¶ 26. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent for two reasons. First, the majority fails to recognize, nor follow, well settled law that at a plea inquiry the court must determine whether the defendant's conduct does not amount to a defense. Second, in relying solely on one sentence in the complaint that the defendant admitted that he "handled" the gun, the circuit court failed to determine whether the facts constitute the offense of felon in possession of a firearm.
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¶ 27. It is well settled law in this state that the judge, at a plea inquiry, must determine whether the facts, if proved, "constitute the offense charged and whether the defendant's conduct does not amount to a defense." Edwards v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 231, 236, 186 N.W.2d 193 (1971) (emphasis added), cited with approval in Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 552, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973) ("What is required is a sufficient postplea inquiry to determine to the court's satisfaction that the facts, if proved, 'constitute the offense charged and whether the defendant's conduct does not amount to a defense.'"); see also Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 423, 228 N.W.2d 687 (1975). The majority does not cite any of the above cases, much less overrule them.
¶ 28. As pointed out in the majority opinion, there are six privileges that, if present, constitute a defense to this charge, including coercion, necessity, *149and defense of persons or property. See majority op. at ¶ 21 (citing Wis. Stat. § 939.45). It is not difficult to imagine a myriad of circumstances that would constitute a defense.
¶ 29. The circuit court made no inquiry whatsoever. The circuit court, and the majority, rely solely on the following sentence in the complaint: "Defendant further stated that he had handled the pistol on Monday in Felicia's bedroom, but he doesn't know to who [sic] the gun belonged to." A simple question— "Why did you handle it?" —would have resolved the problem of any defenses. It was not asked.
¶ 30. The majority opinion, in its attempt to deal with possible defenses, acknowledges that a felon may assert one of six privileges to the charge of possession. Majority op. at ¶ 21. However, then the majority states that there is not a statute or a case that Black can cite as privilege, concluding that "As a result, he does not have a privilege." Respectfully, this statement appears to be a non sequitur. I do not understand the point the majority is trying to make, but if the point is that the defendant bears the burden of establishing a privilege, the majority is incorrect. See Broadie, 68 Wis. 2d at 423; Morones, 61 Wis. 2d at 552; Edwards, 51 Wis. 2d at 236. The court must make an inquiry as to whether the defendant's conduct does not amount to a defense.
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¶ 31. The gist of the majority opinion is that "handling" amounts to "possession" of a firearm. I disagree.
¶ 32. In State v. Bodoh, 226 Wis. 2d 718, 736, 595 N.W.2d 330 (1999), we unanimously upheld a conviction for the negligent handling of a dangerous weapon under Wis. Stat. § 940.24. In defining "handling," we *150noted that this word may encompass different meanings, including " 'to operate with the hands; manipulate'" or " '[t]o deal with or have responsibility for; conduct.'" Id. at 731 (citation omitted). In comparison, we have held that "possession" requires "some right of dominion or control over the thing possessed." Schwartz v. State, 192 Wis. 414, 417, 212 N.W. 664 (1927). Thus, it was error for the court to rely on the mere allegation of "handling" in the complaint in establishing a factual basis because, by itself, this word may encompass conduct that does not rise to the level of dominion or control over the thing possessed.
¶ 33. Further, possession requires that the defendant knowingly have actual physical control of the item. Wis JI — Criminal 1343 (2000). Standing alone, the word "handling" does not provide any indication as to whether Black "knowingly" possessed the firearm. Such possession connotes a defendant's "conscious" possession. See Doscher v. State, 194 Wis. 67, 69, 214 N.W. 359 (1927). In other words, as to the nature of one's conduct, "knowingly" requires that, a person is aware that his or her conduct is of that nature. 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5(b) (1986). Again, there is nothing inherent in the word "handling" to show that Black was aware that his conduct constituted actual possession of the firearm. The facts could have displayed a momentary "handling," which may have been too slight or negligible to show conscious possession.
¶ 34. An inquiry into the facts could have also possibly revealed Black's lack of knowledge as to the thing possessed. For example, the firearm could have been contained in a package, and Black's "handling" could have constituted his unsolicited and temporary receipt of the package from Ferguson without his *151knowledge of the contents. Such facts would not amount to conscious possession. Cf. Kabat v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 224, 229, 251 N.W.2d 38 (1977) (burnt traces of marijuana in a pipe were not sufficient to impute knowledge that the substance contained ingredients of marijuana to sustain a conviction of possession of a controlled substance).
¶ 35. The allegations in the complaint also do not present circumstances that are sufficient to support an inference that Black exercised control over or intended to possess the firearm, i.e., to show constructive possession. See State v. Allbaugh, 148 Wis. 2d 807, 812, 436 N.W.2d 898 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Wis JI—Criminal 920, Comment (1987)). Mere proximity of Black to the firearm is insufficient to support a finding of possession of the firearm. Id. In this case, despite any proximity that Black had to the firearm, the allegations in the complaint do not provide any indication of Black's control over or intent to possess the firearm. In fact, the complaint states that Black claimed no ownership of the firearm. For these reasons, constructive possession was not shown.
¶ 36. I recognize that the circuit court's insufficient inquiry was in all likelihood the result of an overloaded calendar and an effort by a hard-working judge to complete the calendar. However, oversights can occur. This record cannot support the crime charged.
¶ 37. Collectively, these factors show a serious flaw in the fundamental integrity of the plea because the court failed to determine whether the defendant committed the crime charged. See State v. Thomas, 2000 WI 13, ¶ 16, 232 Wis. 2d 714, 605 N.W.2d 836. A manifest injustice resulted for the defendant. Withdrawal of Black's plea is necessary to correct the *152manifest injustice. See State v. Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 239, 244, 558 N.W.2d 375 (1997). As a result, the court of appeals' decision should be affirmed, and this case remanded with directions to the circuit court to withdraw Black's no contest plea.
¶ 38. Finally, I disagree with the majority opinion's assertion that a circuit court has less of a responsibility to establish a factual basis if the defendant pleads no contest. The majority does not cite any authority for this proposition, and this assertion is in direct contravention of the clear language of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1). This statute specifically states that "[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall. . .[m]ake such inquiry as satisfies it that the defendant in fact committed the crime charged." Wis. Stat. § 971.08(l)(b) (emphasis added). The fact that Black entered a no contest plea rather than a plea of guilty has no bearing on the court's responsibilities under § 971.08(1). See State v. Higgs, 230 Wis. 2d 1, 10-11, 601 N.W.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1999) (defendant challenged the factual basis for his no contest plea; the court applied the same standards that exist for a challenge to a guilty plea).
¶ 39. For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 40. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.