of the prior incidents and also testimony from plaintiff that he did not notice that the water looked or smelled any dif*182ferent and did not feel any burning to his tongue as he drank the water. Punitive damages require an element of aggravation which plaintiff has not conclusively shown here. See Lashlee, - N.C. App. -, -, 548 S.E.2d 821, 827 (2001) (citation omitted).
The record supports the trial court’s finding and conclusion that the jury applied the law and definitions given in the court’s instructions, and that plaintiff was not prejudiced. I would affirm the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. I respectfully dissent from part II of the majority’s opinion.