concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in parts L, II., and IV. of the majority opinion.
I respectfully dissent from part'III., which holds Abbott made no showing Daisy’s actions impacted upon the public interest. This holding is contrary to the plain language of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, the case law of South Carolina, and the facts of this case.
The UTPA provides, in pertinent part:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20(a) (1985). “Trade” and “commerce” are defined terms under the UTPA:
“Trade” and “commerce” shall include the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal and mixed, and any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever situate, and shall include anv trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.
Id. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (underscored emphasis added).
The UTPA is not available to redress disputes between two *22private parties unless the public interest is affected. Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan, 298 S.C. 210, 379 S.E. (2d) 289 (1989); LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia Inc., 296 S.C. 66, 370 S.E. (2d) 711 (1988); Noack Enterprises, Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E. (2d) 347 (Ct. App. 1986).
I first observe that many of the leading South Carolina UTPA cases do not address the issue of impact on the public interest. See Fields v. Yarborough Ford, Inc., 307 S.C. 207, 414 S.E. (2d) 164 (1992); Ward v. Dick Dyer & Associates, Inc., 304 S.C. 152, 403 S.E. (2d) 310 (1991); Inman v. Ken Hyatt Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 294 S.C. 240, 363 S.E. (2d) 691 (1988); Baker v. Chavis, 306 S.C. 203, 410 S.E. (2d) 600 (Ct. App. 1991); Potomac Leasing Co. v. Bone, 294 S.C. 494, 366 S.E. (2d) 26 (Ct. App. 1988); Bocook Outdoor Media, Inc. v. Summey Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 294 S.C. 169, 363 S.E. (2d) 390 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled by O’Neal v. Bowles, — S.C. —, 431 S.E. (2d) 555 (1993); Payne v. Holiday Towers, Inc., 283 S.C. 210, 321 S.E. (2d) 179 (Ct. App. 1984).
In a number of cases, however, our Courts have found an impact upon the public interest. In Haley Nursery Co. v. Forrest, 298 S.C. 520, 381 S.E. (2d) 906 (1989), a commercial nursery’s customer invoices contained a printed misrepresentation. The Supreme Court held the nursery’s “breach of warranty impacts on the public interest because of the potential for publication of these misrepresentations to other [commercial] consumers.” Id. See also Goiser v. Harper, 307 S.C. 64, 413 S.E. (2d) 845 (Ct. App. 1991) (investors brought action against promoter of tax shelter scheme); Young v. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 302 S.C. 320, 396 S.E. (2d) 105 (Ct. App. 1989), modified, 309 S.C. 263, 422 S.E. (2d) 103 (1992) (dealer practice of notifying insurance company only (not owner of car) of increased repair charges where insurance company is liable); Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E. (2d) 156 (Ct. App. 1987) (padding of auto bills).
The cases discussed above are clearly distinguishable from the following cases, in which our Courts found no impact upon the public interest because the controversies arose out of mere breaches of contracts between the parties. See Ardis v. Cox, — S.C. —, 431 S.E. (2d) 267 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. denied (1994); Columbia East Associates v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 299 S.C. 515, *23386 S.E. (2d) 259 (Ct. App. 1989); South Carolina National Bank v. Silks, 295 S.C. 107, 367 S.E. (2d) 421 (Ct. App. 1988); Noack Enterprises v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E. (2d) 347 (Ct. App. 1986); Key Co. v. Fameco Distributors, Inc., 292 S.C. 524, 357 S.E. (2d) 476 (Ct. App. 1987).
Only two reported South Carolina UTPA cases have, for reasons other than mere breach of contract, found no impact on the public interest. In Florence Paper Co. v. Orphan, 298 S.C. 210, 379 S.E. (2d) 289 (1989), Justice Toal explained both the limited breadth and rationale for the court’s holding:
Although we believe that it is possible for the adverse impact on public interest to be based on a private injury, we conclude that the evidence in this case does not support a private right of action.... While we do not reject this idea [that unfair methods of competition inherently involve acts which impact public interest], we conclude that such an impact could not be inherent in this situation where only two direct competitors are involved.
Id. (emphasis added). In LaMotte v. Punch Line of Columbia, Inc., 296 S.C. 66, 370 S.E. (2d) 711 (1988), the Supreme Court, relying on Noack, affirmed a finding of no public interest impact where the misconduct complained of involved an alleged conspiracy by merchants to prevent a new, competing business from opening. See also Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Columbia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 974 F. (2d) 502 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding public interest impact requirement not met in antitrust action).
The majority agrees with the trial judge’s findings that the misconduct (1) occurred in a business setting; (2) has the potential for repetition; and (3) impacted Abbott (to the extent that Daisy interfered with contracts with two of its customers). The majority, however, would require another element of proof, not found in any of our prior cases: that “adverseness” must be proven to some requisite degree. The majority also appears to hold that commercial consumers are excluded under the UTPA.
In determining whether the public interest has been affected, the fact finder may consider the number of other consumers who were or are likely to be affected and the potential *24for the misconduct’s repetition.
Clearly both of these were present here. As noted by the majority, the trial judge believed Abbott’s evidence that Daisy’s conduct had the potential for repetition. Daisy had already engaged in the practice twice in the present case. Moreover, because it owned over 200 other billboard properties in South Carolina, Daisy’s practice was readily capable of repetition. As the trial judge found, the practice was readily capable of repetition with other advertising companies operating in the same area.
In Haley Nursery Co. v. Forrest, 298 S.C. 520, 381 S.E. (2d) 906 (1989), our Supreme Court held a dispute between a commercial nursery and a grower affected the public interest. The commercial nursery’s invoices to the grower and its other customers contained a printed misrepresentation. The Court held the commercial nursery’s “breach of warranty impacts on the public interest because of the potential for publication of these misrepresentations to other consumers.” Id. In Barnes v. Jones Chevrolet Co., 292 S.C. 607, 358 S.E. (2d) 156 (Ct. App. 1987), we held that padding auto repair bills is an unfair trade practice that affects the public interest because of its potential for repetition. The requirement demonstrated by these two cases has been exceeded in the case now before us.
Although the majority affirms the trial judge’s damage award based on Daisy’s intentional interference with Abbott’s contracts, it finds the same facts fall short of demonstrating an impact upon the public interest. The majority appears to require that one of the parties to the dispute be a noncommercial consumer, a notion that finds support nowhere in the UTPA or in our cases.
The trial judge found Daisy’s conduct affected the public interest because it occurred “in a business setting,” or “in the course of business.” In other words, the misconduct was done as a matter of course, which is exactly the type of misconduct all consumer protection legislation targets. The UTPA defines trade or commerce, and uses the mandatory “shall” to include “any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10(b) (1985) (emphasis added).
The record clearly shows the dispute between the parties affected the public interest both directly and indirectly. One of *25Abbott’s customers, who was paying $550.00 per month in lease payments, cancelled its contract with Abbott because Daisy blocked the billboard. Daisy forced another of Abbott’s customers to move to a different property also owned by Abbott, making the second location unavailable for Abbott to lease to someone else. These customers fit the UTPA definition of persons: “ ‘Person’ shall include natural persons, corporations, trusts, partnerships, incorporated or unincorporated associations and any other legal entity.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10(a) (1985).
Outdoor billboards are by definition a medium of communication to the public. By their very nature billboards indirectly affect the public interest because the public is the intended target of the billboard’s message. Buyers are willing to buy and sellers are willing to sell billboard space to communicate. Here, Daisy denied the public access to messages Abbott’s customers paid to send.
The dispute between Daisy and Abbott affected the public interest. Therefore, the UTPA is available as a remedy. I would affirm the trial judge.