Moody v. State

Carley, Judge,

concurring specially.

In view of the language of our constitutional provision (Code Ann. § 2-109) as applied by this court in Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 496 (254 SE2d 739), I am constrained to concur in the judgment of the majority. However, while I am obligated to follow precedent, I am not required to endorse and embrace the prior interpretation and the resulting effect with the enthusiastic expression of approval and support which the majority enunciates in its opinion. My thorough review of the record and transcript causes me to have great sympathy with the trial court’s dilemma in this case *868and his attempt to resolve the same in a manner which would preserve and protect the constitutional rights of the defendant and which also would ensure order and proper decorum throughout a very serious trial. Although Jackson evidently proscribes the attainment of the objective of the trial court, the record indicates that the trial court was endeavoring to avoid courtroom chaos which might well have resulted in inadvertent violation of other rights of the defendant. I wholeheartedly agree with Justice Jordan in his special concurrence in the case of Burney v. State, 244 Ga. 33, 41 (1979), when he said: "I do not believe that the writers of the Constitution intended that this provision of the Constitution should be interpreted as the majority opinion holds.” I concur in judgment only.