dissenting. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 215 Ga. 746 (1) (113 SE2d 611) it was held: “Where an award of compensation is made under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, whether by agreement of the parties approved by the board, or by an award of the board, the sole provision of law for further consideration of the case is a review by the board based upon a change in condition.” Thus it is well settled that the original award was binding on the employer in the present case.
It is also well settled that the employer is entitled to credit against the weekly compensation due for each week that wages were paid to the employee during the existence of such award. Compare Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Davis, 106 Ga. App. 369 (1) (126 SE2d 909) where it was held: “Although an employee who is receiving compensation payments under an agreement approved by the Board of Workmen’s Compensation, or under an award of the board, continues to be entitled to such payments after he returns to work until and unless a change in or discontinuance of payments is authorized by order *866of the board, or until the statutory amount has been paid in full, or a final settlement receipt has been filed with and approved by the board, when the employee returns to his job or to a different job with his employer, the employer is entitled to a credit for wages paid during the period of re-employment.”
In the present case the employee returned to work and was later absent from work. He was entitled to payments of workmen’s compensation under the original award whether the absence was due to other illness, or even if he merely decided to take a fishing trip, or work for another employer. See Guess v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 219 Ga. 581 (134 SE2d 783).
The original award was binding, the judgment was entered on this award, and credit was properly allowed for those weeks when wages were paid. The employer, if it contended the disability had ceased, should have had a new award entered stopping its liability on the original award.
The employee did nothing that could lull the employer into a belief that it was not bound to pay him under the original award and under the decision in Hicks v. Hicks, 226 Ga. 798, even if it could be said that the judgment was in the breast of the court under such circumstances, the trial court was without authority to set the judgment aside since as stated in the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-160 (e)) to set aside a judgment under the equitable powers of the court it must have been obtained by “fraud, accident or mistake or the act of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of the complainant.” (Emphasis supplied.) The sole reason that the award had been allowed to stand was the negligence of the employer in failing to ask for and receive a new award based upon change in the claimant’s condition when he returned to work.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hawes concurs in this dissent.