dissenting.
Although I concur in the majority’s holding that Payne’s right to possess the wallet was superior to Beard’s, I would nevertheless hold the evidence insufficient to support a finding that the violence was concomitant with the taking.
As the majority states, robbery is a common law crime. To prove robbery, the Commonwealth must show a taking and asportation of the property of another, with the intent to steal, from the person or the person’s presence, against the person’s will, and by violence or intimidation which precedes or is concomitant with the taking. See, e.g., Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 255-56, 105 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1958) (holding that taking and asportation *367were complete prior to the violence); Jones v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 566, 572, 414 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1992) (holding that taking was accomplished by means of violence and intimidation). The position taken by the majority expands this common law definition of robbery.
I dissent because I believe the asportation was complete by the time Payne entered the office. As the majority recognizes, proof of asportation requires a “[sjeverance of the goods from the owner and absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an instant.” Mason, 200 Va. at 256, 105 S.E.2d at 151 (emphasis added). Any violence occurring after the taking and asportation are complete is insufficient to support a robbery conviction. “No violence, no excitation of fear, resorted to merely for the purpose of retaining a possession already acquired, or to effect escape, will, in point of time, supply the element of force or intimidation, an essential ingredient of the offense.” Id.
Following these principles, and even accepting as accurate the majority’s interpretations of Mason, Durham, and Pritchard, I nevertheless conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s conviction because it fails to show violence preceding or concomitant with the taking. Appellant gained actual possession of the wallet and the money inside it before Payne discovered him and attempted to block his escape.2 Thus, any force or violence occurred after the taking was complete “for the purpose of retaining possession already acquired,” and “to effect escape.” See Mason, 200 Va. at 256, 105 S.E.2d at 151.
Although the majority correctly interprets Mason, it fails to apply Mason's principles to the instant case. Just as in Mason, where the asportation had been completed when the television set was given to another outside the store, the asportation in the instant case was complete when appellant removed the wallet from Jackson’s purse. “Severance of the goods from the owner and absolute control of the property by the taker, even for an instant, constitutes an asportation.” Mason, 220 Va. at 256, 105 S.E.2d at *368151 (emphasis added). Although I agree with the majority’s reluctance to adopt a bright-line test for determining when an asportation is complete, I believe these facts clearly establish an absolute severance of the property from Payne’s possession by the time she entered the office. Any violence used by Beard at that point was used to effectuate an escape, as opposed to removing the wallet from Payne’s dominion and control.
I also believe this case can be distinguished from Durham v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 166, 198 S.E.2d 603 (1973); therefore, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s application of that case to the facts of this case. In Durham, the Supreme Court found that the only motive for the homeowner’s killing was to prevent interference with the taking of the homeowner’s property or subsequent identification of the thieves. Thus, the homicide was not committed for the purpose of retaining possession of property already acquired or to effect an escape, as was the situation in Mason and the instant case.
This case also differs from Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 429 S.E.2d 468 (1993), in which we upheld the defendant’s robbery conviction. In Broady, defendant seized the victim’s purse from her motel room,3 and she chased him as he attempted to flee with it. When appellant dropped the purse in the driveway of the motel, both he and the victim tried to pick it up. Defendant then pushed the victim back several feet, enabling him to recover the purse. This Court held that “when the purse fell in the driveway of the motel, [the victim] had constructive possession of [it].” Id. at 288-89, 429 S.E.2d at 473. As a result, “the taking was not complete until appellant applied force to [the victim] in the parking lot while [the victim] had constructive possession of the purse. That struggle was sufficient to satisfy the element of violence.” Id. at 289, 429 S.E.2d at 473.
Implicit in Broady is that, as it relates to robbery, the victim did not have constructive possession of the purse while the defendant was in actual possession of it. In the instant case, appellant *369never dropped the wallet, nor did appellant lose actual possession of it. Thus, Broady can be distinguished because at no point was Payne able to regain constructive possession of the stolen property as defined by Broady.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Despite the Commonwealth’s contrary contention, it is irrelevant that appellant had not yet removed the money from the wallet, for he had both in his possession. It would be anomalous to hold that the taking would have been complete if appellant had fled with the wallet and its contents but was incomplete because appellant subsequently removed the money and discarded the wallet.
The Court noted that because the evidence in Broady did not show precisely how the defendant initially obtained the purse from the victim or whether any force was used to accomplish the taking, it could “infer nothing from the evidence concerning whether the initial [taking] of the purse from [the victim] in the motel room was by force so as to support a robbery conviction.” Broady, 16 Va. App. at 288, 429 S.E.2d at 473.