dissenting.
Only by completely isolating the statement at issue from its context can the majority conclude that Robinson made an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel. “The comments on which [Robinson] relies [must be] viewed in context . . . .” Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 698, 699 (2) (a) (523 SE2d 866) (1999). When so viewed, Robinson’s statement hardly constitutes an unambiguous request for the immediate provision of counsel, and instead can only be construed to contain either a request for an attorney in the future or “contradictory messages . . . .” State v. Blackburn, 766 NW2d 177, 184 (S.D. 2009).
At a minimum, our analysis must consider the entire question to which Robinson was responding: “Knowing these rights that I just advised you, do you wish to speak to me without an attorney present?” The initial portion of Robinson’s answer was “Uhm, yeah.” If he had stopped at this point, his message could not have been clearer to any reasonable officer that Robinson did wish to speak to him without an attorney present. However, Robinson *46continued, “I would like a lawyer.” Thus, his “statement expressed both a desire to have an attorney and a desire to continue without.” State v. Blackburn, supra. Robinson “indicated that he did not mind talking and that he would also like to see a lawyer.” Cheatham v. State, 719 P2d 612, 619 (Wyo. 1986) (where defendant, in answer to a question very similar to the one at issue here, stated, “Well I don’t care, I’d like to see a lawyer, too you know.”).
The two parts of Robinson’s answer may be reconciled by construing the latter portion as a request for a lawyer at some future point. That construction is far more reasonable than the majority’s complete disregard of the first portion of Robinson’s statement and interpretation of his answer as an unambiguous request for the immediate provision of an attorney. See Stanley v. State, 283 Ga. 36, 40 (2) (a) (656 SE2d 806) (2008); Moore v. State, 272 Ga. 359, 360 (2) (528 SE2d 793) (2000) (defendant’s “statement that he would like to talk to someone about who his attorney was going to be is not a clear request for counsel”); Johnson v. State, 289 Ga. App. 41, 43 (656 SE2d 200) (2007) (this Court “has previously held that statements that a suspect would like to talk to an attorney in the future were not clear and unambiguous requests for counsel. [Cits.]”).
If the two parts of Robinson’s answer cannot be reasonably reconciled in this way, then the answer must be considered internally contradictory. In either event, “there did not occur any unequivocal request for counsel.” Cheatham v. State, supra. See also Wyatt v. State, 272 Ga. 490, 491 (2) (532 SE2d 390) (2000) (statement was “ambiguous under the circumstances” where accused, “when asked if he wanted to speak, replied that T could make a statement, but I’ll just wait till I get a lawyer.’ ”); Johnson v. State, supra at 42-43; Smith v. State, 269 Ga. App. 133, 137 (2) (603 SE2d 445) (2004) (response was ambiguous where, after an officer asked the accused “if she were willing to talk with him, she said, ‘Well, I mean, I don’t have anything — yeah, why not. I mean I can have, can I have a lawyer?’ ”). Because Robinson’s “request for counsel was accompanied by affirmative announcements of his willingness to speak with the authorities, that officials took the opportunity provided to obtain a statement is quite consistent with the Fifth Amendment.” Moore v. State, 263 Ga. App. 548, 550-551 (2) (588 SE2d 327) (2003). Therefore, Robinson’s request for an attorney “is properly viewed as ambiguous, and the detective’s attempt at clarification was warranted. [Cit.]” Stanley v. State, supra. That attempt to clarify, as quoted in the second paragraph of the majority opinion, was entirely evenhanded and resulted in unequivocal statements by Robinson that he did in fact want to talk to the detective without a lawyer. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in determining that Robinson’s subsequent statements were admissible.
*47Decided October 5, 2009 Reconsideration denied November 2, 2009. H. Maddox Kilgore, Robert D. Leonard II, for appellant. Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Dana J. Norman, Maurice Brown, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.The implications of today’s decision are as serious as they are unreasonable. Under the majority opinion, whenever an accused simultaneously expresses a desire both to have a lawyer, without specifying when, and to continue a custodial interrogation without the presence of an attorney, Georgia courts must blindly ignore the expressed desire to continue without counsel and the equivocation which is inherent in that simultaneous expression. Because the majority’s holding is authorized by neither Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981) nor its progeny, I respectfully dissent to the reversal of the trial court’s order denying the motion to exclude evidence obtained from the custodial interrogation of Robinson.
I am authorized to state that Justice Nahmias joins in this dissent.