dissenting.
I join in Presiding Judge McMurray’s dissent. I write separately to emphasize the Supreme Court’s explicit holding in Maloney, if a claimant suffers physical limitations from a prior compensable injury and diligently but unsuccessfully seeks suitable employment, it may be inferred that the continuing disability proximately caused the inability to obtain suitable employment. Maloney v. Gordon County Farms, 265 Ga. 825, 828 (462 SE2d 606) (1995). There is no further burden on the claimant to show why he was not hired by prospective employers. Id.
Thus, the expert testimony based totally on hearsay was not crucial to a finding of proximate cause in this case. Because the ALJ clearly relied on this inadmissible testimony in finding proximate cause, the Board was not wrong in rejecting his finding; but because there is other evidence from which proximate cause could be inferred under Maloney, the case should be remanded as Presiding Judge McMurray suggests.
The majority points out that under Maloney, the claimant’s diligent but unsuccessful search is sufficient to support a finding of proximate cause, but does not mandate such a determination. Clearly this is correct, and the factfinder’s decision on whether or not to infer proximate cause from the claimant’s showing should be respected. It is equally clear, however, that in this case the factfinder/ALJ never made a decision on this question, since at the time the ALJ issued his order (and at the time the appellate division concluded there was no other evidence supporting the ALJ’s award), Aden’s Minit Market v. Landon, 202 Ga. App. 219 (413 SE2d 738) (1991) had not been overruled and the claimant’s diligent but unsuccessful search was insufficient to support a finding of proximate cause as a matter of law.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Blackburn join in this dissent.
*635Decided November 20, 1996 Mundy & Gammage, Kelly B. Gammage, for appellant. Saveli & Williams, Carrie L. Christie, Mark S. Gannon, for appellees.