(dissenting) :
*27The primary question in this case concerns whether or not the General Assembly may change the current legal and functioning form of government of Horry County in light of Article VIII of our State Constitution. I would adhere to our precedent by holding the Constitution prevents the General Assembly from repeatedly interjecting through special legislation its will into the operation of county government and I would therefore invalidate the Acts.
After interpreting the Acts as addressing only the situation of transition to initial county government, the majority validates the enactments by applying R308, Section 2 of the 1980 Acts to the current case. They hold that this provision of the Act is activated because the initial form of government was declared invalid by this Court in Van Fore v. Cooke, supra. Their premise is incorrect. Neither this Court, nor any other tribunal, has declared the initial form of government invalid.
Van Fore v. Cooke, supra, relied upon by the majority, involved a similar attempt by the -legislature to enact successive special legislation in an attempt to secure Justice Department sanction. We held the attempt invalid and directed reinstatement of the initial form of government. The only difference between the legislation in that case and the case presently before the Court is R 308, Section 2 of the Acts, which purports to allow the General Assembly to prescribe a form of government in the event the initial form is invalidated.
Despite the implication of the majority otherwise, it is clear that the initial form of government of Horry County has never been “declared to be illegal and not in compliance with the State or Federal law by a court of competent jurisdiction.” R. 308, Section 2. Therefore, even assuming this additional provision satisfies the constitutional defect present in Van Fore v. Cooke, supra, the conditions of this new provision have not been met. Hence, the provision is of no *28moment and cannot be held to remedy the fatal defect recognized in Van Fore v. Cooke, supra.
I further disagree with the opinion of the majority because it applies the Acts in an unconstitutional manner.
We held in Duncan, supra, that no constitutional infirmity was presented by an Act providing for a “one shot” special legislation to bring about an orderly transition to county government. However, we added that under our constitution such authority of the General Assembly was of a limited and temporary nature.
Horry County’s initial form of government has been in effect since 1976. I cannot agree that after four years, their government is still in a transition. The only possible conclusion is the legislature has exceeded the temporary nature of their authority. Under the reasoning and holding of the majority, invalidation of the initial form of government 100 years after its installation would involve a transitory stage and consequently allow the General Assembly to thereafter interject its will into the operation of the county’s government. They have allowed the “one shot” exception articulated in Duncan, supra, to consume the general rule mandated by the Constitution.
I respectfully dissent.