State Ex Rel. Faircloth v. Catlett

Caplan, Justice

dissenting:

1 respectfully but firmly disagree with the majority wherein it, with complete disregard for the plain language of W.Va. Code, 1931, 62-lC-l(b), as amended, held that one convicted of armed robbery may be released on bond pending an appeal.

The above statute, in clear and unambiguous language, provides that bail may be available “pending ap*182peal from a conviction for an offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment.” (emphasis supplied)

“Punished” implies the infliction of some penalty on a wrongdoer while “punishable” connotes punishment to which he is liable or deserving under the law. Webster’s New World Dictionary.

This Court has held in several decisions that one is liable to or punishable by life imprisonment for armed robbery. (As noted by the majority, “Aiding and abetting armed robbery is punishable to the same extent as is commission of armed robbery.”) See State ex rel. Wright v. Boles, 150 W.Va. 381, 146 S.E. 2d 524 (1966); State ex rel. Vascovich v. Skeen, 138 W.Va. 417 (1953), 76 S.E. 2d 283, cert. denied 346 U.S. 916, 98 L.Ed. 411, 74 S.Ct. 277 (1953), State v. Newman, 108 W.Va. 642, 152 S.E. 195 (1930); Franklin and Ponto v. Brown, 73 W.Va. 727, 81 S.E. 405 (1914); Young v. Boles, 343 F. 2d 136 (CA4 1965); and Paige v. Coiner, 283 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. W.Va. 1968).

The above statute’s language being clear, there is no need for interpretation, only application. While I perhaps have joined in judicial legislation on occasion, I have not, to my knowledge, aided or abetted in legislating in a manner directly contrary to clear statutory language. Here, in my opinion, the majority has legislated and has substituted its own language — “punished” for “punishable” — contrary to clear and unambiguous language.

I am authorized to say that Chief Justice Neely concurs in the views expressed in this dissenting opinion and joins therein.