¶ 27. (dissenting). The majority opinion reduces the prosecutor to the proverbial "potted plant" at a sentencing hearing under this kind of plea agreement. For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 28. As the majority concedes, the law permits a prosecutor in this kind of setting to convey information to the sentencing court which is unfavorable to a defendant so long as the prosecutor abides by the plea agreement. See State v. Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d 291, 302, 606 N.W.2d 278 (Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 234 Wis. 2d 177, 612 N.W.2d 733 (Wis. Apr. 26, 2000) (No. 99-0120-CR). I contend that the prosecutor's sentencing statements represented a proper balance between her duty to honor the plea agreement and her duty to convey relevant information to the sentencing court. Therefore, I disagree with the majority's holding that *20the prosecutor's sentencing statements violated the terms of the plea agreement.
¶ 29. Hanson is informative to this case both on its law and on its facts. In Hanson, the plea agreement required the State to cap its sentencing recommendation at ten years. See id. at 293. In the course of her sentencing remarks, the prosecutor stated that the State was standing by the plea agreement. However, the prosecutor then added:
Having said that, this is an extremely violent case. This is an individual who constitutes a clear and present danger, not only to the two women who have been in intimate relationships with the Defendant, but also to the community at large. I urge the Court to consider all of the information that has been presented to the Court, in fashioning a sentence that is both fair to the Defendant and to the victim.
Id. at 296.
¶ 30. In assessing whether these statements constituted a breach of the plea agreement, we looked to the entire sentencing proceeding to get "the true flavor" of the prosecutor's remarks. We held that the prosecutor's "[h]aving said that" remark, followed by her negative impressions regarding the defendant, did not breach the plea agreement. See id. at 303. In conducting that exercise, we harmonized the concomitant duties of the prosecutor to abide by the plea agreement and to present relevant sentencing information to the court even if the information is unfavorable to the defendant. See id. at 301-02.
¶ 31. State v. Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d 317, 479 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991), is also informative. There, the State promised to argue for an imposed and stayed *21sentence. At the sentencing when arguing for a substantial sentence, the prosecutor spoke at some length about the severity of the offense, using terms such as "perverted," "worst of all crimes," "the sickest case that I have seen," and referred to the defendant as "sleaze." See id. at 319-20. Only after these highly charged comments did the prosecutor recite the State's request for an imposed and stayed sentence. The defendant argued that the prosecutor's inflammatory language violated the plea agreement. See id. at 321. The court of appeals disagreed:
The plea agreement in this case did not prohibit the state from informing the trial court of aggravating sentencing factors. Nor could it. At sentencing, pertinent factors relating to the defendant's character and behavioral pattern cannot "be immunized by a plea agreement between the defendant and the state." Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559, 562 (1980). A plea agreement which does not allow the sentencing court to be apprised of relevant information is void as against public policy. State v. McQuay, 154 Wis. 2d 116, 125-26, 452 N.W.2d 377, 381 (1990) (quoting Grant v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 243 N.W.2d 186, 190 (1976), writ of habeas corpus granted, 450 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 324.
¶ 32. Here, the very first words spoken by the prosecutor were an accurate and complete recital of the plea agreement followed by the State's sentencing recommendation which was in accord with the agreement:
Judge, I believe that when Mr. Williams entered his plea that we had told the Court that we would be recommending a presentence investigation. And that we would be recommending that sentence be *22withheld for a period of three years — I am sorry, that he be placed on probation for a period of three years, that he pay arrearages and pay current child support. And then as a condition of the probation he be incarcerated in the county jail for a period of 60 days.
¶ 33. Later, after the prosecutor had made her other sentencing comments about Williams, she concluded her remarks, stating:
[W]e are standing by our recommendation, and I have not changed that, and that's why I started off by saying we were recommending the three years probation. We had placed that on the record when the defendant entered his plea, and again today at sentencing.
¶ 34. This case is stronger on its facts than Hanson or Ferguson. Unlike Hanson, where the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation was immediately followed by the qualifying phrase, "[hjaving said that," here the prosecutor's subsequent statement was not introduced with any qualifying language suggesting sub silentio that the prosecutor was no longer adhering to the plea agreement. And unlike Ferguson, where the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation did not come until after the prosecutor had spoken about the depravity of the defendant's conduct, here the prosecutor set out the State's compliance with the plea agreement in explicit and unambiguous terms at the very outset of the proceeding and then reaffirmed it at the conclusion of her remarks.
¶ 35. This case is not governed by State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 389 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1986). There, new information about the defendant came to light after the plea and before sentencing. The prosecutor *23said her recommendation was made "before we knew of the other instances. But that is our agreement." Id. at 360. The court held that the "state's use of qualified or negative language in making the sentence recommendation" breached the agreement. Id. at 364. As I have noted, the prosecutor's recital of her sentencing recommendation in this case was not couched in qualifying terms. It is also important to note that Poole does not bar the State from using negative information that has come to light after the plea and before the sentencing. Rather, the impropriety lies in the prosecutor's recital of the sentencing recommendation accompanied by the simultaneous recital of qualifying or negative language by which the State distanced itself from its own agreement. See id.
¶ 36. Here, the prosecutor twice confirmed the plea agreement without accompanying qualifying language suggesting that the agreement did not mean what it said. And since the law allows a prosecutor to convey relevant negative information about a defendant under such a plea agreement, I conclude that the prosecutor's sentencing statement represented the "neutral recitation" required by the law. See id. at 362. The trial court also saw it that way in its postconviction ruling. I would uphold the court's ruling.
¶ 37. However, my misgivings about the majority opinion go deeper than my disagreement with the result. A sentencing constitutes a critical phase of a criminal proceeding. See State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403, 411, 588 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1998). A prosecutor is an officer of the court and holds a "quasi-judicial" office. See State v. Neuser, 191 Wis. 2d 131, 139, 528 N.W.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1995). Agreements by prosecutors not to reveal relevant information to the sentencing judge are against public policy and cannot be respected *24by the courts. See Grant v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 441, 448, 243 N.W.2d 186 (1976), writ of habeas corpus granted, 450 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Wis. 1978). At sentencing, pertinent factors relating to the defendant's character and behavioral pattern cannot be immunized by a plea agreement between the defendant and the State. See Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 278, 285, 286 N.W.2d 559 (1980).
¶ 38. The majority opinion runs afoul of these principles. Until today, plea agreements of this type did not violate public policy because they did not "silence" a prosecutor. But under the majority's interpretation, and particularly under its "close case goes to the defendant" rule, prosecutors are now schooled to remain silent if they have relevant sentencing information that is unfavorable to the defendant. Or, if they choose to speak, they risk violation of the "close case" rule. I see no need for the majority's adoption of the "close case" rule. The cases to date (whether close or not) have addressed each situation on its own facts and its own merits. That approach has served the law well, and I see no need to change it.
¶ 39. Also until today, prosecutors were entitled to offer their unfavorable personal opinions or impressions regarding a defendant under this kind of plea agreement. But now, in this nonsupport case, the majority makes the startling conclusion that it was somehow improper for the prosecutor to state that Williams, by his manipulative and irresponsible conduct, had intentionally failed to support his child or to establish any kind of relationship with her. I conclude that it was self-evidently proper for the prosecutor to speak to these failures on Williams's part and to label them "disheartening and saddening."
*25¶ 40. But the majority holds that these statements were improper because they implied a "personal recommendation" as to the proper sentence. Majority at ¶ 8. As with the majority's "close case" rule, the majority's bar against the prosecutor's opinion or impression of a defendant is inconsistent with current law. Surely, the prosecutor's statements in Hanson that the crime was "extremely violent" and that the defendant represented "a clear and present danger" were her impressions or opinions. See Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d at 296. The same must be said of the prosecutor's highly charged statements in Ferguson ("perverted," "sickest case" and calling the defendant "sleaze"). Ferguson, 166 Wis. 2d at 319-20. And even in Poole where the court held that the prosecutor's remarks violated the plea agreement, the court did not say that a prosecutor could not venture a negative opinion or impression regarding a defendant. See Poole, 131 Wis. 2d at 364.
¶ 41. This new prohibition fashioned by the majority will frustrate the flow of important and relevant information to a sentencing court about the defendant, the crime, the victim or other factors bearing on the sentence. That is not the current law, and it is not wise policy for future law.
¶ 42. I also disagree with the majority's condemnation of the prosecutor's remarks offered in support of the victim. Among other rights, article I, section 9m of the Wisconsin Constitution assures that a victim have "the opportunity to confer with the prosecution" and "the opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition." Who more likely to represent a victim at a sentencing hearing and to make a statement on the victim's behalf than the prosecutor? Moreover, a victim is not bound by a plea agreement and is entitled to seek *26a disposition different than that agreed to between the parties. Here the prosecutor clearly indicated in this phase of her remarks that she was speaking to the victim's position, not to the State's obligation under the plea agreement.
¶ 43. The majority also seems to say that because the victim was present and spoke for herself, the prosecutor was off limits in speaking for her. But I see nothing in the constitutional or statutory provisions covering victim rights which bars such procedure. Moreover, in many cases, the victim may be unable to deliver an articulate statement because of nervousness, fear or intimidation. Putting aside the victim's constitutional and statutory rights, commonsense dictates that the prosecutor should be allowed to speak for the victim under all circumstances.
¶ 44. Finally, the majority opinion deals a setback to the plea bargaining process. The majority opinion requires the prosecutor to either "clam up" at the sentencing hearing or risk violation of the "close case" rule if information unfavorable to a defendant is divulged. Faced with that Hobson's choice, prosecutors will understandably be reluctant to enter into these kinds of plea agreements in the first instance. This is unfortunate because all concerned — the prosecution, the courts, and, most importantly, defendants — will lose the benefits of this process.
¶ 45. I have no particular quarrel with calling this case a "close case." I believe we said as much in Hanson when we observed that a prosecutor walks a "fine line" under this kind of plea agreement when conveying unfavorable sentencing information about a defendant. See Hanson, 232 Wis. 2d at 302. But I do not agree that a "close case" should translate into an auto*27matic holding that such statements constitute a breach of the plea agreement.
¶ 46. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.