concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the majority on the guilt phase of this case. However, given the manner in which the crime was committed, defendant’s subsequent conduct, our precedents holding that death sentences under similar circumstances are disproportionate, the compelling mitigating circumstances found by the jury and that juries in this State have consistently returned life sentences under similar circumstances, I conclude the death penalty here as a matter of law is disproportionate.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2) mandates that we consider whether “the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” This requires a comparison of “the case at bar with other cases in the [proportionality] pool1 which are roughly similar with regard to the crime and the defendant, such as, for example, the manner in which the crime was committed and the defendant’s character, background, and physical and mental condition.” State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 648, 314 S.E.2d 493, 503 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. *1631120, 86 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1985). A comparison of this case to other capitally tried cases in our proportionality pool in which both crimes and defendants are similar to the crime and defendant in the instant case compels the conclusion that the sentence of death here is disproportionate.
The State offered in evidence defendant’s out-of-court confession to investigators. It offered an edited version during the guilt proceeding and an unedited version during the sentencing proceeding. According to the unedited version of defendant’s confession, defendant and Joe Simpson, his accomplice, both worked for the deceased, John Redd, a shrimper. For about a week they had been talking about stealing Redd’s truck so they could go to Georgia. On the day of the murder, defendant and Simpson had been drinking. They planned to rob Redd while the three of them were shrimping. While shrimping, defendant and Simpson “dropped the net wrong.... It was tangled up. John [Redd] . . . got upset about it and he kept yelling at us. . . . Then he started hounding Joe, saying you are just a piece of shit, I’d rather have Ida working for me. . . . [W]e never did plan to kill him. We did plan to rob him. What happened I don’t know. I guess I got tired of his griping and I stabbed the man. I thought I only stabbed him twice, but after I stabbed him, we made him lay down in the boat. He laid down in the boat and he asked me did he have his liquor, so I gave him his liquor and I lit him a cigarette.” Defendant and Simpson decided to take the deceased to a beach; “but we got stuck, the boat motor stuck in the sand and we had to drag that out, but when we got there, Joe helped the man off the boat. I told the man that I would call somebody and try to send somebody to him to help him. ... We weren’t going to throw him overboard. We was going to tie him up and put him on the bank. Then take his truck... . When I put him down in the boat... I asked him, are you all right. He said boys I am hurting, don’t stick me again, don’t kill me. I said John I am not going to kill you, I am going to get you some help. John, I reckon he thought we was taking him to the dock, because when we pulled up to the bank, I said O.K. John we’re here. He looked up, put his hand on the side of the boat, and said we are at the dock? He looked up and he goes oh no don’t do that. That’s when Joe helped him out of the boat and put him on the bank. ... I kept telling Joe I think I killed the man. Joe kept saying we need to call somebody and tell them where he was at. We never called anybody. Joe never called anybody. I never called anybody.” Defendant, when asked how he felt “inside,” replied, “Bad.”
*164This incident occurred shortly before 2:00 a.m. on 21 August 1991. Norwood Mercer, a fisherman, discovered Redd alive at about 6:00 a.m. apparently on or near the bank where defendant and Simpson had left him. Redd told Mercer that he had been robbed and stabbed and had been there “the biggest part of the night.” Redd was sitting on a pile of oyster shells at the edge of the water.
Mercer got back to Shell Rock Landing with Redd at approximately 6:30 a.m. and the rescue' squad arrived fifteen to twenty minutes later. A paramedic noticed that Redd was pale, cold and wet. He saw two stab wounds on Redd’s back. The ambulance arrived at Naval Hospital at Camp Lejeune at 7:22 a.m. Detective Lee Stevens arrived at 7:45 a.m. and spoke to Redd. Redd told Stevens that two persons whom he had hired two weeks ago had accosted him and that defendant had stabbed him and robbed him. Redd said that his assailants had planned it but that the knife with which he was stabbed belonged to him. He said defendant stabbed him twice and that “they threw me overboard.” Redd stated that defendant said he would not kill him.
Redd was taken to the operating room at about 10:20 a.m. Dr. David Geiger, a surgeon, was called in and observed three stab wounds in Redd’s back. Redd died at 12:46 p.m. on 21 August 1991 because of blood loss from the stab wounds.
Although defendant was convicted on the basis of both premeditation and deliberation and felony murder, the underlying felony being armed robbery, there is barely enough evidence in the guilt phase to carry the question of premeditation and deliberation to the jury. The fatal stabbing was not planned but took place on the spur of the moment. While there is evidence that defendant intended to kill Redd when he stabbed him, the evidence also shows that, after the stabbing occurred, defendant and Simpson took measures which they thought might save Redd’s life. They assisted Redd after the stabbing and left him alive in a place where he might be rescued. Redd was, in fact, rescued alive, and he lived for almost twenty-four hours after defendant stabbed him.
Defendant voluntarily surrendered himself and gave a full confession to law enforcement authorities. His confession was the principal evidence against him at trial. Defendant showed some remorse in his confession; although the jury did not find this to be a mitigating circumstance.
*165At sentencing, the jury found two aggravating circumstances— that defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person and that the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. It also found the statutory mitigating circumstance that defendant’s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired. The jury found seven nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: Defendant has acknowledged his guilt to law enforcement officers; defendant took responsibility for the killing and did not try to minimize his culpability; defendant’s confession was consistent with the evidence uncovered by the sheriff’s department in the course of its investigation; after the arrest, defendant freely and knowingly waived his constitutional right to remain silent and to have an attorney; defendant is a product of a dysfunctional home environment; defendant experienced repeated violence in the form of verbal abuse, physical abuse and emotional abuse during childhood; and defendant suffered from continual alcohol and drug abuse from an early age.
These circumstances, of course, do not justify defendant’s having inflicted the fatal wounds; and defendant should be severely punished by being imprisoned for life for the murder he committed. They do, I believe, show that this murder does not rise to the level of egregiousness present in those cases in which juries have returned, and we have affirmed, death sentences. Considering both the crime and the defendant, this case is more like murder cases in which life imprisonment has been imposed.
There are several cases in the proportionality pool, similar to the one before us, in which this Court concluded the death penalty was disproportionate:
In State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985), the defendant and two companions went to the victim’s home to both rob and murder him. Because the victim knew the defendant and his companions, they were allowed into the home under the guise that they were going to buy some liquor. The defendant surprised the victim and stabbed him twice. A companion “finish[ed] him” by stabbing him five or six more times. After the killing, the defendant along with the others stole valuables from the victim. They then searched his house and stole his coin collection. The jury in Young found two aggravating circumstances, that the murder was committed while defendant *166was engaged in the commission of an armed robbery and that it was committed for pecuniary gain.
The robbery and murder in Young are similar to the robbery and murder in this case in that in both cases alcohol was a factor, defendants took advantage of their familiarity with the victims, and stabbing was the means by which the killings were committed. Indeed, the killing in Young was more aggravated because it was planned in advance and some of the wounds were inflicted after the victim was rendered helpless. Here defendant only planned to rob the victim. It was only after an argument and the consumption of alcohol that the robbery escalated into murder. Defendant also made some attempt to assist the victim after the stabbing.
In State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983), another similar robbery murder case, three men conspired to rob an elderly man. The defendant tricked the victim into giving him a ride and then shot him twice in the head during the course of the robbery. The jury found as an aggravating circumstance that the killing was committed for pecuniary gain. The Court found the death sentence imposed on Jackson was disproportionate.
In State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988), the victim died of a cardiac arrest after being robbed and shot in the legs by the defendant. The jury found the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain. In determining that the death sentence was disproportionate, the Court noted that it appeared defendant was simply attempting to rob the victim. Defendant pleaded guilty during the trial and acknowledged his wrongdoing before the jury. Likewise in this case, I believe the evidence shows that defendant only planned to rob the victim. He turned himself in to the authorities and took responsibility for his actions.
There are several robbery murder cases in which juries, after finding the same two aggravating circumstances as those found here, have recommended life imprisonment. State v. Howard, 334 N.C. 602, 433 S.E.2d 742 (1993); State v. Erlewine, 328 N.C. 626, 403 S.E.2d 280 (1991); State v. Darden, 323 N.C. 356, 372 S.E.2d 539 (1988); State v. Clark, 319 N.C. 215, 353 S.E.2d 205 (1987); State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310; 338 S.E.2d 75 (1986); State v. Wilson, 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46 (1984); and State v. Murray, 310 N.C. 541, 313 S.E.2d 523 (1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. White, 322 N.C. 506, 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988).
*167In State v. Holland, 318 N.C. 602, 350 S.E.2d 56 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Childress, 321 N.C. 226, 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987), defendant stabbed the victim to death, and the jury found two aggravating circumstances: the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in committing robbery with a dangerous weapon and the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. The jury recommended life imprisonment.
It thus appears that in cases where both the crime and the defendant are similar to the crime and the defendant here either this Court has declared the death penalty to be disproportionate or juries have returned sentences of life imprisonment. The majority has not cited a similar case in which the death penalty was imposed at trial and affirmed on appeal, and my research has not revealed one.
In State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. at 648, 314 S.E.2d at 503, we said that if, after making the comparisons with similar cases, considering both the crimes committed and the defendants who committed them,
we find that juries have consistently been returning death sentences in the similar cases, then we will have a strong basis for concluding that a death sentence in the case under review is not excessive or disproportionate. On the other hand if we find that juries have consistently been returning life sentences in the similar cases, we will have a strong basis for concluding that a death sentence in the case under review is excessive or disproportionate.
This Court has consistently and recently made these kinds of comparisons in conducting its proportionality reviews in death sentence cases. See State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 444 S.E.2d 879 (1994); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306 (1994); State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 428 S.E.2d 118 (1993), cert. denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341, 62 USLW 3319 (U.S.N.C., Nov. 1, 1993) (No. 93-5077), reh’g denied, 126 L. Ed. 2d 707, 62 USLW 3453 (U.S.N.C., Jan. 10, 1994) (No. 93-5077); State v. Hill, 331 N.C. 387, 417 S.E.2d 765 (1992), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 684, 61 USLW 3582 (U.S.N.C., Feb. 22, 1993) (No. 92-6594), reh’g denied, 123 L. Ed. 2d 503, 61 USLW 3715 (U.S.N.C., Apr. 19, 1993) (No. 92-6594); and State v. Roper, 328 N.C. 337, 402 S.E.2d 600 (1991), cert. denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 232, 60 USLW 3266 (U.S.N.C., Oct. 7, 1991) (No. 91-5252).
Considering both the crime and defendant, as we are required to do by N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(d)(2), and the other cases in our propor*168tionality pool in which both the crime and defendant are similar to the crime and the defendant here, I conclude the sentence of death imposed in this case is disproportionate. I vote to remand the case to the superior court for the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment.
Justice Frye joins in this concurring and dissenting opinion.. For a definition of those cases in the proportionality pool, see State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 446 S.E.2d 542 (1994).