dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s determination that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court. While I disagree with the rationale the trial court employed to deny the motion, the motion was properly denied since it lacked merit. Following the rationale that “a judgment right for any reason will be affirmed” (Brissey v. Ellison, 272 Ga. 38, 40 (526 SE2d 851) (2000)), I would affirm the trial court’s denial of Glean’s motion.
1. Glean sought to have the trial court declare null and void the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him as a result of his conviction for malice murder. Glean’s conviction was affirmed by this Court in Glean v. State, 268 Ga. 260 (486 SE2d 172) (1997). The trial court’s action on a motion seeking to have a sentence declared null and void is directly appealable. See Williams v. State, 271 Ga. 686 (1) (523 SE2d 857) (1999) (“[T]he denial of a petition to correct a sentence on the ground that the original sentence was void is appealable as a matter of right.”).
“ ‘A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.’ [Cit.]” Jones v. State, 278 Ga. 669 (604 SE2d 483) (2004). A sentence of life imprisonment following a conviction for malice murder is punishment the law allows. Former OCGA § 16-5-1 (d) (“A person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life.”). Since the sentence *825imposed was allowable by law, that portion of appellant’s motion seeking to have the sentence declared null and void is without merit, and the trial court should have denied the motion instead of dismissing it.3
2. Glean asserts that the judgment of conviction against him and the sentence imposed as a result thereof are void because the trial court, the Superior Court of Ware County, did not have jurisdiction to impose a sentence inasmuch as Glean’s motion for change of venue from Ware County had been granted. See Glean v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at 263-264. The change of venue was obtained by empaneling Chatham County jurors who then heard the case in Ware County in a trial presided over by a superior court judge of Ware County, pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 19.2 (b). Id. See also Mobley v. State, 265 Ga. 292 (12) (455 SE2d 61) (1995); Hittson v. State, 264 Ga. 682 (15) (449 SE2d 586) (1994). Two years after Glean’s trial, the practice of effecting a change of venue by empaneling a jury from another county to hear the case in the county in which venue lay was ruled “unenforceable, absent consent of the parties, because it [was] inconsistent with OCGA § 17-7-150 (a) [(1992)].” Hardwick v. State, 264 Ga. 161 (2) (442 SE2d 236) (1994), superseded by legislative enactment, OCGA § 17-7-150 (a) (3) (1995).
Glean contends the Superior Court of Ware County “lost jurisdiction” of the case when it granted the change of venue. A criminal case is to be tried in the county where the crime was committed (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. VI), and venue to try the murder charges lodged against Glean was in Ware County since the victim’s body was found in that county and it could not be readily determined in what county the cause of death was inflicted. OCGA § 17-2-2 (c). Additionally, the superior court of a county has exclusive jurisdiction over trials of an adult charged with a felony, and murder is a felony. Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. TV, Par. I; OCGA § 16-1-3 (5) (“ ‘Felony’ means a crime punishable by death, by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for more than 12 months”); former OCGA § 16-5-1 (d) (“A person convicted of the offense of murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life”). Contrary to Glean’s contention, *826the court which heard his case had jurisdiction to do so. The decision to change the venue of the trial from Ware County was to obtain an impartial jury because the trial court had determined that an impartial jury could not be obtained from the venire in Ware County. See Hardwick v. State, supra, 264 Ga. at 163. That an impartial jury could not be obtained from the Ware County venire did not deprive the Superior Court of Ware County of jurisdiction to hear the trial of an adult accused of committing a felony in Ware County. It, in effect, deprived the venire of Ware County from sitting as jurors in the case. Inasmuch as a judge of the Superior Court of Ware County had jurisdiction to preside over the case and impose the mandatory sentence upon Glean’s conviction, the conviction and the sentence imposed are not void.
Decided October 5, 2009. Michael A. Glean, pro se. Richard E. Currie, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.In conclusion, Glean’s motion was without merit and the trial court’s denial of the motion is not error. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Glean also asserts the life sentence is void because he was denied counsel to pursue his motion for new trial and his direct appeal. However, such an alleged deprivation of counsel is not an allegation that can result in declaring a sentence void since it does not set forth how the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment is the imposition of punishment not allowed by law. Jones v. State, supra, 278 Ga. at 670. Inasmuch as Glean’s assertion is not one which could be the basis for a declaration that the sentence imposed was void, but is, instead, an assertion of erroneous procedure or unfair treatment, the trial court’s ruling is not subject to direct appeal but must be pursued by petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 671.