*219OPINION.
Blume, Justice.The facts in this case and the constitutional and statutory provisions applicable have been stated by the Chief Justice, and it is not necessary to do so again *220except insofar as deemed necessary for a fair understanding of this opinion. Natrona County High School District embraces School District No. 2 of said county and some territory in addition thereto, the addition having about 11 per cent of the assessed valuation of the high school district, the remainder — the territory of School District No. 2 — having about 89 per cent of the assessed valuation of the whole high school district. Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution limits the debt of school districts to 2 per cent, with an additional 4 per cent for buildings, a total of 6 per cent. The question to be resolved herein is, as stated by the Chief Justice, whether District No. 2 in the County of Natrona and the Natrona County High School District each have their own separate 6 per cent limitation of bonded indebtedness, or whether the maximum of 6 per cent as a debt limit applies to both of them so that the debts of both districts when entered together may not exceed that figure. The contention of respondents, upheld by the trial court, is for the correctness of the first of these positions, that of the appellant is to the contrary.
For the purpose of this case we may at times for convenience refer to School District No. 2 of Natrona County and like districts as the ordinary school district in contra-distinction to a high school district. It is at least a doubtful question whether Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution relating to the limitation of indebtedness in school districts permits each of the districts mentioned to have their own 6 per cent limitation, an affirmative answer apparently involving, as pointed out by counsel for appellant, the logical conclusion that if a high school district may be superimposed in whole or in part upon an ordinary school district with an independent debt limit of 6 per cent, so may a junior high school district, a kinder*221garten district, and in fact a district for every grade of school. See State ex rel. vs. Clausen, 66 Wash. 324, 119 P. 797, Ikard vs. Union Graded School Dist. No. 64 of Caddo Co. et al., 101 Okla. 80, 223 P. 141, Mistler vs. Eye, 107 Okla. 289, 231 P. 1045, 2 dissenting opinions in House vs. School District No. 4 of Park Co., 120 Mont. 319, 184 P. 2d 285. But it is not necessary to decide that point at the present time, since this case may be disposed of by considering our statutory provisions, and when that can be done, courts will not decide constitutional questions. 16 C. J. S. 207, etc. What we have said on the latter subject has been said solely for the purpose of aiding us in determining the probable meaning of the statutes hereafter considered. There must be statutory authority for the right of each of the districts to have a separate 6 per cent limitation hereinabove mentioned. Not only do we find no such statutory authority, but on the contrary it is, we think, specifically forbidden under our statutes, as will presently be shown. In order that the statutory provisions applicable may be more clearly understood, we must bear in mind that a school district as ordinarily understood includes a high school. It is said in 56 C. J. 168: “Properly speaking, the term ‘public’ or ‘common’ as applied to a school has no reference to the grade of the school or to what may or may not be taught therein, and includes graded and ungraded schools, elementary schools, grammar schools, and high schools. * * * The phrase ‘common school education’ has been said to be not easily defined nor to have any accepted definite meaning; but it has been held that education in subjects commonly taught in high schools is within the term as used in a constitutional provision for schools providing a common school education.” In Annotation 113 A. L. R. 702 it is stated: “It is generally held, or conceded, that high schools are common or public schools within constitu*222tional and statutory provisions.” Cases are cited from 16 different jurisdictions. We think that various sections of our Constitution, for example Sections 1, 6, and 9 of Article 7, support the general rule. In other words a high school is a component part of a school district.
The cases cited by the Chief Justice which deal with constitutional questions are not in point herein for the reason that the statutes applicable in those cases do not deal with the limitation of indebtedness contained in our own statutes. Thus in Montana, for instance, the statute provided that the high school districts could issue bonds “irrespective of the debt of the common school districts.” Nor do we think that the cases are in point herein which hold that a municipality and a school district are separate entities enabling each to have indebtedness up to the limitation provided by the Constitution. There is no doubt on that point. The question here is whether the legislature intended that a school district can, for the purpose of creation of debt, be considered, practically speaking, as consisting of component parts, so as to give the school district and each part thereof authority to have indebtedness up to the constitutional limitation, namely, up to 6 per cent of the assessed valuation. Stated otherwise the question is whether a school district has more than one debt capability, which is similar to the question as to whether or not a municipality has more than one debt capability. In the latter case the question would be readily answered in the negative. We might incidentally mention the fact that only a “school” district, not a “high school” district is as such, permitted under Section 5, Article 16 of the Constitution to incur a debt of 4 per cent of the assessed valuation for the purposes of construction of buildings (authorized by a constitutional amendment in 1920), *223and if a high school district does not come within the orbit of indebtedness of the constitutional “school district” but were considered an independent subdivision of the state for that purpose, it would, it seems, at most be enabled to incur an indebtedness not exceeding 2 per cent of its assessed valuation. However, as already stated, a school district as ordinarily understood includes a high school.
Section 67-916, Wyo. Comp. St. 1945 (both as it originally stood and as it was amended by Chapter 90, Session Laws 1947) which relates to a high school district provides as follows: “and provided further, that no bonds shall be issued by such district beyond the united bonding capability of the territory embraced within such district, taking into consideration existing obligations thereof at the time of the creation of such high school districts.” What does bonding capability of the territory mean? There is no definition of that term in the statute and there can scarcely be any doubt that it refers to the 6 per cent limitation of indebtedness mentioned in Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution. That constitutional provision insofar as pertinent here refers to school districts, not to any subdivision or component part thereof or adjunct thereto. And in the absence of a contrary showing — and there is none — it must be understood as heretofore shown, as including high schools. Hence, the legislature must be presumed to have had in mind, we think, that none of the territory embraced in a high school district could be bonded for more than a total of 6 per cent of the assessed valuation. That conclusion is strengthened by the provision that obligations should be considered which existed at the time of the creation of the high school district. That existing obligation could refer only to the obligation existing in what- we have heretofore denominated as the *224ordinary school district, and the indebtedness of that district and the indebtedness of the high school district are here linked together. If the high school district had an independent bonding capability of 6 per cent as contended by respondents herein, it is rather strange and was wholly futile and meaningless for the statute to refer to, and link the indebtedness of the high school district to an indebtedness of, any other district. It is true as pointed out by the Chief Justice that Section 67-916, supra, is no longer a part of the statutes of this state, in view of the fact that the amendment of 1947 provided that it should cease to be in force after June 1, 1949. Nevertheless, we think it clear that the statutory provision here discussed may still be taken into consideration in determining the meaning of the following section of the statute which we shall proceed to consider. 50 Am. Jur. “Statutes”, Sec. 353.
Section 67-917, Wyo. Comp. St. 1945, is the main section which provides for issuing bonds of a high school district, after having been authorized by a vote of the people. That section contains this provision: “and provided, any such issue of bonds shall not increase the school indebtedness of the territory of said district beyond the maximum limit fixed by the State Constitution.” That provision seems plain enough, but we may possibly make it still plainer. School indebtedness means nothing more than an indebtedness for schools. The maximum constitutional limitation as contained in Section 5, Article 16 of our Constitution is 6 per cent of the assessed valuation of the property in the district. Substituting these terms we have the statute reading substantially as follows: “Provided any such issue of bonds shall not increase the indebtedness for schools in the territory of said district beyond 6 per cent of the assessed valuation.” The *225term “increase” itself is important, for it refers to the then existing indebtedness in the territory covered by the high school district, whether that indebtedness was created by the high school district or by the ordinary school district, for it might well happen that only the latter would have an indebtedness. We are unable to see that the provision means anything else than that the property assessed for taxation in any territory within a school or a high school district in this state cannot be bonded for school purposes, including high school purposes, in excess of 6 per cent of the assessed valuation of the property therein.
That this construction of the statute is the only reasonable construction may be seen by considering another fact. The school districts embracing Cheyenne and Sheridan respectively, for example are not located in any high school district. They themselves teach the grades usually taught in high schools. They are limited in their indebtedness to 6 per cent of the assessed valuation. The same situation exists, and existed when the high school district law was passed in 1905 in most of the larger communities in the state. It is scarcely likely that in view of this fact the legislature intended, when it passed the high school district law, that a community by the simple expedient of causing a high school district to be organized should at once be able to double or nearly double the bonding capability of the territory, and in this respect obtain a radically differential status over the other large communities in the state. We think that the fundamental intention of the legislature in passing the high school district law was to lighten the burden of taxation of a school district by permitting various districts to join, and thus share, not add to, the burden which would otherwise exist. If the legislature had intended anything else than here indicated, it could easily have *226provided that a bonded indebtedness of a high school district should not exceed 6 per cent of the assessed valuation of the district, or could have enacted a statute similar to that in Montana, but it did not do so. It follows, of course, that the governing authorities of a high school district which covers or overlaps an ordinary school district, and the governing authorities of the latter must cooperate in connection with the bonded indebtedness of the territory for school purposes so that the allowable ilmitation of 6 per cent of the assessed valuation in the aggregate may not be exceeded.
The foregoing construction seems to leave the situation in this case about as follows: The assessed valuation of the high school district is, as shown by the record, the sum of $49,953,604. The assessed valuation of the territory embraced in School District No. 2 is $44,423,049 which is a little less than 89 per cent of the former, leaving a little more than 11 per cent for the territory of the high school district which lies outside of the territory embraced in School District No. 2. The indebtedness heretofore incurred by the high school district should be apportioned accordingly. That district has already incurred an indebtedness of $1,000,000 by issuing bonds in that amount. Apportioning that as above mentioned makes a bonded indebtedness for school purposes upon the territory embraced in School District No. 2 of approximately $890,000. School District No. 2 has incurred an indebtedness of $1,000,000 by issuing bonds in that amount, making the total indebtedness for school purposes resting upon the territory embraced in School District No. 2, the sum of approximately $1,890,000. The capability of incurring indebtedness for school purposes of the territory of that district — 6% of $44,423,049 — is $2,665,382 leaving approximately *227$775,382 which may be still incurred as an indebtedness for school purposes by either of the districts or by both in combination, assuming that the situation still is as shown by the record. The exact amount can be determined by the trial court.
It has been suggested in the brief of counsel for respondents that the construction here placed upon our statutory provisions would be violative of Section 34, Article 1 of our Constitution which provides that all laws of a general nature shall be uniform in operation. The limitation mentioned in this statute applies to all high school districts alike and it is difficult to see how uniformity could be bettter attained than by such a provision.
The judgment of the District Court is accordingly reversed with direction to enter a judgment in conformity with this opinion, and for any additional order that may be deemed proper.
Kimball, J., concurs. Riner, C. J., dissents.