concurring. “The practice of fitting glasses to the human eye, and treating ocular inflammation, without the use of drugs or surgery, is subject to supervision and regulation under the state police power.” McNaughton v. *207Johnson, 242 U.S. 344 (37 SC 178, 61 LE 362). It is the general rule that in the absence of express statutory authority a corporation or individual not licensed to practice optometry can not practice optometry through a licensed employee. 102 ALR 343; 13 Am. Jur. 838, Corporations, § 837; 19 CJS 401, Corporations, § 956.
Exceptions to the general rule exist where the statute treats optometry merely as a mechanical art. Dvorine v. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661 (185 A 562). In the Dvorine case the Maryland court stated that the practice of optometry “is essentially a mechanical art,” and this language is quoted in the decision of this court in Georgia State Board of Examiners in Optometry v. Friedman’s Jewelers, Inc., 183 Ga. 669, 674 (189 SE 238). The statute of Maryland (Ann. Code of Maryland of 1924, art. 43, § 318) at the time of the Dvorine decision provided in part for an examination in “the use of all instruments used in making examination of the eye, and such other subjects as said board may deem advisable.” I do not understand this court in Friedman’s case to hold that (under § 84-1105 of the Code of 1933 pertaining to examinations of optometrists, effective at the time of the decision) the practice of optometry was a “mechanical art.” The court quoted the statute defining optometry (Code of 1933, § 84-1101) as follows: “‘Optometry’ or the practice thereof is the employment of any means, other than the use of drugs, for the measurement of the powers of vision and the adaptation of lenses for the aid of same.” The court then stated: “we conclude that the practice of optometry is not, outside of statutory enactments, recognized as comparable to the ‘learned professions,’ and that the employment of a qualified optometrist by a corporation is not against public policy.” Since the court did not in Friedman’s case review the standards required of optometrists on examination as then existing (Code of 1933, § 84-1105), it appears that the court’s decision and judgment (in part at least) may have rested on the Dvorine case by the Maryland court. The Maryland decision was based on requirements of their statutes substantially different from the Georgia law. However the decision in Friedman’s case, decided in 1936, was arrived at, it was binding au*208thority for the proposition that optometry under the Georgia law and the standards of Code § 84-1105 (and until the Act of 1953, Ga. L. 1953, pp. 114-117) was not a learned profession.
Under our system of government it is axiomatic that the judicial branch alone has the power to construe and interpret the Constitution and laws of this State. Calhoun v. McLendon, 42 Ga. 405; Northside Manor, Inc. v. Vann, 219 Ga. 298 (133 SE2d 32). A declaration by the General Assembly purporting to state the scope of statutory enactments is valid only in so far as the statutes support the declaration made.
Under the amendatory Act of 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, pp. 114-117) the standards of training and knowledge required of an applicant for examination to be licensed as an optometrist were substantially extended as to time of study and the number of subjects to be studied. After providing that a person must be 21 years of age, of good moral character, and possessed of a high school education of not less than 16 Carnegie units, or the equivalent, the statute then provides that the applicant shall have “completed not less than two years of pre-optometry college work in a college of arts and sciences approved by the board, or the equivalent thereof to be determined by the board, and hold a certificate of graduation from an accredited college or university teaching optometry acceptable to the board requiring a course of study therein of at least three school years. The said board shall examine all applicants shown to have the necessary qualifications, as above set forth, in the following-subjects : anatomy—gross, microscopic, neural, cranial and ocular; physiology—general, human and physiological optics; psychology—general, applied, abnormal and visual; pathology— general, cranial and ocular; chemistry—general and organic; mathematics—physical and geometrical optics; mechanical optics; pharmacology; bacteriology; optometry —■ theoretical, practical and clinical; and any other subject or subjects which may be germane to the practice of optometry, including normal and abnormal refractive, accommodative and muscular conditions of the eye as applied by recognized methods of subjective and objective optometry when determining the need for visual correction, visual training and any other physical or physio*209logical means of restoring the visual process to normal. When the applicant shall attain an average standing of 75 per cent, on all subjects submitted he shall be deemed to have passed satisfactorily, and shall be given a certificate of registration, . . Knowledge of the subjects required by the 1953 amendment (Code Ann. § 84-1105) sufficient to make a passing grade of 75 percent demonstrates conclusively that an optometrist practicing his profession in Georgia under a license issued by this State is engaged in practicing a learned profession. The declaration by the General Assembly in the amendatory Act of 1956 (Ga. L. 1956, pp. 94-95; Code Ann. Supp. § 84-1101) that optometry is a “learned profession” is supported factually by the amendatory Act of 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, pp. 114-117; Code Ann. § 84-1105).
The decision of this court in Pearle Optical of Monroeville, Inc. v. State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 219 Ga. 364 (133 SE2d 374), pursuant to the amendatory Acts of 1953 (Ga. L. 1953, pp. 114-117) and 1956 (Ga. L. 1956, pp. 94-95) established the rule that (under the amendatory Acts) the practice of optometry in this State is now the practice of a “learned profession.”
The defendant Gold’s employment was in violation of valid rules of the State Board of Examiners in Optometry, and the trial judge properly enjoined such employment.
I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Mobley, Mr. Justice Quillian and Mr. Justice Grice join in this concurring opinion.