dissenting in part.
At the time the arrests were made and the indictments handed down in these appeals, the case law in this state had construed the applicable statute to authorize convictions for trafficking in cocaine based on the accused’s constructive possession of the contraband. See, e.g., Blaise v. State, 185 Ga. App. 653, 654 (365 SE2d 499) (1988); Clark v. State, 184 Ga. App. 380, 382 (1) (361 SE2d 682) (1987). That case law was overruled in Lockwood v. State, 257 Ga. 796, 798 (364 SE2d 574) (1988) which mandated a strict application of the statutory requirement of actual possession of the contraband to support a trafficking conviction. “ ‘A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is in actual possession of it.’ ” Id. at 797. It is to be noted that the legislature amended OCGA § 16-13-31 (a) to delete the requirement of “actual” possession effective 52 days after Lockwood was decided. That amendment, however, is not applicable to these appeals, see generally McIntosh v. State, 185 Ga. App. 612, 616 (365 SE2d 454) (1988), and I cannot agree with the majority that we can give lip service to Lockwood’s controlling authority by relabeling as “actual” possession evidence which clearly establishes only joint constructive possession.
Passmore and Cochran were the driver and cousin of the owner, respectively, of the blue Mercedes automobile in which approximately three pounds of 98 percent pure cocaine were found under the hood. The automobile had four occupants of whom Cochran was the closest to the glove compartment containing $2,200. It is uncontroverted that the cocaine was physically inaccessible to the occupants inside the Mercedes and, while there is evidence that a state patrol officer had difficulty opening the hood, contrary to the majority’s statement there is no evidence that the hood could not be raised and the contraband accessed by anyone with a modicum of mechanical ability. Other than Cochran’s proximity to money equally accessible to all four occupants of the vehicle, and the presumption of possession of contraband which arises from the control of the Mercedes, i.e., Passmore’s status as driver of the vehicle and Cochran’s status as the person to whom the owner of the vehicle had entrusted the car, there is no evidence of knowing direct physical control over the contraband to support the convictions of Cochran and Passmore.
In Farmer v. State, 152 Ga. App. 792 (264 SE2d 235) (1979), this court held that when there is any competent evidence that others *888have had equal access to the vehicle where contraband is found, it cannot be inferred as a matter of fact, giving rise to a presumption of law, that based solely upon ownership or operation of the vehicle that the accused was in actual or constructive possession of the contraband. Id. at 796. “[N]o presumption of possession arises where there is evidence of equal access by others. [Cit.] Without the presumption of possession and control, what is left is mere presence at the scene of a crime or, more to the point, mere presence near hidden contraband. As a matter of law, this is not enough to support a finding of criminal possession of the contraband beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. [Cits.]” In the Interest of C. A. A., 187 Ga. App. 691, 693-694 (371 SE2d 247) (1988).
Even though the State’s evidence showed, and appellants’ counsel on cross established, that all four occupants in the car did have equal access to the contraband, the majority holds that appellants’ failure to submit the same evidence as their case in chief means no “affirmative” defense of equal access was presented. I cannot agree that such a burden is placed on accuseds in this state. Further, the majority indulges in speculation by asserting that the owner of the Mercedes “would not have loaned his vehicle” knowing that he had three pounds of cocaine under the hood. And I cannot agree with thé majority that it is “speculation” that the hood to the vehicle was not accessible to all merely because one state patrol officer had difficulty opening it, when the State easily could have presented evidence of an interior latch or other mechanism accessible only to the occupants of the vehicle had such been the case.
Convictions cannot be based on what a jury could have “speculated” from the sparsity of evidence presented. Rather, the evidence must be such that a rational trier of fact can find evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime, including here the actual possession by knowing direct physical control over the contraband by appellants Cochran and Passmore. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Moore v. State, 255 Ga. 519, 520 (340 SE2d 888) (1986). The evidence here consisted of a presumption of possession rebutted by evidence of equal access and vague speculations which failed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accuseds under OCGA § 24-4-6. Since I would not place upon the citizens of this state the burden of looking under the hood of a vehicle before they agree to drive it or of searching all vehicle cavities before accepting the loan of a car from a relative, I can concur only in the reversal of Ballard’s conviction in Case No. 77508, and must respectfully dissent to the majority’s affirmance of the conviction of Passmore in Case No. 77507. Since the evidence was insufficient to support Cochran’s conviction in Case No. 77506, the absence of exception does not preclude this court from ad*889dressing this obvious error, see Almond v. State, 180 Ga. App. 475, 480 (349 SE2d 482) (1986); Taylor v. State, 186 Ga. App. 113, 114-115 (366 SE2d 422) (1988), and I must likewise dissent to the affirmance of the conviction in Case No. 77506.
Decided March 8, 1989 Rehearing denied March 23, 1989. Larry B. Mims, for appellant (case no. 77506). Lee W. Fitzpatrick, for appellant (case no. 77507). Buckley & Buckley, Richard R. Buckley, Jr., for appellant (case no. 77508). David E. Perry, District Attorney, Ronald M. Adams, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.