concurring specially.
There are two types of interpleader available in this state; that provided by CPA § 22 (Code Ann. § 81A-122), and that provided by Code Ann. § 37-1503. One is not entitled to proceed under the latter unless four requirements are met: “(1) The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all of the parties against whom the relief is demanded; (2) all their adverse titles or claims must be dependent, or be derived, from a common source; (3) the plaintiff must not have or claim any interest in the subject matter; (4) the plaintiff must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants, but must *178stand indifferent between them merely as a stakeholder.” Almand v. Reese, 209 Ga. 138, 142 (71 SE2d 223).
None of the above requirements were met by the City in this case and it should not have been allowed to proceed under Code Ann. § 37-1503.1 Of particular importance are the last two requirements. The City failed to meet requirement (3) above because it was not a disinterested stakeholder — it had its own claim to the fund. The City did not meet requirement (4) because under Code Ann. § 77-309 (e), the City was independently liable to the hospital.
Because the City had its own claim to the fund, it was obviously in its interest to restrict the number of claimants competing for the fund. Only the hospital, to whom the City was independently liable anyway, was personally served in this case. The difference between equitable interpleader and rule interpleader is that under the former, because of Code Ann. § 37-410, non-parties are bound by the judgment.
Appellant Johnson was in the hospital for several months following the shootout. He then returned home for a period of convalescence and apparently had not yet returned to work at the time the fund was distributed. It was following his return from the hospital and during his convalescence that appellant talked with the city attorney and discovered the pendency of the proceeding. He was not, however, told of the deadline for filing a claim. Shortly before the fund was distributed, appellant talked to an attorney about submitting a claim. However, before anything could be filed on his behalf, a final judgment was entered barring his claim.
The validity of Johnson’s claim is not an issue in this case. What was improper here was that although the City was aware of his claim (it said so in its pleadings), appellant was cut off without having a reasonable opportunity to present his claim on its merits.2
As I view the majority opinion, its holding is very limited. It will not preclude service by publication, nor defeat the purpose of Code Ann. § 37-410 which is to allow claims to money or property in the hands of the court to be “finally closed, rights fixed, and distribution of the assets made.” Cohen v. McCandless, 202 Ga. 231, 235 (42 SE2d 739) (1947). The facts of this case, however, require reversal.
Nor would a bill in the nature of interpleader have been proper. Such a bill may be used by one only when there is an independent basis for equitable jurisdiction. Campbell v. Trust Co. of Ga., 197 Ga. 37 (28 SE2d 471) (1943).
I note also that insofar as we can tell from the record, the bank in Mississippi who claimed to have been robbed by Squires was not informed of this proceeding.